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Richard Paul ANDERSON 
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This thesis examines through the means of a comparative 
perspective, factors which have allowed the British National Party to 
enjoy recent electoral success at the local level under the leadership 
of party chairman Nick Griffin.  Such electoral successes have arisen 
despite the seemingly relative obscurity of the party at the turn of the 
century.   A number of different aspects are examined in order to 
achieve this aim.  The history of the far right in the UK is examined to 
establish whether the BNP have changed their stance in comparison 
to previous far right movements.  The BNP are also investigated 
comparatively with other West European parties who have enjoyed 
national success, as a means of discovering whether the party are 
similar to their far right neighbours and why they have not enjoyed 
similar national success.  The press coverage of the BNP is examined 
at a local and national level, using content analysis and the LexisNexis 
database.  The thesis looks at the role played by the BNP in local 
elections and the decline of participation in political activity, to 
establish if there is a link between these two factors.  Finally a case 
study is taken of Calderdale in West Yorkshire, to establish directly if 
any of the above factors can be directly applied to BNP electoral 
success in this district.  The research discovers that there are 
opportunities for the BNP to establish a connection with the electorate 
in local politics which are not necessarily available at times of general 
election. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1:1 Introduction 
The emergence of the British National Party (BNP) onto the political 
scene has seemingly been one of the most intriguing and emotive 
events in British politics of the past decade.  From a position of relative 
obscurity compared to established mainstream parties at the turn of 
the twenty-first century, the party are now being seen as a growing 
political force, particularly following success at the local elections.  
Indeed the phenomenon of far right success has occurred throughout 
Western Europe, notably in landmark successes for the Front National 
(FN) in France and the Freiheits Partei Osterreich (FPO) in Austria, 
whilst far right success has also been prevalent in countries such as 
Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands.  Subsequently, in the recent years, 
far right parties were arguably enjoying their most successful period in 
politics.   
 
In contrast, Britain has always been regarded as somewhat the 
exception to the rule with regard to national electoral success for far 
right parties, in comparison with Western Europe.  Indeed, previously, 
the far right have only enjoyed what can be classed as sporadic local 
successes in Britain, with no strong movement being established to 
mount a challenge at the polls in a general election (Hainsworth, 2000; 
Ignazi 2003; Carter, 2005). 
 
 10 
However, since the appointment of Griffin as party chairman, the 
profile of the BNP has begun to rise, whereby following initial success 
in the Lancashire area in 2002, the party have moved on to become a 
strong force across England at local elections.  Consequently, the 
party are seemingly provoking great debate amongst the mainstream 
parties, media and academics alike over their potential impact and 
subsequently the best methods in which to deal with their growing 
presence (Renton, 2000; Copsey, 2004; Fieschi, 2004; Sykes, 2005). 
 
Indeed, there is no doubting that the subject of the far right is an 
emotive issue amongst the British electorate, however, given the 
relatively recent emergence of the BNP, relatively little academic 
literature investigates their effect with regard to the local level of British 
politics.  Thus, whilst conclusions have been made with regard to the 
failure of the British far right in comparison with Western European 
countries, this thesis examines why the BNP have risen from their 
relative obscurity on the British political map. 
 
Therefore, the primary aim of this thesis is to examine the effect that 
the BNP have made under the leadership of Nick Griffin in a 
comparative perspective.  By doing this, the research intends to 
understand which factors are influencing the ability of the BNP to 
enjoy electoral success in the UK local elections.   The research aims 
to determine whether the BNP’s effect is the result of a change in the 
party itself, or as a consequence of the leadership of Griffin.  The 
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thesis aims to analyse the change in ideology of the BNP, from 
previous far right movements in Britain.  Moreover, the thesis aims to 
establish that if there has been a change in ideology of the BNP, 
whether this change has brought it into line with the other far right 
European parties who have been successful at both national and local 
levels.  In addition to examining the image of the BNP, the thesis will 
analyse the campaigning tactics now used at local elections by the 
party, in order to see if there has been a change in campaign tactic 
under Griffin’s leadership in local wards, in terms of the methods used 
by the party and the voters that the party aim to attract. 
 
Furthermore, to examine the effect of the BNP, it is necessary to 
analyse other factors which may have affected the impact that the 
party have made at the local level.  One such factor to be investigated 
in order to meet this aim is the role played by the mainstream parties 
at both a national and local level and, whether their actions have 
consequences for the far right to attract new support.   
 
Additionally, this research will attempt to answer questions relating to 
campaigning at the local level in terms of the level of importance that 
parties place on campaigning at local elections, understanding how 
they organise their electoral campaigns.  This will include an 
examination as whether the local party committees are still strong, or 
whether they merely follow a structure set in place by the national 
party.  Such research into the effect of the BNP at the local level will 
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also aim to examine the local state of democracy, in order to 
determine whether there is a difference between elections at the 
national and local level in terms of voter turnout and voters attitudes to 
local politics, and whether the BNP are benefiting from any difference. 
 
The role of the local press is also examined to establish whether the 
press coverage by local newspapers could also have an influence on 
party performance at the local elections.  This could be particularly 
relevant if research on local parties shows that there has been a 
decline in active campaigning.   Furthermore, the BNP have appeared 
to enjoy an increase in their media profile; consequently, the thesis will 
investigate the press coverage of the BNP.  The study of press 
coverage will aim to examine the debate that the giving the BNP the 
oxygen of publicity will only be beneficial for the party, which in turn 
allows for them to make an impact at the local level (Fieschi, 2004). 
 
Therefore, in order to meet these aims, the thesis focuses on a 
number of areas relevant in allowing the questions posed to be 
answered conclusively.  Chapter One of this study is the introduction 
to the thesis, establishing the areas of study which are to be 
examined.  Chapter Two is the Literature Review of the thesis, 
examining the definition of a far right party and exploring key themes 
regarding far right study.  Chapter Three will focus on the history of the 
far right in Britain, from Oswald Mosley in the 1930s up to the present 
day.  Chapter Four studies the BNP in comparative perspective with 
 13 
other Western European far right parties, Chapter Five will focus on 
press coverage of the BNP, through both a national and local 
perspective.  Additionally, Chapter Six will examine the campaigning 
of the BNP and their performance at the local level.  Finally Chapter 
Seven will focus on the West Yorkshire region of Calderdale, 
examining the impact of the BNP in that area, using a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative data.  
 
1.2 The history of the far right in Britain 
In Chapter Three, the history of the far right in Britain is examined, 
with a view to understanding how British far right movements have 
evolved.  A study of the history of the far right will enable us to make a 
conclusion as to the ideological direction which previous far right 
groups have taken, thus allowing for observations to be made 
regarding why British far right movements have previously failed to 
make an impact at a national or local level.  Moreover, the 
examination of the far right history will establish whether the far right 
have hitherto made impacts at the local level, therefore providing an 
example for the BNP on how to succeed at the local level.  Chapter 
Three will also chart the progress made of the BNP following its 
formation by John Tyndall, through the 1980s to the election of Nick 
Griffin as party chairman in 1999 and the subsequent progress of the 
party under his leadership.  Additionally, Chapter Three will examine 
the background of Nick Griffin, as this thesis will examine the idea that 
the change in direction of the BNP under his leadership has been one 
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of the key reasons for the increasing impact of the BNP at the local 
level in Britain.  Such an examination will show the change in style and 
beliefs which Griffin appears to have made in order to succeed as 
leader of the BNP. 
 
Finally, an examination of the history of the BNP will encompass two 
further aspects which have been put forward as factors in previously 
preventing the far right from making any impact on the British political 
scene, namely the response of the mainstream parties, and the work 
of anti fascist groups, notably at election times (Eatwell, 2000; Renton, 
2003; Copsey, 2004).  Studying the history of the mainstream parties 
will analyse whether there has been a change in policy with regards to 
their attitudes towards the far right, or indeed, their ideological 
viewpoint on issues such as immigration and asylum. 
 
1.3 The BNP in comparative perspective 
Chapter Four of this thesis will be a comparative analysis, carried out 
in order to understand how the BNP fits alongside other Western 
European far right parties across a number of wide ranging issues, 
such as manifestos, image of the party, leadership and response to 
the far right by the mainstream parties.  Comparative studies have 
previously been used with regard to the far right in determining why 
the British far right have not made the same impact as their Western 
European counterparts (Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 
2005).  The major factor for the inclusion of a chapter of this nature is 
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due to the success of the far right in Western Europe, whereby it is 
claimed that the style and image of these parties have had an 
influence on the manner in which Griffin has attempted to modernise 
and professionalize the BNP (Copsey, 2004).   Hence, this Chapter 
will examine how far the BNP has come in its attempts to bring itself 
into line with other Western European parties.   
 
Firstly, Chapter Four will examine the ideology of the party in terms of 
examining their policy at elections, in a bid to investigate whether the 
BNP are pursuing similar policies to their European counterparts. 
Hence, content analysis of manifestoes explicitly demonstrates these 
policies through charting the most recent manifestoes of the political 
parties.   
 
Secondly the image of the party and its leader is examined in the 
respective countries, to determine how the parties are seemingly 
viewed in their own countries.  Far right leaders in Western Europe 
have been seen to be more charismatic and moderate over recent 
years, leading to their success at the polls (Roxburgh, 2002; Fysh and 
Wolfreys, 2003; Carter, 2005).  Therefore, the chapter will analyse 
whether the image of the BNP and Griffin is regarded in the same 
light. 
 
Furthermore, the party leadership of Griffin will be analysed 
comparatively in order to establish whether the BNP are still viewed as 
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being more extreme and poorly led than their far right neighbours.  
Previous far right literature has asserted that far right parties require 
strong leadership as a consequence of the factions that can appear in 
far right parties.  Thus, Chapter Four examines if the leadership of 
Griffin has been successful as the leadership qualities of fellow far 
right party leaders. 
 
1.4 National and local press coverage of the BNP 
Chapter Five of the thesis investigates the press coverage of the BNP.  
This chapter will follow on from the discussion in Chapter Four 
regarding how the BNP are viewed in terms of their image to voters.  
The Chapter will also look at the impact that the BNP have made in 
the press, notably at the time of local elections.  Additionally, Chapter 
Five will be focusing on the media coverage of the BNP at both the 
national and local level, thus bringing in uniqueness through an 
analysis of the reporting of the national and local level press.  
 
Subsequently, such an analysis allows for observations to be made 
regarding the amount of coverage the party are receiving and whether 
the coverage of the party displays any particular correlations in 
reporting.  The coverage will also demonstrate whether there is a 
difference of the coverage which the party receives depending on the 
level of election, be it national, European or local.  Hence, this could 
provide answers to why the party are seemingly having a potential 
effect at the local level.   Moreover, the examination of national press 
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is carried out using the statistical Lexus Nexus package. The package 
allows the researcher statistically to establish the number of 
newspaper articles which have reported on the BNP through a 
keyword search, thus providing an accurate measure of the amount of 
press coverage received by the BNP (Deacon, 2007; Baimbridge and 
Anderson, 2008).   
In addition to the national press coverage of the BNP, the local press 
coverage of the party is examined in the month leading up to the 2006 
local elections in two newspapers, the Halifax Courier newspaper and 
the Bradford Telegraph and Argus, both situated in West Yorkshire.  
The examination will take the form of a codebook (Espindola, 2005), 
and investigates the type of political coverage received in the run up to 
the election with regards to the type of story which is covered and 
whether there is a particular positive or negative aspect to the article.  
This allows for a greater understanding of the attitudes of the local 
media to local politics in particular. 
 
1.5 BNP campaigning at the local level  
Subsequently, the focus of Chapter Six will turn to the campaigning of 
the BNP, at the local level.   This chapter examines local specific 
factors which have allowed for the party to have an effect at the local 
level.  The chapter will investigate the campaigning of the BNP and 
the state of politics at the local level, examining areas of strong BNP 
support such as Barking and Dagenham.  Consequently, the coverage 
of both the national and local level will therefore allow for any potential 
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contrast to be shown between the impact of the BNP at the national 
and local level.  Chapter Six will also focus on the roles of the 
mainstream at a local level.  Moreover, this chapter will also 
investigate the link between the BNP and UKIP, and any potential 
effect that they may have on each others electoral success.  The role 
of UKIP at the national and local level is discussed as a consequence 
of its ideological standing on the right wing.  
 
1.6 The BNP in Calderdale 
Consequently, having made an analysis of the campaigning of the 
BNP at the local and national level, Chapter Seven will use a case 
study of the Calderdale area to apply the conclusions made from the 
study.  This area has been chosen for a number of reasons.  Firstly, 
Calderdale is a diverse area with regard to the make-up of different 
social groups in the district (Census, 2001).  Secondly, the Calderdale 
region is situated close to areas which saw riots in the summer of 
2001, notably in areas of Oldham and Bradford.  Thirdly, the BNP has 
had a presence in the town for a significant number of years, following 
the success of Adrian Marsden in the Mixenden by-election of 2003, 
the first victory for the party outside Lancashire (Copsey, 2004).  
Therefore these factors provide an opportunity for a study to be made 
of the impact that the BNP has made in this area. 
 
This will take place by using a mixture of quantitative data from 
election results and socio-economic data provided by the 2001 
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Census.  Socio-economic data taken from the 2001 census is used in 
order to examine previous academic notions regarding far right 
support, and whether there is any correlation with regard to wards in 
which the BNP choose to put forward candidates, thus allowing for 
conclusions to be drawn regarding the relationship between these 
variables and BNP support in Calderdale.  A number of socio-
economic variables will be studied, amongst them ethnicity, social 
groups, income, and unemployment and education.  Subsequently, 
this will help to investigate whether there are any trends relating to 
BNP support and the aforementioned variables. 
 
Quantitative data in the form of election results allow for the progress 
of the BNP to be charted in the area, furthermore they allow for a 
comparison of the BNP performance in relation to the other 
mainstream parties.   This establishes whether the party has had an 
impact on their respective electoral performances, thus examining 
whether the rise of the BNP has been at the expense of any other 
political party. 
 
The qualitative data in Chapter Seven are taken in the form of semi-
structured interviews with the local leaders of the mainstream parties 
at the time of the 2006 local elections.  The interviews will focus on the 
viewpoint of the party leaders on the state of local democracy, the 
strength of their own party at the local level and their views on the 
BNP presence in Calderdale.  This unique approach in evaluating the 
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impact of the BNP will allow us to understand the mainstream parties’ 
attitudes to the emergence of the BNP, and whether they see them as 
being a threat to their own party’s chances of success in the area.  
 
1.7 Methodology 
In order to achieve these aims, a variety of analytical methods will be 
used to establish the findings.  In Chapter Three, a historical analysis 
will be used to show the development of the far right in Britain.  To 
achieve this, quantitative data in the form of election results will be 
used to act as a monitor of the BNP’s electoral success. Furthermore, 
a more detailed analysis of the backgrounds of key far right figures in 
Britain such as Nick Griffin will act as a useful reference to future work 
in the thesis regarding the personality and image of the BNP.  The 
chapter will also examine more innovative methods used by the far 
right such as the BNP website which has been chosen to demonstrate 
areas of development for the BNP that were previously unavailable to 
far right parties. 
 
In Chapter Four, the method of comparative analysis used will be the 
Most Different System, whereby similarities will be looked for in policy 
areas between the BNP and West European parties.  This method has 
been chosen due to the literature which suggests that the BNP cannot 
be classed in the same grouping as these parties, due to their more 
extremist nature (Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005).  
Using such a comparative method therefore will determine whether 
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the party are beginning to develop into a seemingly more moderate far 
right party-type. 
 
Subsequently, the differences between these parties and the BNP 
allow a comparative analysis to determine whether the attempts made 
by Griffin to modernise the party has brought them into line with other 
West European far right parties, by displaying any similarities in policy, 
structure of party, leadership and image. 
 
To examine policy, this chapter uses manifestos taken from national 
elections and interpreted for a content analysis.  The manifestos were 
those at the national level for the most recent elections in which the 
party fielded candidates, namely the 2008 general elections for the 
FPO and the 2007 national elections for the DF FN and VB and also 
the 2005 general election for the BNP.  By using such a method, it 
explicitly demonstrates whether the BNP are competing at elections 
using similar policies to European far right parties who have been 
previously regarded in academic literature as being more moderate. 
 
To measure the press coverage of the BNP, the LexisNexis package 
is used in Chapter Five.  This package performs a key word search of 
digital newspaper archives and provides ‘hits’ which display the 
number of occasions the key words are mentioned.  One such 
methodological consequence of using Lexis-Nexis is the potential of a 
key word search to provide false ‘hits’ in the search.  For example,   
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searching for ‘BNP’ provided the possibility of including results for the 
bank BNP Paribas and the Bangladeshi National Party.  Subsequently 
these ‘hits’ were eliminated from the results (Baimbridge and 
Anderson, 2008).  Moreover, key word searching can be viewed as 
being a more appropriate source for examining groups and particular 
people and places as opposed to themes (Deacon, 2007; Baimbridge 
and Anderson, 2008).  Consequently, this chapter focuses more on 
the BNP themselves being featured in the national press, as opposed 
to a concept such as the far right, which may not mention the BNP 
directly.  Furthermore, the LexisNexis database allows the coverage to 
be broken down into monthly coverage, thus enabling coverage to be 
examined around periods of elections or any particular events which 
may affect the level of reporting of the BNP (Deacon 2007; Baimbridge 
and Anderson, 2008).  
 
This chapter will also use a codebook analysis method to assess local 
politics coverage.  The codebook used to measure the coverage was 
that designed by Espindola, from studying press coverage in Latin 
American elections (Espindola, 2002; 2005).  Such a method of 
content analysis has been further used in other research of election 
coverage (Patterson, 1993; Negrine, 1998).  The orientation of the 
article was decided by studying the language used in the article.  If it 
was deemed that there was three times the coverage in an article of 
one particular orientation, then that was the general orientation of the 
article.  Additionally, the codebook was also used to examine whether 
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the articles referred to the image of the candidates involved in the 
campaign, their personality and behaviour, the programmes of the 
party, their policies for local government, or the campaign itself.  The 
major subjects in the articles also permitted understanding of which 
issues the newspapers’ thought were important in the campaign.  By 
using a content analysis of this literature, the research will 
demonstrate how much local coverage the BNP receives in 
comparison with their mainstream rivals, alongside the amount of 
coverage that local politics receives during an election campaign. 
 
In Chapter Six, a number of analytical methods will be used to 
measure the development of the BNP at the local level.  This chapter 
will provide analysis of BNP election results, in order to observe 
whether the party have benefited from the failure of local mainstream 
parties to put forward candidates to stand against them in elections.  
The BNP’s local election successes in Barking in 2006 will be used to 
examine this idea, as the party’s victories in Barking were the best 
results a far right group in one particular election, leading the BNP to 
become the official opposition on Barking and Dagenham Council. 
 
Additionally, this chapter aims to be innovative in its research by 
providing a content analysis of BNP literature aimed for the party 
members.  This literature consists of a booklet to act as a guide for 
canvassing, containing the standards and campaigning methods 
expected of a prospective candidate. This will provide a unique 
 24 
perspective on far right campaigning as it examines the guidelines set 
out by the BNP for its members to follow, with regard to presenting the 
image of the party to the electorate.  
 
 
Subsequently, to examine whether these guidelines are having any 
effect at local level campaigning, secondary sources such as claims 
made by anti-fascist groups and newspapers will provide a balance to 
the BNP literature.  By using these sources, it provides perspective 
into just how much of a change there has been in the campaigning 
strategies of the far right in Britain, or whether there is still a focus on 
what are perceived as traditional far right issues, such as immigration. 
 
Moreover, this thesis uses a case study to examine BNP support at 
the local level and the possible effects that this has on local 
democracy.  The Calderdale region in West Yorkshire will provide an 
insight into BNP performance in a region yet to be studied in detail in 
any academic work.  Calderdale is not viewed as a particularly 
‘traditional’ far right area, in that it is not an urban area with a large 
group of working class voters.  Whereas previous research has 
focused on areas such as Barking and Dagenham and Burnley 
(Renton 2004; Goodwin, 2007), this study will be the first of its kind 
examining BNP support in this area.  To demonstrate this point further, 
socio-economic data of the area will look for any patterns in social 
status and voting. 
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To demonstrate the development of the party, electoral data will be 
used to show how the party have risen to a position of prominence.  
Furthermore, focusing on particular wards of BNP support in 
Calderdale allows for a tracking of the development of the party in the 
area, in terms of the level of support, that the party have received.  
Furthermore, by producing data regarding the performances of the 
political parties in BNP wards over the past decade, this can also 
enable conclusions to be drawn regarding the effect that the BNP can 
have on the mainstream parties. 
 
However, Calderdale is also an innovative case study in that the 
research will also attempt to answer the question as to why support for 
the party appeared to dip in the area following the 2007 local 
elections, after its constant increases in previous years.  In an attempt 
to answer this, aspects of national issues will be examined, in terms of 
using opinion polls to determine what key issues at local elections 
were.  Moreover, the role of the BNP councillors in the area will be 
examined, thus taking in both national and local issues to examine a 
decline in voter support across the region. 
 
A number of semi-structured interviews with local mainstream leaders 
will provide an opportunity for the interviewees to give their own 
opinions on how the view local politics in Calderdale.  The semi-
structured nature allows flexibility for the councillors to express their 
 26 
views without being tied down to a particular line of questioning.  
Additionally, since the rise of the BNP at the local level, there has 
been an absence of literature which examines the way in which the 
mainstream parties view the growth of the BNP.  Indeed, it would 
appear that there has been reluctance on the part of politicians at any 
level to speak about the development of the far right. Therefore, this 
thesis is original in conducting qualitative research whereby the 
mainstream leaders in Calderdale talk about the rise and the BNP and 
the problems faced in their campaigning. 
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Chapter Two: Literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to developing the intended research on the BNP, a review of the 
literature was carried out focusing on a number of aspects relevant to 
the literature on the far right.   Firstly, the review examined issues of 
terminology within the field on the far right, notably with regard to 
defining the far right.  Secondly, the literature addresses what 
constitutes a far right party whilst understanding any potential issues 
and indeed difficulties academics have faced in labelling far right 
parties as such.  Additionally, the review also focuses on explanations 
for the local and national electoral success achieved by far right 
parties in Western Europe, particularly in terms of policy areas that 
have proved popular with voters.   
 
This review also studies comparative analyses by authors such as 
Kitschelt (1995), Hainsworth (2000) and Ignazi (2003) in order to 
discuss the reasons why the British far right have not proved to be as 
successful as their Western European counterparts, thus examining 
issues of leadership and organisation and the role of mainstream 
parties.  Subsequently, the broader theme of nationalism and identity 
is also examined in order to help understand better key issues 
surrounding the far right in Britain in terms of a political culture in the 
country.  Consequently, existing academic work is reviewed in order to 
understand the potential support in Britain for a far right party through 
both policy and political issues and issues of nationalism and identity. 
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Finally, literature on the French far right party the Front National is 
reviewed, as a consequence of the links that have been made 
between the BNP and the FN (Goodwin, 2007).  Academic literature 
has recently noted that the BNP has attempted to model themselves 
on the FN in a bid to modernise the party and seemingly appear more 
moderate, subsequently, this notion is examined alongside literature 
regarding the success of the Front National, in order to examine 
whether the BNP have made changes to their party based on the 
example of the FN (Goodwin, 2007). 
 
2.2 Defining the far right 
Defining the far right has always been a source of debate; indeed 
academic literature can still carry a number of terms for the far right, 
including extreme right and radical right (Kitschelt, 1995; Hainsworth, 
2000; Ignazi, 2000; Roxburgh, 2002; Carter, 2005). Indeed, such a 
definition can prove to be problematic, as Ignazi noted that “no specific 
organizational feature characterizes the far right parties” (2003:30).    
 
The literature would suggest however, that there has perhaps been an 
evolution or modernisation of the far right parties in Western Europe, 
indeed the policies of the far right are now said to have some overlap 
with mainstream parties (Linz 1980; (Ignazi, 2000, Carter, 2005).  
Roberts (1994:180) argues that “due to links with extreme and 
mainstream right, it is impossible to draw a boundary line between the 
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main and extremist parties”. Far right parties have been seen to take a 
more centrist position and modify their ideological stance in order to 
appeal to a wider range of voters (De Lange, 2007).  Such is the 
change in stance taken and the changes in political climate, the far 
right family have been described as a post-industrial extreme right, 
due to the secularization of society in Western Europe, and a 
loosening of traditional loyalties from voters (Ignazi 2003).  Whereas in 
the 1980s, far right groups were profiled as having demographic 
characteristics amongst the support which are predominately male, 
working class and marginal self employed (Husbands 1983), Ignazi 
(2003) argues that such social classes between working class and 
bourgeoisie are no longer as “radically defined” and therefore have led 
to different types of far right party, namely the traditional and post-
industrial party.   Carter (2005) rejects Ignazi’s party typology, arguing 
that the post-industrial far right does not account for xenophobia, a 
leading principle for the far right family.     
 
The evolution of the far right has seen parties move to create a 
disassociation from any concept of fascism (Ignazi, 2000; Roxburgh, 
2002; Carter, 2005; Mudde 2007).  Furthermore, calling these parties 
radicalist has been described as being too extreme for the parties as it 
suggests links to violent means such as terrorism (Ignazi, 2003).   
However, any traces of fascism to the current far right family have 
been associated more with the BNP, as opposed to other West 
European far right parties (Ignazi, 2000; Copsey, 2004; Carter, 2005).  
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Carter argues that the BNP could fall into the category of Neo-Nazi 
parties, that being radically xenophobic, adhering to classical racism, 
and rejecting the outright existing democratic system (2005:51).  This 
is in comparison to other parties such as the FN, and the Freedom 
Party of Austria (FPO), who fall into a category of being Authoritarian-
xenophobic parties, who are culturist, demanding reform of the 
democratic system, less democracy and more state control.  It would 
appear therefore, that the BNP are seen as being more extreme in 
comparison with other far right parties in Western Europe, as a 
consequence of their xenophobic and racist stances still prevalent in 
the party (Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005). 
 
Consequently, it appears that there are key issues which emerge 
when defining a party as far right.  Such issues include nationalism, 
xenophobia, racism, some element of anti-democracy and a wish for a 
strong state (Mudde, 1995; Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 
2005).   Carter (2005) argues therefore that right-wing extremism is 
defined by what are termed two “anti-constitutional and anti-
democratic elements”, namely a rejection of the fundamental value 
procedures and institutions of democratic constitutional state and a 
rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality.    
Furthermore it must still be noted that despite the possible softening of 
beliefs, the far right still have values which are vastly different from the 
mainstream parties (Ignazi, 2003). Certainly it appears that far right 
parties can differ in their values and subsequently, issues of neo-
 31 
Nazism and fascism can be seen purely as a sub-value of the far right 
phenomenon (Ignazi, 2003). 
 
2.3 Explanations of far right success 
Far right success has been accounted as a result of the individual 
fortunes of the party, as opposed to a particular phenomenon 
occurring across Europe, indeed the far right parties have been said to 
have been “masters of their own success” (Carter, 2005:13).  
However, the rise of far right parties, notably at the turn of the 21st 
Century suggest that they took advantage of particular circumstances 
in their own respective countries which led to their successes. 
 
Kitschelt (1995) examines the evolution of the far right parties in 
Europe, noting that; 
 
“The success is contingent upon the strategic choices of the moderate 
conservative parties as well as the ability of the extreme-right leaders 
to find the electoral “winning formula” to assemble a significant voter 
constituency.  The conditions for the rise of extreme-rightist parties 
become favourable if moderately left and right parties converge 
towards the median voter” (1995:vii). 
 
Kitschelt’s theoretical framework argues that economics also plays an 
important role in the far right’s appeal to new voters.  To win the 
support of groups such as small businessmen, the far right parties 
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look to tone down their racism in order for more success, therefore 
blue collar workers, petit bourgeois and lower salaried employees are 
more likely to vote for the extreme right.   
 
Moreover, Kitschelt looks to concentrate on dispelling what he sees as 
rather stereotyped hypotheses regarding the far right in Europe.  
These hypotheses include the notion that the far right in Europe is a 
single-issue racist movement against the levels of immigration.  
Hence, Kitschelt argues that whilst the issue of immigration may be a 
catalyst for extremist right parties, “the issue must be embedded in a 
broader right-authoritarian agenda” in order to be successful in the 
long term (Kitschelt, 1995:3).  Additionally, Kitschelt’s theoretical 
framework examines the comparisons between the contemporary 
extreme right and the ‘old’ European right, arguing that whilst the new 
and old extreme right may share values such as the importance of 
citizenship and the maintaining of law and order, there are few 
similarities between the two.  Indeed, “where contemporary parties 
build on the legacy of the interwar extreme right, they typically fail to 
attract significant electorates” (1995:3).  Notably Kitschelt states that 
the contemporary extreme right is strong in countries where fascism 
remained weak in the interwar period, although this claim is debatable 
in Germany and Italy, two countries where such fascism was strong in 
the interwar period, the far right are enjoying an upsurge in support, 
notably with the success of the Lega Nord in Italy.  Kitschelt argues 
that the contemporary extreme right accept parliamentary democracy, 
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advocate the free market, finding that it is necessary to combine free 
market messages with xenophobic messages contrasting with the 
authoritarian anti-capitalist messages of the European fascist right of 
the interwar period.  He highlights the work of Mayer (1989:249) who 
stated that “there is no link at a municipal level between the number of 
immigrants and Front National voters.”  Thus, according to Kitschelt 
(1995) it is the endorsement of free-market capitalism combining with 
state authority which was the appeal of the FN.   
 
However this explanation has seemingly attracted some criticism in 
other academic works, particularly with regard to the far right’s rise in 
popularity (Eatwell, 2000; Copsey, 2004; Eatwell, 2008).  Copsey 
(2004) argues that if Kitschelt’s framework is correct, then support for 
the Front National should have fallen away in the 1990s when Le Pen 
moved away from economic neo-liberalism and instead focused on the 
issues of unity and identity.  Copsey (2004:162) adds that “post 
materialist values are considered to be stronger in Germany and the 
Netherlands than in France, yet in Germany and the Netherlands the 
performance of extreme-right parties has been less robust.”  
 
Furthermore, Eatwell (2000) counters the arguments put forward by 
Kitschelt (1995) by arguing that it is politics that dictates the way in 
which people vote rather than socio-economic factors.  As evidence 
for this, the BNP’s local election victory in Millwall, no free-market 
appeal was used in order to attract voters; instead the main focus of 
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the campaign was immigration.  Therefore, Eatwell (2000) argues that 
there firstly has to be a loss in faith of the major political parties for 
voters to look at alternative parties.  Secondly the electorate need to 
believe that a vote for the extreme right will have an effect on the 
political mainstream.   
  
2.4 The British far right in comparative perspective 
Far right literature featuring the British far right has seemingly focused 
on the various groups in a comparative perspective (Hainsworth, 
2000; Mudde, 2000; Roxburgh, 2002; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005; 
Mudde 2007; Eatwell 2008).   Consequently, the prevailing aspect of 
British coverage focuses on why the British far right have performed 
less successfully than their European counterparts. 
 
Ignazi (2003) highlights how the Conservatives under the leadership of 
Margaret Thatcher prevented the far right from making gains in Britain 
through tough immigration policies, observing that this was the 
principle reason why John Tyndall’s attempt to persuade Conservative 
voters to vote for the BNP failed.  Eatwell (2000) also focuses on the 
role of the mainstream parties in Britain to understand why the far right 
have not made an impact, by assessing the organization and policy 
areas of the Labour and Conservative parties, arguing that the major 
parties are well organized at both a local and a national level.  This is 
in contrast to the extreme right groups in Britain, whose poor 
organization and factionalism have made them unable to mount strong 
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campaigns at elections “unless they can bus activists in for single by-
elections” (Eatwell; 2000:180). 
 
However, whilst the role of the mainstream parties in Britain have 
been seen to have prevented a strong far right showing at elections, 
the literature also suggests that the failure of the far right in Britain is 
as much the fault of the numerous movements themselves.  Ignazi 
(2003) argues that the BNP links with Nazism has been a major factor 
in their inability to attract the centre right voters in Britain.  Ignazi cites 
the work of Roger Griffin (2000) who stated that the British far right’s 
links to Nazism was the end game for the parties in attracting new 
voters.  Moreover, Roxburgh (2002) notes that whilst leader Nick 
Griffin attempts to present the BNP in a moderate light, his own history 
suggests strong links with the extreme elements of the NF.  Roxburgh 
uses newspaper articles to support his claims, highlighting an article 
by Jackie Ashley in The Guardian (2002:224) which states; 
 
“The NF was more unashamedly neo-Nazi, with its shaven heads and 
bovver boots.  Its strategy, like the Hitler followers of the bierkeller era, 
was pubs and streets first, votes later.  The BNP is a little cleverer.  It 
tries to present a respectable, scrubbed face.  It talks, as does the 
French national front, about crime and fear and the kids’ future” 
(Guardian, 1 May 2002). 
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Indeed, Roxburgh highlights the issue of leadership of the far right 
parties in Europe, nothing that “the BNP also lacks what all the 
successful European far right parties have- a charismatic leader” 
(2002:243).  Roxburgh also notes that Le Pen, Haider and Fortuyn 
were also men who had independently built up a personal wealth 
which therefore enabled them to secure links with the media, 
comparing this with Nick Griffin, who hasn’t the wealth of other leaders 
and has therefore not been able to establish such a successful public 
relations campaign for the BNP. 
 
Additionally, Eatwell (2000), like Roxburgh and Ignazi, notes that the 
leadership of John Tyndall and his links to Nazism provided a platform 
for opposition parties to highlights links between the BNP and Nazism, 
meaning that despite the NF being the major British post-war extreme 
right group, by the mid 90s “the NF was little more than a dwindling 
band of activists.”(2000:172) Hence, the membership of the FN has 
never been more than 3000, with the majority of these “young working 
class toughs” (2000:173).   
 
Furthermore, another concept drawing on why the British far right 
movements have failed to make electoral successes draws on the 
notion of a political culture in Britain preventing the far right form 
making an impact (Eatwell, 2000; Ignazi, 2003).  Ignazi (2003) 
highlights the solidity of the traditional right in the UK, alongside the 
management of the economic crises. Allied to this a national pride and 
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a constitutional tradition has prevented a far right movement from 
gaining momentum.  Eatwell studies the idea that the extreme right 
have not made any impact in Britain due to a ‘civic culture’ which 
exists.  The notion of a civic culture has been put forward by Benewick 
(1969) and Almond and Verba (1963).  A ‘civic culture’ implies that 
Britain is a country “whose democratic institutions are held in high 
esteem, possessing a unique blend of modernity and tradition” 
(Eatwell 2000:179).  The sense of modernity and tradition implies that 
the British electorate would therefore reject radical groups such as the 
far right.  However, this is tempered by the notion that a ‘civic culture’ 
in Britain leaves too many key questions unanswered with regard to 
nationalism and identity in Britain, and makes too many assumptions 
that successive governments have dealt well with the far right in 
Britain. 
 
Finally, with regard to the electoral system in Britain, there is literature 
noting how the first past the post electoral system in Britain does not 
give smaller parties such as those on the far right a chance to gain 
any foothold into Parliament (Kitschelt, 1995; Ignazi. 2003; Carter, 
2005).  The consequence of such a system means that a protest vote 
for the far right would make less of an impact in the British system of 
voting than it does in a system of proportional representation.  
Furthermore, Fysh and Wolfreys (2003) note that the protests which 
took place in the lead up to the second round of French presidential 
elections demonstrated that the votes for Le Pen were not to support 
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him for president, but because he was viewed as the only viable 
alternative to the mainstream parties, which had been discredited by 
the time of the 2002 elections.  Subsequently, there is doubt that the 
far right in Britain could benefit from such a similar protest vote due to 
the constraints on smaller parties in the British electoral system. 
 
2.5 The far right potential in Britain 
Whilst academic literature has seemingly sought to demonstrate why 
the far right in Britain have not been as successful as other Western 
European far right parties, there is however existing academic 
literature which can demonstrate that the far right do indeed have a 
potential to make an impact electorally in the UK (Eatwell, 2000; 
Ignazi, 2003; Renton, 2003; Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005; John et al, 
2006).   
 
When examining how this situation has arisen whereby voters are now 
prepared to vote for the far right, the academic literature appears to 
suggest that one of the principal reasons for the potential increase of 
the far right vote in Britain is due to the actions of the mainstream 
parties.  Whereas, Eatwell (2000) noted that local campaigning in 
tandem with the role played by leaders such as Thatcher, had 
previously given the Conservatives a strong sense of nationalism yet 
never in an overtly racist way, there is an acknowledgement that 
allegiance to mainstream parties is in decline, noting the weak 
leadership of the Conservatives by John Major and William Hague as 
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factors which could lead to an increase of support for the far right.  
Moreover splits in the Conservative Party, allied with a strong far right 
leadership could offer the BNP an opportunity to make an impact on 
British politics.   To support these claims, an ICM poll from the Daily 
Express in 1995 is cited which said that nine per cent of respondents 
would vote for a Le Pen style FN and another 17 per cent said they 
would seriously consider doing so, leading Eatwell to argue that there 
is evidence supporting the notion that charismatic leaders appeal to 
the less politically interested groups. Additionally, Eatwell (2000) cites 
Nordlinger (1967:17) who argued that “there has been a major strand 
in working-class opinion which has sought strong leadership.”  This 
argument is supported in the work of Roxburgh (2002) who observed 
the FN conferences where Le Pen often captivated his audiences with 
his speeches playing on the insecurities of the French people. 
 
Additionally, Copsey’s (2004) examination of the responses of Labour 
and the Conservatives to both the BNP and issues such as asylum 
suggests that the Labour and Conservative parties need to establish a 
reconnection with dissatisfied voters.  Indeed Copsey notes that the 
BNP have been able to profit from what he sees as the Conservatives 
and Labour moving to the centre on the issues such as asylum and 
immigration which led to the BNP being able to exploit disenchanted 
voters, an idea which points to the suggestion put forward by Kitschelt 
(1995) and Carter (2005) of far right parties gaining support when 
mainstream parties converge to the centre ground.  Moreover there is 
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criticism of the Labour government who are regarded as having given 
the BNP legitimacy through means such as David Blunkett’s 
comments regarding asylum seekers “swamping” British schools 
(BBC, 2002).  Furthermore, Copsey (2004) argues that the 
Conservatives took up the issue of immigration and asylum following 
pressure from right-wing tabloids, and according to Copsey, at local 
level, “Tory election literature imitated that of the BNP” (2004:147).    
There further appears to be a lack of door-step contact with voters by 
the Labour and Conservative parties.  At the 2001 general election, 14 
per cent of voters were canvassed by the mainstream parties 
compared to 24 per cent in 1997, thus providing a potential for the 
BNP to connect with a dissatisfied electorate (Worcester and 
Mortimore, 2001:166).   
 
Ignazi (2003) highlights the work of Husbands (1983) who stated that 
NF support was conductive where “rapid economic expansion has 
come to a halt or areas which are in the process of de-industrializing” 
(1983:83).  Initial examination of the BNP support would suggest this 
to still be the case, with party support particularly strong in such areas, 
for example Burnley, Barking and Dagenham and Stoke-on-Trent, 
areas which have experienced de-industrialization.   
 
Renton’s (2004) study of the BNP’s success from 1999-2003 looks at 
the local council seats that the BNP won in order to explain their 
growing appeal.  Consequently, Renton noted that it is the middle-
 41 
class areas of Burnley where the BNP enjoyed support, thus 
supporting his claims that it is a fear of immigrants and asylum 
seekers moving in to these areas that prompt a vote for the BNP, in 
addition to supporting Kitschelt’s (1995) claims earlier in this chapter 
regarding the petit bourgeoisie supporting the far right parties.   This 
suggest an evolution in the British far right as it is no longer the 
traditional view of urban working class males supporting the far right, 
indeed the BNP are now in a position to attract a wider-ranging 
support. 
 
2.6 The FN influence on the BNP 
Finally, having established that there is potential for the far right to 
benefit from the actions of the mainstream parties, the review now 
looks at the influence which the Front National has had on the BNP.  
This influence is examined for a number of reasons, namely that the 
FN can be held up as a good example of demonstrating how a far right 
party can gain momentum once they are part of the political system 
(Marcus, 1995; Hainsworth, 2000; Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  
Additionally, the meeting of Nick Griffin and Jean-Marie Le Pen in 
October 2004 in Cheshire suggested that the leaders were planning a 
potential alliance between the two parties, notably at a European level 
(BBC, 2004).  Finally recent academic work has noted the influence 
that the Front National have had on the BNP with Griffin looking to 
emulate the Front National’s “intensive campaigns” and “ideological 
changes”  (Goodwin 2007:245).  Indeed for Griffin, the development of 
 42 
the Front National has been said to have provided a blueprint for the 
BNP (Goodwin: 2007:246-247). 
 
Roxburgh (2002) notes the subtle changes made by Le Pen towards 
the end of the 1980s.  This, he argues was due to the recruitment of 
centre right politicians such as Bruno Mégret, the establishment of 
satellite organisations and circles and the acknowledgement of 
successful Socialist policies.  These actions led to the FN becoming 
the party most popular with the working class, with 30 per cent of 
workers and 25 per cent of the unemployed voting for the party.  It is 
these actions taken by Le Pen which leads Roxburgh to talk of a ‘left-
wing Lepenism’ in France (2002:85).  Thus, these actions appear to 
support Kitschelt’s (1995) theory that the contemporary extreme right 
cannot rely on just a xenophobic policy to attract new voters, instead 
there needs to be some economic policies to attract potential support 
from small businessmen and blue collar workers (Kitschelt, 1995). 
 
Hainsworth (2000) discusses how the Front National haven’t been 
original in their policies regarding immigration, but have rather taken 
issues which have been courted by the mainstream political parties, 
reworking them to give a ‘national-populist’ edge, that is bringing 
policies in line with the extreme right traditions of the past (2000:26).  
Hainsworth also cites the work of Perrineau (1997) who argues that 
the policies of the FN, particularly regarding immigration and national 
preference can gain between one fifth and one third of respondents to 
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opinion polls thus showing that they retain the xenophobic edge to the 
party, whilst also appearing to be considered as more mainstream. 
 
Moreover, Fysh and Wolfreys (2003) was the first major work to be 
released following the success of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 2002 
presidential elections. Fysh and Wolfreys (2003) point to Le Pen’s 
success at the 2002 elections by highlighting the shortcomings in the 
mainstream parties in what they call ‘the collapse of official politics.’  
As evidence of this, they note the crises which faced Chirac and his 
RPR party in the build up to the elections and also, the failings of 
Lionel Jospin and the Socialists, by highlighting the marked reduction 
in campaigning by the Socialists in the lead-up to the elections.  
Indeed they suggest that the assumption from the Socialists they 
would win through to the second round only led to more discontented 
voters (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).   
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Previous academic literature placing the BNP in a comparative 
perspective with European far right parties has portrayed the party as 
a classically racist movement with links to neo-Nazism (Eatwell, 2000; 
Roxburgh, 2002; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005; Mudde 2007).  Indeed, 
comparative approaches have argued that it is this extremist image 
which has made the BNP the exception to far right success in Western 
Europe (Eatwell, 2000; Roxburgh, 2002; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005; 
Mudde 2007).  In contrast, parties such as the FPO in Austria and the 
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FN in France have managed to portray a more moderate image, 
through charismatic leadership, moderate policies and a professional 
organisation (Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Luther, 2004; Carter, 
2005). It is this moderate image and professional organisation evident 
in other West European far right parties that have been purposely 
used by Nick Griffin as a blueprint for the future development of the 
BNP (Goodwin, 2007). 
 
The literature has also suggested an evolving far right electorate 
across Western Europe.  Far right parties in the UK have traditionally 
gained support from working class areas which have experienced de-
industrialisation and unemployment (Husbands, 1983, 2000; Sykes, 
2005).   Yet this chapter has established that that there has arguably 
been a loosening of class loyalties, with the boundaries between 
working class and middle class no longer so clearly defined (Ignazi, 
2003).  Such a loosening of class boundaries can be attributed to a 
growing secularization in society (Ignazi, 2003; De Lange, 2007).    
 
Furthermore, it would appear there the far right have opportunities to 
appeal to a greater electorate as a consequence of the action of the 
mainstream parties. As Kitschelt (1995) and Carter (2005) have noted, 
if there is a move by mainstream parties towards the centre, this 
opens up opportunities for far right parties to gain support from those 
voters on both sides of the political spectrum.  Previous literature 
relating to the BNP argues that this has been seen in the UK, due to 
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the convergence of the Conservative and Labour parties towards the 
centre on issues such as immigration and asylum (Copsey, 2004). 
Subsequently, this could provide the BNP with an opportunity to win 
support from voters who are disenchanted at such a convergence 
from the mainstream. 
 
The literature review in this chapter also demonstrates that the actions 
of a far right party, as opposed to their policies, can provide a base for 
electoral success in Britain.  The literature has noted how previous 
BNP successes in local elections have come about due to effective 
community-based politics (Eatwell, 2000; Copsey, 2004; Renton, 
2004).  Community politics has played an important role in recent far 
right successes, suggesting that voter engagement and identity is as 
strong and necessary as ever in British politics (Eatwell, 2000; 
Copsey, 2004).  As Renton (2004) noted, the BNP can look to target 
support from middle class supporters through such means.  By gaining 
a common identity with middle class voters, the BNP have the 
opportunity to develop their support base. 
 
This chapter establishes an argument that a key factor to far right 
success is that of strong and authoritative leadership.  This form of 
leadership is important to far right success.  Indeed, the evidence 
presented in this chapter relating to strong leadership can be linked 
the idea of the deferential voter, in that working class opinion has 
traditionally sought strong leadership (Nordlinger, 1967).  Moreover 
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strong leadership is arguably needed due to the modern structure of 
the far right.  The review noted that far right parties will have satellite 
circles and various groups and movement under the banner of the 
party, as is particularly the case in France (Hainsworth, 2000; Fysh 
and Wolfreys, 2003; Goodwin, 2007).  For these satellite groups to 
operate effectively and with united aims, strong leadership is a key to 
the success.  In Britain, the idea of strong leadership is particularly 
relevant with regard to the authority of the mainstream party leaders.  
Strong leadership by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s was deemed to 
be a contributory factor in the failure of the far right to increase their 
vote share (Eatwell, 2000; Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).  Subsequent 
leadership of the Conservative Party has since been accused of not 
being as strong (Eatwell, 2000; Copsey, 2004; Mudde, 2007).  If the 
leadership of the mainstream parties is perceived to be weak, then 
authoritative leadership from a far right leader may attract support 
from voters who are disillusioned with the mainstream parties.   
Aligned to authoritative leadership is the idea of a charismatic leader.  
This chapter has shown that charismatic far right leadership is 
important in order for the far right to appeal to sections of the 
electorate who may otherwise be disinterested in politics.  
Furthermore, charismatic leadership is not only a means of 
establishing a link with the electorate, but establishing links with the 
media.  The literature suggests that the ability to influence the media 
can be of great benefit to far right parties, particularly with regard to 
displaying a new image of the party (Griffin, 2000; Roxburgh, 2002).  
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As the literature review demonstrated, Griffin had not been able to 
establish the links with the media in the UK, as Haider, Le Pen and 
Fortuyn had managed to do in their respective countries (Roxburgh, 
2000; Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007).   
 
Whilst xenophobia remains a key element to the far right’s ideology, 
there have been clear attempts by far right parties in Europe to appeal 
to a wider electorate (Hainworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005; De 
Lange, 2005). As Kitschelt (1995) argued, policy issues on areas such 
as free-market capitalism are a factor to electoral success in Western 
Europe.  Furthermore, academics have noted policy changes from Le 
Pen which were deemed to be more in keeping with the Socialists, in 
order to win the support of blue-collar workers (Kitschelt, 1995; 
Perrineau, 1997).  This suggests that far right parties cannot merely 
rely on xenophobic policies; in order to win new support, parties must 
demonstrate that they can offer substantial policy issues in other 
areas.  Moreover, there has seemingly been a shift from far right 
parties in terms of relation to the state.  Successful far right parties in 
Western Europe no longer reject the authority of the state, but instead 
will look for some form of reform of the existing democratic system 
(Carter, 2005). Far right parties will now look to distance themselves 
from accusations of extremism.  It is this change in ideology that leads 
academics to reject labelling the modern far right parties as radical 
(Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005). 
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The review of the literature has highlighted poor organisation within 
the far right parties in the UK as one of the major obstacles to their 
development.  The literature has pointed towards the attempts of Nick 
Griffin to bring his party into line with other far right parties in Western 
Europe, in terms of ideological changes and the changes in the 
structure of the party (Copsey, 2004; Goodwin, 2007).  Professional 
organisation has been seen to be vital in countries such as Austria, 
Denmark and France in transforming the far right image into an 
electable party, both through the way the party is run and who stands 
for the party.  In addition to portraying an electable image, a more 
professional organisation allows for the far right to exploit any political 
opportunities afforded to them.  The success of the FN in the 2002 
Presidential Elections was built upon the ability of the party to organise 
and carry out intensive and effective electioneering, following the 
failure of the Socialists to do the same (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  It 
is clear from the comparative literature that historically, far right 
movements in the UK have struggled with regard to portraying a 
professional image, not only due to links with Nazism but the failings 
of the party to mount effective campaigns at elections (Hainsworth, 
2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007). 
 
The literature has also demonstrated that it is not simply the 
positioning of the BNP that prevents electoral success; seemingly, 
there are also what could be termed classically ‘British’ factors behind 
the electoral failure of the BNP, such as the notion of a ‘civic culture’ 
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and indeed the British electoral system at the national level (Eatwell, 
2000; 2008; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005; Mudde 2008).  Yet again, it 
would be unwise to accept these as totally prohibitive barriers to far 
right success which could not be overcome by the BNP.   However, it 
appears that one of the key issues to come out of the review of the 
literature is whether the BNP have the means and ability within the 
party to exploit these opportunities presented to them and to 
overcome the barriers to success.   
 
Therefore, to benefit from the loosening of class boundaries and voter 
ties, Griffin and the BNP must be seen as more charismatic and 
indeed more moderate and professional, moving away from links with 
Nazism to a more populist appeal amongst the voters.  If the party 
were to develop such a populist image, particularly amongst a 
disillusioned electorate and media, then the successes enjoyed by 
their West European far right neighbours could be enjoyed in the UK. 
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Chapter 3: The history of the far right in Britain 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two of this thesis argued how academic studies on the British 
far right have often focused on the failure of the various movements to 
gain any success at the national or local level (Hainsworth, 2000; 
Ignazi, 2003; Copsey, 2004; Carter, 2005).  Indeed, Table 3.1 shows 
how, in British general elections, the vote share for a far right party is 
yet to pass 2 per cent.  The biggest growth of the far right occurred in 
the 1970s, with the National Front fielding an increasing number of 
candidates throughout the country.  This culminated in the 1979 
general election when the NF put forward 303 candidates for election. 
However, despite this record number of candidates standing for 
election, the party only polled a total of 191,719 votes, which resulted 
in all candidates losing their deposits.  In 2010, the BNP broke through 
the one per cent barrier for a far right party, gaining 1.9 per cent of the 
vote.  
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Table 3.1 The far right electoral performance in general elections 
(1959-2005) 
Year Party Candidates Total Votes Vote Share 
(        (%) 
Average 
Votes per 
candidate 
1959 UM 1 2,821 0.00 2,821 
1964 LEL 3 1,046 0.00 349 
1966 UM 4 4,075 0.00 1019 
1970 NF 10 11,449 0.1 1145 
1974 NF 54 76,885 0.1 1424 
1974 NF 90 113,843 0.4 1265 
1979 NF 303 191,719 0.6 633 
 
1983 
NF 60 27,065 0.1 452 
BNP 53 14,621 0.0 276 
1987 BNP 2 553 0.0 277 
 
1992 
NF 14 4,816 0.1 344 
BNP 13 7,631 0.1 587 
 
1997 
NF 14 2,716 0.1 194 
BNP 13 35,832 0.1 640 
 
2001 
BNP 33 47,129 0.2 1428 
NF 5 2,484 0.0 497 
 
2005 
BNP 119 192,746 0.7 1620 
NF 13 8029 0.0 618 
 
2010 
BNP 338 563,743 1.9 1668 
NF 17 10,784 0.0 634 
 
Notes:  UM = Union Movement LEL= League of Empire Loyalists 
BNP= British National Party NF = National Front  
Sources: Parliament UK 2009; BBC 2010 
 52 
This chapter studies the history of the far right in Britain, to understand 
how it has evolved, and to establish initial observations about the 
reasoning behind the far right’s apparent failure to make a 
breakthrough at the national level in Britain.  Hence, the chapter takes 
a chronological viewpoint of the far right in Britain, firstly beginning 
with Oswald Mosley in the 1930s, through to post-war groups in the 
1950s and 1960s.  The chapter also examines the limited successes 
for the National Front in the 1970s and the subsequent failure of this 
party.   
 
Moreover, the history of the BNP is covered, from the first general 
election fought by John Tyndall in 1983, through to the controversies 
surrounding the releasing of the BNP membership list, to track the 
progress made by what is, currently, the major far right movement in 
Britain.  The chapter examines the background of Nick Griffin, 
establishing how his stance from hard-liner to a, seemingly, more 
‘moderate’ leader has occurred, including a study of the controversies 
that have dogged his time leading the BNP.  Aspects of modernisation 
and professionalism are also studied with a view to examining as to 
whether the BNP have made steps in advancing a programme of 
modernisation and professionalism, in a bid to attract a greater 
number of voters. 
 
Finally, the chapter looks at the reaction to the BNP, from both the 
mainstream parties and anti-fascist groups; such an examination as 
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this is done in order to establish the role they have played with regard 
to the effect of the BNP at both the local and national level.  
 
3.2 The far-right 1930-1939 
The far right in Great Britain in the 1930s was largely centred on the 
actions of Oswald Mosley, a politician who had represented both sides 
of the House in Parliament.  Mosley was a Conservative MP for 
Harrow between 1918 and 1922, before a disagreement over policy 
issues, with regard to Ireland subsequently led him to joining the 
Labour Party in 1924, thus representing the party as MP for 
Smethwick. Indeed, Mosley was seen as a rising star in the Labour 
Party, before a disagreement with Prime Minister Ramsay McDonald 
over his social plan for reconstruction, led to his departure from the 
party.  Thus, following his departure from the Labour Party, Mosley set 
up the New Party, with support from other disillusioned Labour 
politicians.  Despite optimism from Mosley and his colleagues, the 
New Party suffered from a very poor showing in elections, with no 
candidates returned.  Consequently, the disappointing showing from 
the New Party led to the creation of the British Union of Fascists (BUF) 
in October 1932 (Thurlow, 1998).   
 
The BUF’s primary focus was on the increasing unemployment at the 
time, and thus aimed to attract the support of the unemployed workers 
in industrial towns, yet the party failed to achieve this aim (Thurlow, 
1998).  Nevertheless, in spite of these initial setbacks, Mosley 
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received financial support from businessmen such as Lord 
Rothermere of the Daily Mail.   The support of Lord Rothermere was 
particularly key to the BUF, as it afforded the party free publicity, 
consequently leading to an increase in membership figures (Thurlow, 
1998).  Additionally, Mosley was also keenly aware of the power of 
spectacle. This could be seen in the form of extravagant rallies and 
the production of films to form part of his campaigning strategy. 
 
However, the financial support which funded such propaganda was to 
drain from the party following their links to violence, notably the 
violence carried out by the Blackshirts, a group originally created to 
act as Mosley’s security at BUF meetings. Such a problem had always 
been an issue with Mosley’s parties (Thurlow, 1998).   Mosley’s rallies 
were often interrupted by fighting amongst BUF supporters and left-
wing supporters. Such violence was particularly severe at a BUF 
meeting at Olympia, when the Blackshirts clashed with anti-fascist 
protesters and the police (Thurlow, 1998).  Subsequently, Lord 
Rothermere withdrew his support for the BUF, no longer supporting a 
movement which “was increasingly to believe in dictatorship, anti-
Semitism and the corporate state” (Thurlow, 1998:72).  Such a loss in 
support could not be underestimated; indeed Thurlow (1998:72) noted 
that “it was the loss of Lord Rothermere’s support and the free 
publicity in the Daily Mail that contributed most to the decline of the 
BUF.” 
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However, despite this withdrawal of support, Mosley and the BUF 
were to continue the policy of anti-Semitism and violence.  This led to 
the break-up of the party; as such violent outbreaks only served to 
deter members from joining and, thus, prevented the party from 
becoming a force in British politics.  The ineffectiveness of the BUF 
was highlighted at the 1935 general election, where the BUF did not 
field a candidate, leading to the suggestion that they had no resources 
to organise a national campaign (Thurlow, 1998:76).  Instead the 
campaign of violence continued, notably at Cable Street in the East 
End of London, following an attempted march by Mosley through an 
area with a prominent Jewish community, leading to clashes with anti-
fascist campaigners.  Consequently, by the outbreak of World War 
Two, Mosley had been banned from any broadcasting by the BBC.  
Mosley and fellow BUF members were interned after the outbreak of 
the war under government Defence Regulations. 
 
3.3 Post-war far right in Britain 
The post-war period in British far right politics can be defined as a 
period which witnessed a number of short-lived groups. Their failure to 
mount a political challenge was the result of the increasing factions 
which were to dominate the British far right for the following 40 years.  
In the immediate post-war period, the first far right group to be 
launched was the Union Movement, a group which was run in a similar 
style to that of the BUF, in that old street politics were used by the 
group, and similar violence and harassment against anti-fascists and 
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Jews were committed (Eatwell, 1995).  This group was run by 
supporters of Oswald Mosley, who was in exile waiting for what he 
believed was an economic crisis to occur which would return him into 
the forefront of politics (Thurlow, 1998).  This appeared to 
demonstrate how the styles of far right movements in Britain were in 
contrast to similar movements at the time across Western Europe, 
notably in France in the 1950s, with the rise in popularity of Pierre 
Poujade (Davies, 1999).  Poujade’s UDCA party (Union pour la 
Dèfense des Commerçants et Artisans) was formed as a response to 
perceived corruption amongst politicians, and aimed to defend the 
right of workers against the state and played strongly on the themes of 
solidarity and patriotism.  Yet there was also an undeniable sense of 
anti-Semitism in the rhetoric of Poujade (Davies, 1999).  In 1956 the 
UDCA won 2.6 millions votes, leading to the election of fifty-seven 
members to the National Assembly.  Amongst these members elected 
was future Front National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. 
 
In Britain, the 1950s were to witness a change in focus for far right 
groups, with the arrival of West Indian immigrants, with the far right 
groups seemingly moving away from the anti-Semitism which had 
dominated pre-war movements.  In the period of the 1950s-1970s a 
number of far right groups were to form, thus demonstrating the 
fractious nature of the far right.  One such group formed in the late 
1950s, was the League of Empire Loyalists, which contested the 1964 
general election.  Led by A.K Chesterton, its focus centred on 
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nationalism and race and has been seen to be less extreme than other 
far right groups in post-war Britain.  Indeed the group has been 
described as “Colonel Blimpish reactionary Conservatives rather than 
fascists” (Eatwell, 1992:177). 
 
Furthermore, the British National Party was formed by Arnold Leese.  
The ‘old’ BNP. as opposed to its current form, had clear links to 
National Socialism in Germany, with Tyndall’s admiration for National 
Socialism in clear evidence, including having uniforms for its 
members.  This group, however, had no support and a very weak 
membership largely due to Tyndall’s open support for Hitler (Thurlow, 
1998; Copsey, 2004).  The open mix of Nazi sympathisers and 
Conservative racists led to policy and, consequently, power struggles 
amongst key figures in the far right, including Colin Jordan and Martin 
Webster (Thurlow, 1998).  In response to the BNP, Jordan formed the 
National Socialist Movement in 1962.  Tyndall’s extremism even led to 
a prison sentence after being found guilty of forming a paramilitary 
organisation under Section 2 of the Public Order Act.  Subsequently, 
the Greater Britain Movement was founded, though membership again 
was seriously weak, leading Tyndall to abandon his policy of open 
neo-Nazism (Copsey, 2004). 
As a consequence, it appeared that by the late 1960s, the far right in 
Britain was suffering from in-fighting and a lack of direction regarding 
policy and its place on the political spectrum in terms of how extreme it 
wished to be.  However, in 1968, immigration was to come to the 
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forefront of British politics, following the “rivers of blood” speech in 
which Enoch Powell predicted rising levels of racial violence in Britain 
(Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).   The impact of Powell’s comments at 
the time was such that it received sympathy within the wider 
Conservative support, however, whilst the NF enjoyed an increase in 
recruitment, they were not able to capitalise on Powell’s speech, 
notably due to factionalism and a clash in the leadership between 
more moderate and hard-line members (Sykes, 2005). 
 
Moreover, the National Front appeared to be making a move away the 
violence which had been a main tactic of previous far right groups.  
Instead, the NF realised that, following the support for Powell’s rivers 
of blood speech, there was an opportunity to enjoy electoral success 
(Eatwell, 1992:177).   Indeed, early election results for the NF 
appeared to look promising, notably when the party scored 16 per cent 
of the vote in the 1973 West Bromwich by-election, with the party also 
boasting a membership of 14,000.  However, subsequent election 
results were to be disappointing, as a consequence of further divisions 
in the leadership.  Despite promising showings in the 1976 local 
elections in areas such as Leicester, the NF recorded dismal results in 
the 1979 general elections (Eatwell, 1992). 
 
The subsequent failure of the NF was attributed to a number of 
factors, including the inability of the party to rid itself of the links to 
fascism and anti-Semitism, alongside campaigns of repatriation and 
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immigration and the failure to attract a figure such as Enoch Powell 
(Eatwell, 1992:177).  Hence, whilst Powell broke away with the 
Conservatives in 1974 over Britain’s membership of the EU, the 
extreme nature of the NF meant he was not to join the party.  
Consequently, it has been argued that the lack of a seemingly more 
moderate and respectable figurehead, cost the party severely 
(Eatwell, 1992). 
 
Subsequently, John Tyndall was to leave the NF and form the British 
National Party.   This party were still quite openly anti-Semitic and 
leader orientated, similar to the NF.  The NF were to again witness a 
change in policy and behaviour, resulting in their activism through the 
means of marches and links with football hooliganism, as more militant 
members took over the leadership (Sykes, 2005). 
 
3.4 The BNP in the 1980s 
The performance of the far right in the 1970s did, however, 
demonstrate that there was a potential support for the far right which 
tended to come from areas suffering from economic downturn with self 
employed workers.  Additionally, these areas were seen to be on the 
periphery of areas where large numbers of ethnic minorities were 
living (Husbands, 1983:182).  Therefore, the newly formed BNP were 
able to head into their first general election, confident of being able to 
attract support, which was reflected in the party fielding a record 
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number of candidates; 53, in addition to the 60 candidates fielded by 
the NF.    
 
The 1983 general election was to be the first test for Tyndall’s BNP, 
competing for the far right vote with the NF.  These parties were 
locked in a battle to win the support of the far right voters.  Whilst the 
NF remained strong in the capital, the BNP were beginning to win the 
support in the major cities in Britain.  This was due to the party 
structure which the BNP was putting into place, where local 
organisations were being established to canvass for support, notably 
in areas which had experienced unemployment, particularly due to a 
decline in traditional industry.  The 1983 general election also 
presented the BNP with a party political broadcast on prime time 
television, thus providing the best opportunity for the party to appeal to 
a great number of potential voters nationwide.   
 
Furthermore, the actions of the mainstream parties also gave the far 
right grounds for optimism in the 1983 election.  Labour’s position at 
the 1983 general election was seemingly weak, giving rise to a 
possibility that the far right could be able to capitalise on those voters 
disillusioned with the party.  Indeed, its position was further weakened 
when the party released their manifesto, described by Gerald 
Kaufman as the “longest suicide note in history” (BBC, 2005).  The 
manifesto was deemed to have policies unpopular with the public, 
including nuclear disarmament and the abolition of the House of 
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Lords, particularly given the timing of the election, coming only a year 
after the Falklands War (Butler and Kavanagh, 1983; BBC, 2005). 
 
The Conservatives also faced possible problems at the election, as 
rising unemployment during their first term in office threatened to allow 
the far right to establish themselves in communities where there was a 
clear dismay for the mainstream parties.  The issue of immigration had 
also stayed high on the agenda.  Since Powell’s speech in 1974, the 
Conservatives had been linked with immigration issues, a situation 
further exacerbated by Margaret Thatcher who had also made 
speeches regarding the issue of immigration since becoming leader of 
the Tories, using provocative terms such as immigrants ‘swamping’ 
the country (Copsey, 2004:67).  Thus, it appeared that, whilst the 
Conservatives were winning support over the immigration issue, they 
were also allowing the possibility of the far right being legitimised in 
their actions. 
 
Yet, despite these initial grounds for optimism, the election result tells 
a clear story.  The BNP managed to win just 0.58 per cent of the vote 
from its 54 candidates, the National Front faring little better with 1.04 
per cent from its 60 candidates.  There are arguably, a number of 
reasons for this performance.  Firstly, looking at the party itself, the 
electioneering by the BNP was unorganised and poor.  The party 
broadcast featuring Tyndall was uninspiring.  The party manifesto was 
also still too extreme for many voters to vote for the BNP.  The lack of 
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organisation and harmony in the far right, which had continually 
dogged the various parties, continued to do so.  Consequently, the fall 
out from the 1983 general election was seen four years later, when the 
BNP fielded just two candidates by 1987, as the continuing factions 
amongst the far right occurred throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s (Parliament UK, 2009)  
 
3.5 The BNP in the 1990s 
Following a similarly disappointing showing at the 1992 general 
election, the BNP’s biggest success in the 1990s came in the local 
election in Tower Hamlets in 1993, where candidate, Derek Beacon, 
enjoyed an unexpected success based on a ‘Rights for Whites’ 
campaign in the area (Smith, 2009).   The party were said to benefit 
from the actions of the ruling Liberal Democrat council, following a 
controversial policy brought in which “favoured white residents and 
pushed migrant workers further down the housing priority list” (Smith, 
2009).  Such a move arguably allowed the BNP to push forward their 
‘Rights for Whites’ campaign with more justification (Copsey, 2004).  
Moreover, the methods of campaigning by the BNP were also the first 
signs of changing style of the party.  The party attempted to portray a 
more respectable image in its bid to win the support of the local 
electorate by such measures as organising peaceful marches by local 
residents and emphasising local roots and the community (Smith, 
2009). 
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However, this initial success in Tower Hamlets was not to be built 
upon, with the party losing the seat at the subsequent local election.  
The blame for this was attributed, once more, to the extremist links 
within the party, most notably with regard to Combat 18.  Members of 
the BNP, notably young working class males, were attracted to 
Combat 18, with the group claiming to have recruited three quarters of 
London activists, thus reducing the BNP membership to as low as 700 
(Copsey, 2004:67).   
 
Indeed, much of the negativity surrounding the image of the BNP in 
the 1990s linked to the positioning between themselves and the 
Combat 18 group.  The group, originally established as providing a 
means of security for the BNP, carried out violence on extreme levels 
and were linked with Nazi music and football hooliganism, including 
the rioting which took place during the Republic of Ireland versus 
England game in Dublin in 1995 (Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).  
Combat 18’s extremist behaviour was displayed in its anti-Semitic 
views, and a desire for a white revolution; indeed, such extreme views 
saw the group fall out with the BNP leadership, which led to leaders of 
the BNP becoming victims of physical attacks by members of Combat 
18 (Sykes, 2005:130). 
 
By the end of the 1990s, there were splits in the group which led to 
splinter groups. Blood and Honour and the National Socialist 
Movement were formed, appearing to suggest the end of Combat 18 
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activities.  However, the riots which were to break out in Oldham in 
2001 were claimed to be as a result of activity by the group in the town 
(Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).  
 
Significantly for the BNP, 1999 saw Nick Griffin elected as party 
chairman, replacing Tyndall.  Since Griffin’s appointment as BNP 
chairman in September 1999, the profile of the BNP has risen 
considerably, with the party making gains in local elections, firstly 
across northern England and, now, nationwide.  Griffin has attempted 
to bring the BNP into line with the other far right parties in Western 
Europe, whereas previously they had been seen to be a more extreme 
and classically racist party (Carter 2005).  In the past, the party had 
been seen displaying a deeply fascist ideology and “barely hidden 
allegiance to biological racism and Jewish conspiracy” under the 
leadership of John Tyndall (Copsey, 2004:98).   
 
3.6 Nick Griffin 
Whilst Griffin has been linked with the turnaround with regards to the 
change in image of the BNP, such a moderate and professional image 
have not, hitherto, been associated with the party chairman.  Indeed, 
Griffin has been dogged by controversies and claims of extremism 
throughout his political career. 
Griffin attended Downing College, Cambridge, where he studied 
history and law, graduating with a second class degree alongside his 
achievements as a boxing blue (Times, 2009).  However, in the early 
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stages of his political career, Griffin was seen somewhat as a hardliner 
and a more extreme member of the NF and BNP, with his early 
writings calling not so much for populism as a means of winning 
support, but rather a focus on other issues such as a call for a more 
direct involvement in Holocaust denial (Copsey, 2004)  
 
Griffin left the BNP to form the International Third Position, which was 
to be a defence of nations, races and cultures, seeing it threatened by 
“internationalism and enforced multiculturalism and multiracialism”, 
vowing also to protect England and Englishness (Sykes, 2005:27).  
However the ITP has been accused of merely being a “racist agenda 
aimed at Jews, blacks and immigrants” (Times, 2009).  Furthermore 
Griffin courted controversy by going on a fund raising trip to Libya, and 
arranging a meeting with Colonel Gadaffi (Times, 2009) 
 
Griffin was to return to the BNP in 1995, yet his anti-Semitic attacks 
appeared to continue unabated.  Griffin was criticised for his 
numerous Holocaust denials, alongside the publication of an article 
entitled ‘Who are the mind-benders?’ where he attacked what he 
called the “undemocratic and dangerous concentration of Jewish 
influence in the British mass media” (Copsey 2004:70).  Such was the 
nature of Griffin’s hard-line views, that in May 1998 he was convicted 
for incitement to racial hatred and received a nine month sentence 
suspended for two years (Copsey, 2004).  
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Subsequently, Griffin appeared to change his stance on extremism, in 
an attempt to display a more moderate image, a move which was 
made for a number of possible reasons related to his own personal 
circumstances and the position of the far right itself.  Firstly, it has 
been argued that Griffin had to change from his image as a hardliner 
to that of a more moderate member of the BNP, as a consequence of 
his conviction for incitement to racial hatred (Copsey, 2004).  
Therefore, it became imperative, that if he was to further his political 
career in the BNP, he would have to present a more moderate image 
to avoid any further charges being made against him, otherwise 
risking a prison sentence, and, thus, ending any aspirations of being a 
leader of a far right party which could establish themselves at the 
polls. 
 
Secondly, Griffin, was liaising with less extreme BNP activists such as 
Steve and Sharron Edwards and Eddy Butler, who were advising a 
change of policy to a more community-based campaigning, as the 
most viable way to win the support of new members.  Indeed Griffin 
hoped to be “a beacon of hope to disillusioned mainstream voters” and 
thus realised that the only way to do this would be through a more 
professional and moderate BNP (Copsey, 2004:101). 
 
Thirdly, events in Western Europe, particularly in France, 
demonstrated to Griffin that a moderate professional far right party 
was the most successful means of achieving electoral success for the 
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far right.  The rise of the Front National through the 1980s and 1990s 
had already begun to have an impact on Griffin.  Jean Marie Le Pen 
had similarly attempted to moderate his extreme image to portray 
himself as an anti-sleaze candidate.  This resulted in his success in 
the first round of voting at the Presidential election as many voters 
saw him as the only viable alternative to the mainstream (Fysh and 
Wolfreys, 2003).  Indeed, such was the impact of Le Pen on Griffin, 
that the two leaders met up in northern England in 2004 for a far right 
summit, amid controversy and protests by anti-fascist groups (BBC, 
2004a).  
 
Hence, the influence of the Front National began to be witnessed in 
many of the BNP activities, in terms of policy issues and other events, 
notably in the establishing of an annual Red White and Blue festival, 
an event for BNP members and their families, similar in style to an 
event held by their French counterparts. 
 
Subsequently, Griffin’s leadership challenge to John Tyndall can be 
seen as a battle between two styles of far right leadership, the 
bombastic style of Tyndall compared to Griffin’s new attempts of 
leadership based on populism and moderation.  As Griffin was to 
prove successful in his attempts to become party chairman in 
September, BNP member John Bean noted that John Tyndall was the 
BNP’s “greatest asset and its greatest drawback.  His persistence, 
rock-like reliability and leadership had kept the movement going, but 
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with almost imperceptible growth since its 1982 foundation” (Copsey, 
2004:74). 
 
Whilst Griffin set about his plans for a more professional and moderate 
BNP, the beginning of his reign had seen the BNP perform very badly 
in the 1999 European elections, with links to extremism making press 
headlines, notably a Mirror headline linking London nail bomber David 
Copeland to the BNP (Copsey, 2004).  Hence, Griffin set about 
attempting to change the extremist image of BNP candidates by 
bringing in more professional candidates who did not have any such 
extreme backgrounds, namely Michael Newland, who was BNP 
candidate for the London mayoral elections in 2000 (Copsey, 2004; 
Sykes, 2005).  However, the schism which appeared to have dogged 
previous far right movements in Britain seemed to be about to end the 
leadership of Griffin, when leading activists such as Newland and 
Sharron and Steve Edwards became unhappy with Griffin’s 
leadership, viewing Griffin’s leadership style as that of being too 
similar to Tyndall.  Subsequent poor results in May 2000 led to further 
criticisms of Griffin’s ability to gain support amongst party activists 
(Copsey, 2004).  Consequently, Newlands and Edwards did not mount 
a leadership challenge, but instead, formed the Freedom Party, thus 
leading to further schism in the far right.  However, Griffin was said to 
benefit from keeping hardliner support in the BNP, because many 
activists regarded the Freedom Party as not being hard-line enough in 
their policies (Copsey, 2004). 
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Indeed, as the party began to enjoy local election success, they were 
soon to be embroiled in another controversy which saw the party on 
the front pages of the national newspapers for further negative 
reasons.  The party was exposed in a BBC Panorama documentary, 
which led to Griffin, Tyndall and activist Mark Collett facing race-hate 
charges.  In the BBC programme, reporter, Jason Gwynne, went 
undercover with the BNP for six months in which a number of party 
members were exposed proclaiming extremist views and confessing 
to race hate crimes (Times, 2004).  Griffin himself was filmed 
expressing anti-Islamic sentiments at a series of BNP meeting in 
Yorkshire, stating at one such meeting; “You’ve got to stand up and do 
something for the British National Party because otherwise they, 
(Muslims), will do for someone in your family.  That is the truth”, whilst 
also referring to Islam as a “wicked, vicious faith” (BBC, 2004b).   
 
Following the airing of this programme, Griffin, along with John Tyndall 
and the head of the Youth-wing BNP Mark Collett, were charged on a 
number of race hate charges, of which they were acquitted following 
two trials at Leeds Crown Court, with Judge Norman Jones QC 
declaring that; 
 
"We live in a democratic society which jealously protects the rights of 
its citizens to freedom of expression, to free speech. That does not 
mean it is limited to speaking only the acceptable, popular or politically 
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correct things. It extends to the unpopular, to those which many 
people may find unacceptable, unpalatable and sensitive.” (Naughton, 
2007) 
 
Thus, Griffin left court proudly declaring that; "Something's just 
happened to show Tony Blair and the government toadies in the BBC 
that they can take our taxes, but they cannot take our hearts, they 
cannot take our tongues and they cannot take our freedom," 
(Naughton, 2007).  Hence, Griffin had successfully held off challenges 
and controversies to his leadership and began setting into place his 
plans for a moderate and professional BNP.   
 
3.7 The 2001 riots and local election successes 
However, it can be argued that far right parties benefit from mobilising 
support following a particular event or incident (Carter, 2005).  This is 
the case for the BNP, with the riots which took place in the summer of 
2001 in a number of northern towns and cities providing the catalyst 
for the party’s upturn in fortunes.  Trouble flared firstly in the 
Lancashire town of Oldham, as a consequence of simmering tension 
between local Asian and white youths.  The tension between the two 
groups had been caused due to a number of short-term and long-term 
factors.  The long-term factors had seen Oldham become highly 
segregated, with predominantly Asian areas in Glodwick and 
Westwood being viewed as no go areas for white residents of Oldham.  
Similarly, the white areas of Oldham were deemed as no go areas to 
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Asian residents due to concerns regarding violence. Consequently, 
the Ritchie Report, commissioned to investigate the reasons behind 
the riots in Oldham, noted “there are few opportunities for young 
people across the communal boundaries to mix within Oldham.  
Except where people have significant contact in the workplace this is 
the case for adults too.” (Ritchie, 2001:9).  Moreover, rumours and 
counter rumours abounded that certain groups were receiving more 
money from the councils, with one such rumour that the Council were 
providing money for Mosques to be built in the Glodwick area (Ritchie, 
2001).  Subsequently, such claims and counter claims were adding to 
the effect on relations already strained by an apparent segregation of 
ethnic groups in the Oldham, and such relations were to be damaged 
even further by series of events in early 2001.  
 
Firstly, the NF proposed a planned march through the town at the end 
of March, though this plan was never submitted.   Two months later, a 
group of fifty NF supporters arrived in Oldham with the intention to 
march through the town, however, they were prevented by police from 
marching into Oldham and were escorted back to the M6 (Ritchie, 
2001).  The following week, a number of NF supporters delivered 
leaflets around the Holts and Fitton Hills estates in Oldham, leading to 
an arrest and another escort out of Oldham.  This tension was 
compounded following trouble which broke out after a football match in 
the town between Oldham Athletic and Stoke City, in which a number 
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of racist incidents occurred between local Bangladeshi youths and 
Stoke City supporters (Ritchie, 2001). 
 
Moreover, there was criticism levelled at both the local newspaper, the 
Oldham Chronicle, and at The Chief Superintendent of Oldham Police, 
Eric Hewitt, for their role in causing tension between ethnic groups 
(Copsey, 2004).  Hewitt raised his concerns over the rising levels of 
attacks on white men by gangs of Asians, an issue which was to be 
taken up by the Chronicle, thus acting as a catalyst to the already 
existing tension in the town.  Indeed, the effect of such journalism led 
to the claim that “it is hard not to overdo the significance of the 
Chronicle’s reporting.  It spread the mentality of white victimhood and 
redefined racism as ‘anti-white racism’” (Copsey, 2004:128). 
 
Subsequently, at the 2001 general election, Griffin stood as a 
candidate in the Oldham West constituency, polling 5,091 votes, 
giving him an impressive 16.4 per cent of the vote.  Such was the role 
of the BNP in creating the ethnic tension in Oldham, that the Richie 
report concluded that; 
 
“It is clear that the British National Party, and other racist organisations 
such as the National Front and Combat 18, have exploited these 
divisions and, by countless misrepresentations and the extensive use 
of the term ‘Muslim’ in a derogatory sense as code for Asian, have 
exacerbated problems, whilst generally keeping just within the law.  
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The BNP have exacerbated problems and, undoubtedly, by 
distribution of crude leaflets and other activity, done much to stir up 
tensions” (Ritchie, 2001:10). 
 
More northern towns were to witness riots across the summer of 2001, 
notably in Burnley and Bradford.  Similarities in the long term causes 
of the riots in Burnley and Oldham were apparent, both being former 
industrial towns affected by the collapse of the local industries. Allied 
to this was an apparent segregation in the towns amongst ethnic 
groups on which the BNP attempted to capitalise (Copsey, 2004).  
These electoral successes were to extend throughout other areas of 
Yorkshire, such as Calderdale and into the rest of the country, with a 
notable success for the party coming in the 2006 local elections, when 
twelve seats were won in Barking and Dagenham, propelling the party 
into the official opposition in the Council (BBC, 2006). 
The professional approach adopted by Griffin was reflected in 
electioneering carried out by the party at local elections, with specific 
campaign issues and strategies being adapted to meet the needs of 
the particular area Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).  This was certainly 
seen to be the case in Millwall, where the door to door campaigning by 
the party in the district did much to dispel the previous image of 
extremism in the BNP (Sykes, 2005).  Indeed, more examples of area 
specific campaigning were in evidence during the 2003 local elections.  
In Stoke-on-Trent, BNP campaigners focused on the issue of asylum 
seekers, whilst in Calderdale, the campaigners focused on local 
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issues, complete with different leaflets for different areas of the 
Mixenden ward (Copsey, 2004).  Furthermore, in Heckmondwike in 
West Yorkshire, it appeared that the middle class areas of the town 
were being targeted by the BNP, with a focus on law and order, as 
opposed to the issues of immigration or asylum seekers (Sykes, 
2005).  The targeting of middle class areas was not unique to West 
Yorkshire, with more middle class areas of Burnley in Lancashire also 
canvassed by the party.  Another such area canvassed by the BNP 
was Broxbourne in Hertfordshire, traditionally a Conservative area, 
with few ethnic minorities or social problems on which the BNP could 
capitalise.  
 
Hence, it also appeared that the BNP were now selecting wards where 
they believed they could establish themselves in the community, such 
wards were often areas where working class districts have been 
abandoned by the mainstream parties (Copsey, 2004, 137).  The BNP 
enjoyed its first successes in northern towns and cities which had 
experienced a downturn in industry such as Burnley, Oldham and 
Bradford.  However, the party had now grown to an extent that they 
were able to target both major cities such as London, Birmingham and 
Manchester, alongside smaller towns nationwide, rather than focusing 
on one or two major areas.  Moreover, the party was also beginning to 
target the rural vote, moving away from traditional far right areas of 
support in urban areas (Goodwin, 2008).   
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However, extremist viewpoints were still prevalent within the party, 
indeed following the terrorists attacks on September 11th, the BNP 
launched what was described by EU monitors as a “highly explicit 
Islamophobic campaign” (Roxburgh, 2002:234) demonstrating that, 
whilst there may be an appearance of modernisation and 
professionalism, there was still a racist core to the party’s campaigning 
in many areas. 
 
3.8 The BNP membership and voters 
In November 2008, a list containing the names of the BNP 
membership was leaked to the press and was released onto the 
internet.  The list caused controversy in the British press as it revealed 
that included in the members of the BNP, were doctors, vicars, a 
police officer and a national radio DJ.  The leaking of the list provoked 
anger amongst many of the BNP members, who became concerned 
that the publication could lead to members being subject to attacks 
(BBC, 2008a).  Following this leaking, two former members of the BNP 
were arrested in connection with providing the leak (BBC, 2008a).  
 
However, another aspect of the publication of the BNP membership is 
that it was arguably not necessarily bad publicity for the party.  
Showing that many of the members have respectable professions help 
to promote the party as less extreme, moving the party away from the 
image of extremism which had prevented any breakthrough, therefore 
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potentially encouraging more voters to join up if they perceived this to 
be the case. 
 
An analysis of the BNP membership by the Times (November, 2008) 
allows us to draw some conclusions about the party support.  The 
BNP is predominantly an English party, with seemingly little support in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  Where there are pockets of 
members in Scotland and Wales, these tend to be in cities such as 
Glasgow and Swansea.  The BNP is particularly strong in the West 
and East Midlands, as well as in areas where the party first made a 
breakthrough at the local level, namely in areas of Lancashire and 
West Yorkshire (Times, 2008).  Unsurprisingly, given their local 
election successes in Barking and Dagenham, membership is also 
higher in that area. 
 
3.9 Media Outlets for the BNP 
Campaigning strategies from the party have been professionalised to 
an extent and the same can be said for its media outlets.  Since his 
election as party chairman in 1999, Griffin has presided to improve the 
media communications for the party, establishing Media Monitoring 
Unit with Griffin’s aim to prevent the media from using terms such as 
fascist and Nazi when reporting the Party (Copsey, 2004:107).  
Furthermore, the influence of the FN and Le Pen was clear in Griffin’s 
rebranding of the BNP’s magazine and other literature, with the 
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changing of the Spearhead newspaper to Freedom, seemingly in a bid 
to make the party appear less extreme (Copsey, 2004). 
 
Moreover, the BNP has attempted to present a more moderate image 
through their other media outlets, drawing on language more 
associated with aspects of multiculturalism (Atton, 2006).  One such 
area where this has been in evidence is through the BNP website, to 
such an extent that its website was found to be the most visited 
political website amongst internet users in September 2007, with 59 
per cent of these visitors coming from the more affluent social groups 
(Hope, 2007).  Indeed, this website is as professionally run as the 
mainstream parties, with facilities online such as BNP-TV, which 
provides reports from journalists for visitors to watch, and other 
modern internet techniques such as online shopping and various 
audio and video links providing stories about the party and its activists 
(Atton, 2006; John et al, 2006).  In its website, the BNP portray 
themselves as a movement who are trying to protect a white culture 
which they claim to be under threat from other cultures in Britain 
(Atton, 2006).  Furthermore, the website also provides what it calls 
‘Meet the Real BNP’ where it has profiles of  party members 
describing why they joined the BNP, demonstrating the continuation of 
the notion throughout the website that the white person is the ‘victim’ 
from ethnic minorities (Atton, 2006).  The BNP website does not allow 
non-members to post comments; in fact, the party line appears to be 
quite strongly enforced.  Atton (2006) attributes this to the possible 
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unrest amongst BNP activists with the leadership of Griffin, this 
attribution can be supported by the internal disagreements within the 
party which saw activists in the north of England move away to form 
their own far right group (BBC, 2007).  The lack of opportunity to 
debate and leave comment on the website could, seemingly. also be 
in place to prevent opponents of the party from leaving anti-BNP 
comments.  The website, however, does encourage local activism and 
campaigning by providing leaflets for BNP members to download and 
distribute in their local areas.  Furthermore, the website also offers 
some form of cyber-activism, in the form of their perceived bias 
against them by the BBC, where visitors to the website are 
encouraged to highlight such cases of bias (Atton, 2006). 
 
3.10 The anti-fascist campaign 
Whilst this chapter has so far examined how, historically, the far right’s 
inability to mount a serious campaign in Britain has been due to their 
own shortcomings as a movement, a study of the history of the far 
right Britain must take into account the high profile role played by the 
number of anti-fascist groups, indeed as Britain has been said to have 
an anti-fascist tradition dating back to the 1930s (Renton, 2001:170). 
 
In the 1970s, in response to the rise of the National Front and their 
electoral successes, the Anti-Nazi League (ANL) was founded by 
Peter Hain, Ernie Roberts and Paul Holborow.  Between 1977 and 
1979, the Anti-Nazi League sold 750,000 badges and distributed nine 
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million leaflets (Renton, 2001).  Additionally, an initiative alongside the 
ANL was Rock Against Racism (RAR), set up in response to 
comments made by Eric Clapton supporting Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of 
Blood’ speech (Renton, 1996).  The actions of ANL and RAR have 
been viewed as a successful means of combating the far right threat 
with Renton arguing that if the “RAR and the ANL both intend to turn 
back the growth of the NF, they achieved the goal they set 
themselves” (Renton 2001:179). 
 
This anti-fascist tradition has appeared to remain in Britain with, 
currently, a number of anti-fascist organizations still campaigning at 
election times.  The anti-fascist groups have had notable differences 
of opinion; this was particularly visible in 2005 when Searchlight and 
Unite Against Fascism (UAF) clashed over differences of opinion 
about the running of their national campaign, thus leading to 
Searchlight members resigning from the UAF steering committee 
(Searchlight, 2005). 
 
Searchlight aims to campaign in areas where the BNP is expected to 
perform strongly, often in conjunction with the Labour Party and the 
unions, with campaigning taking a number of forms, including 
extensive leafleting and days of action.  Searchlight will often distribute 
area specific literature in the form of leaflets and newspapers, warning 
of the perceived threat of the BNP and aim to expose any extreme 
past of BNP members (Searchlight, 2006).  Such days of action have 
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included a mass distribution of anti-fascist literature and also have 
often involved setting up stands in towns and cities to speak to local 
voters (Unison, 2008).  Two such areas which have witnessed such a 
day of action are Calderdale and Bradford.  In Calderdale, extensive 
campaigns comprising a combination of Labour activists, anti-fascist 
campaigners and union members have been run in the ward of 
Illingworth and Mixenden, a ward with a strong BNP vote, which 
campaigners claimed has proved successful in preventing BNP 
members winning all seats in the ward (Unison, 2008).  Similarly in 
Bradford, local union members and anti-fascist campaigners have 
used Yorkshire Day as a means of spreading the anti-fascist message 
(Unison, 2007).  Furthermore, singer Billy Bragg embarked on a 
nationwide tour to promote the anti-fascist message in areas where 
the BNP were expected to perform well, notably in London, the North 
West and Yorkshire (Evans, 2006).    
 
3.11 Mainstream parties  
Moreover, within the context of the reaction to BNP, there is also the 
issue of how the mainstream parties deal with the possible threat of 
the party at local elections, an issue that has led to accusations of 
mainstream parties helping the BNP’s cause at local elections through 
their words and actions (Copsey, 2004).  Thus, whereas the actions of 
the mainstream parties have, hitherto, been seen as a key factor 
behind the far right’s ability to win support, as was arguably the case 
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in the 1980s, now, mainstream politicians are potentially giving the 
BNP publicity through their actions. 
 
In 2002, David Blunkett notably caused a controversy when he spoke 
of asylum seekers ‘swamping’ British schools.  This comment was 
particularly emotive with regard to echoing the sentiment from 
Margaret Thatcher’s remarks on immigration in the early 1980s (BBC, 
2002; Copsey, 2004).  Blunkett faced criticism from Labour members 
including Diane Abbott and Roy Hattersley, who led calls for Blunkett 
to apologise for his terminology. However, Blunkett defended his 
actions and gained support from Downing Street over his comments 
(BBC, 2002). 
 
At the 2006 local elections, employment minister Margaret Hodge 
attracted criticism for her remarks with regard to the BNP.  Hodge 
remarked that there was a possibility of 8 out of 10 white families 
voting for the BNP in her constituency of Barking and Dagenham, due 
to their anger with a growing number of asylum seekers in the area 
(BBC, 2006).    The BNP won 12 seats at the subsequent local 
election and Hodge’s comments provoked anger amongst her fellow 
Labour Party members, who called for disciplinary action to be taken 
against her.  Labour candidates in the area accused Hodge of giving 
the BNP the limelight, raising the profile of the BNP and justifying their 
claims on asylum and immigration (BBC, 2006).  This opinion was 
shared by Richard Barnbrook, the BNP’s London organizer for the 
 82 
2006 local elections who thanked Hodge for giving the BNP ‘a million 
pounds worth of free publicity’ (BBC, 2006).  Hodge also faced 
criticism from other MPs such as Alan Johnson and John Cruddas 
over what they perceived to be her giving the limelight to the BNP.   
 
Furthermore, the Conservative Party has been criticised for fuelling 
the debate on immigration and playing into the BNP’s hands through 
opinions expressed in the media (UAF, 2006).  The shadow minister 
for community cohesion, Sayeeda Warsi was particularly criticised by 
the group Operation Black Vote for suggesting that immigration was 
‘out of control’ in the UK, and that the Conservatives must listen to the 
BNP voters (Woolf and Brady, 2007). 
 
This was not the first time that Conservative Party members had faced 
such criticism for remarks made with regard to the BNP.  In 2006, 
Unite Against Fascism called on David Cameron to discipline Norman 
Tebbit after he was accused of legitimizing the BNP by describing 
them not as a far right party, but, in fact, as a left wing party in a letter 
to the Daily Telegraph (UAF, 2006).  Further controversy was made 
when the father of BNP leader Nick Griffin, Edgar Griffin was exposed 
as being the vice-president for Iain Duncan-Smith’s campaign in 
Wales (Britten, 2001).  Following this revelation, Edgar Griffin was 
expelled from the party.  Furthermore, William Hague had been 
accused of helping legitimise the BNP campaign when he accused 
Labour of ‘turning Britain into a foreign land’ (Copsey, 2004:130).  
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Additionally, Conservative MP, John Townend, accused the 
government of turning Britain into a ‘mongrel race’ (Copsey, 
2004:130). 
 
The effects, therefore, of these comments and actions can be, 
perhaps, perceived as having played into the hands of the BNP.  
However, it can be argued that to ignore the BNP altogether and form 
a kind of cordon sanitaire, as has been the case in other West 
European countries, would also potentially increase the BNP vote, as 
voters feel that their voice is not being heard (Goodwin, 2008).  
Copsey (2004), argues that where race is politicised, then BNP 
success should not be surprising.    Indeed, social studies into the 
BNP and anti-fascist campaigners have suggested that mainstream 
politicians should be talking about race and asylum in a way to inform 
the voters about the issues of immigration in order to prevent the 
BNP’s myths about immigration from becoming regarded as fact (John 
et al, 2006).   
 
3.12 Conclusion 
The investigation into the history of the far right in the UK was carried 
out in order to establish any apparent reasoning behind the failure of 
any far right movement to achieve any reasonable level of success 
and the national level.  Having carried out this investigation, it appears 
that a number of themes emerge when examining this history.  Firstly, 
far right movements in Britain appeared to have been dogged by 
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internal fall outs and disagreements amongst leading members, thus 
preventing a stable organisation from forming to represent the British 
far right.  Moreover, the party’s links with Nazism through members 
such as John Tyndall had discouraged voters, particularly those from 
the Conservative Party from supporting a far right movement.  The 
chapter also argues that a strong Conservative Party in the 1980s 
played a major role in preventing the BNP and the NF from winning 
support, due to their strong stance on issues of immigration and 
nationalist tendencies. 
 
Yet the examination of the BNP under Nick Griffin suggest that the 
party learnt from the failures of previous far right movements and were 
taking active steps to present their party in a more moderate light.  
Whilst it is apparent that there are links with extremism in the 
backgrounds of leading members including Griffin himself, at the start 
of the century, the BNP were ready to attempt to exploit the issues of 
immigration and asylum alongside any perceptible weakness in the 
mainstream parties to push for electoral success across the country.  
Indeed, there appeared to be divisions in the mainstream parties with 
regard to the best way of dealing with the rise of the BNP across the 
UK.  Consequently, the BNP were beginning to target voters from all 
social backgrounds having shed their links to violence and Nazism.  
Certainly, the BNP under Nick Griffin seemed to be the best placed far 
movement in recent history to perform strongly in British local 
elections. 
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Chapter Four: The BNP in comparative perspective 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two of this thesis noted how academic literature had focused 
on the role of the British far right, in comparison with other European 
far right parties, and put forward the idea of comparing the BNP 
alongside West European far right parties, as a means of establishing 
whether Nick Griffin has managed to bring the BNP into line with his 
European counterparts.  This chapter, therefore, aims to examine the 
BNP in a thematically organised comparative perspective, with other 
far right West European parties.  Firstly, the structure of the parties is 
examined, in order to establish how similar they are to their 
counterparts, in terms of the way they choose to organise themselves.  
Secondly, the policies and organisation of the BNP will be examined, 
to ascertain if there is any degree of uniformity in the far right parties 
across Western Europe, or whether the BNP take an individualistic 
stance on certain policy areas.  The chapter then examines why the 
BNP has not enjoyed the same levels of success as other West 
European parties, discussing the leadership and image of the parties 
and the reaction of the mainstream parties to the far right threat.   
 
 
 
 
 
 86 
4.2 Methodology 
For the purposes of this chapter, the far right parties in Western 
Europe have been purposefully selected, whilst not considering the far 
right in Eastern Europe.  This is not to say that the far right in Eastern 
Europe have not enjoyed the same levels of success as their Western 
counterparts, indeed, far right parties in Eastern Europe were said to 
have benefited from the collapse of communism and a rise in ultra 
nationalist feelings and movements (Merkl and Weinberg, 2003; 
Carter, 2005).  However, Western Europe has witnessed a rise in 
popularity of the far right over the past twenty years (Hainsworth, 
2000).  Whilst previous radical movements in a number of European 
countries had experienced brief popularity, the sustained electoral 
success of far right parties in Western Europe at the turn of the 
century, was the first time they had enjoyed such a record in elections 
(Hainsworth, 2000).  Furthermore, surveys conducted on behalf of the 
European Union (EU) highlighted a surge in racist and xenophobic 
attitudes, thus demonstrating the potential of far right support (Merkl 
and Weinberg, 2003).  Western Europe has also witnessed a growth 
in immigration and asylum seekers since the 1980s, which has had 
implications for European economics and culture (Hainsworth, 
2000:1). 
 
Additionally, the EU has taken on an ever increasing and widening 
role in Europe, reducing the political power of individual countries, a 
move which has led to a fear over a loss of identity amongst citizens; 
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consequently, far right parties are succeeding in attracting voters who 
have a dislike or distrust of the EU (Ivasflaten, 2008).  Furthermore, 
distrust for politicians in Western Europe has also been apparent as a 
result of a number of political scandals and corruption across the 
continent.  Again, these grievances with mainstream politicians could 
provide the far right with an opportunity to increase their own support 
(Abedi, 2002; Ivasflaten, 2008). 
 
Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, the parties under 
consideration will be the principal far right parties in Western Europe, 
namely the Freiheits Partei Österreich (FPO) in Austria, Vlaams 
Belang (formerly Vlaams Blok) (VB) in Belgium, the Dansk Folkeparti 
(DF) in Denmark and the Front National (FN) in France, in addition to 
the BNP   
 
The VB, FPO, DF and FN are all established far right parties in their 
respective countries and have been extensively recognised as West 
European far right parties (Hainsworth, 2000; Carter, 2005; Kitschelt, 
2007).   Furthermore, the literature review carried out, acknowledged 
that issues such as xenophobia, racism and desire for a strong state 
are seen as a common trait for far right parties.  However when 
placing the BNP in the far right grouping, the party is seen as being 
more radical and classically racist, as a consequence of their links with 
Neo-Nazism (Hainsworth, 2000; Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005). This is in 
contrast to the DF, FN, VB and FPO, who, whilst displaying the classic 
 88 
traits of a far right party, do not adhere to such classic racism and a 
demand for less democracy (Ignazi, 2003; Carter, 2005). 
 
4.3 The general elections under Nick Griffin 
Whilst Chapter 3 acknowledged how the far right have failed to enjoy 
electoral success at the national level, the comparative perspective 
allows for an examination to determine the factors which have 
contributed to these failings, particularly under Griffin’s leadership.  
The 2001 general election was the first election following Griffin’s 
appointment as party chairman, with the party fielding 33 candidates 
polling 44,129 votes at an average of 1428 per candidate.  This figure 
was boosted by the strong performance of Griffin himself in the 
Oldham and Saddleworth constituency, where he polled 16.4 per cent 
of the vote.  This appeared to show some promises to the party for 
potential far right support at a general election.  Therefore, the 2005 
general election provided the BNP with a chance to field 119 
candidates, the highest number for the party, so far, in a general 
election, with the party ready “to fight an aggressive campaign in its 
heartlands” (Kavanagh and Butler 2005:50).  Seemingly, this 
appeared to give the BNP its greatest chance to break through the 1 
per cent mark at a general election.  Nevertheless, despite this, the 
party won just 0.7 per cent of the vote nationally, at the time continuing 
the failure of the British far right to gain more than 1 per cent of the 
vote and, thus, on the surface, appearing to show the failure of 
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Griffin’s party to have the ability to make any more impact at the 
national level than previous far right parties.  
 
At the 2009 European elections, the BNP had two candidates elected 
for the European Parliament, with Nick Griffin elected for the North 
West and Andrew Brons for Yorkshire and Humber, with the party 
gaining over 6 per cent of the vote nationwide.  Consequently, the 
success of the two BNP candidates allowed for a rise in the party 
profile (BBC, 2009).  The European Parliament pays £175,800 a year 
per British MEP, thus allowing Griffin and Brons the potential to 
employ party aides, such as media and communications officers, 
researchers and campaign officers (BBC, 2009).  The success of 
Brons and Griffin arguably provided optimism for the party going into 
the 2010 general election, that it could win its first seat in a general 
election. 
 
The party subsequently won 522,977 votes, at 1.9 per cent of the vote 
nationally.  However, despite breaking through the 1 per cent barrier 
for the first time at an election, the election can be arguably regarded 
as somewhat a failure for the BNP and, indeed, questions the future of 
Griffin’s leadership.  In Barking, where the BNP polled 16.4 per cent, 
hopes were high amongst BNP members of producing a serious 
challenge to Margaret Hodge, the incumbent Labour MP.    Yet, 
despite this, Griffin only polled 6620 votes and was beaten into 3rd 
place by Conservative candidate Simon Marcus (Whitehead, 2010).  
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Further disappointment was to come in Stoke, where, again, BNP 
expectations had been high of a strong support, notably due to the 
decision by the Labour hierarchy to nominate candidate Tristram Hunt, 
much to the chagrin of local Labour supporters, thus raising the 
possibility of voters turning to the BNP as a protest against Hunt 
(Stratton, 2010).  Stoke on Trent was an area where local council 
results had previously produced strong support for the BNP.  Again, 
despite these hopes, BNP candidate Simon Darby polled 2502 votes, 
coming in 4th behind Hunt and the Liberal Democrat and Conservative 
candidates.  Similar stories were witnessed across other areas which 
had witnessed strong BNP support in previous elections, such as 
Burnley, Dewsbury and Keighley all saw their support fall. 
 
4.4 European far right parties under examination 
Austria 
The Freedom Party of Austria has played a major role in Austrian 
politics in the past ten years (FPO).  The FPO’s move to the far right 
was triggered by the appointment of charismatic leader, Jorg Haider, 
to the party leadership in 1986, with Haider’s populist protest, anti-EU 
and immigration tendencies coming to the fore. Through a 
combination of aggressive campaigning and the flamboyancy of 
Haider’s leadership, support for the FPO began to grow amongst 
young men and blue collar workers throughout the 1990s (Luther, 
2003).  The electoral successes of the FPO continued to build and, in 
the 1999 legislative election, the party stunned the political world by 
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winning 27 per cent of the vote, giving it 52 seats in the Austrian 
parliament (Luther, 2003).  In 2000, the party entered into a coalition 
with the People’s Party led by Wolfgang Schüssel, causing outrage 
amongst EU leaders. (Luther, 2003: 192) 
 
However, the period of incumbency appeared to dramatically affect 
the position and strategy of the FPO.  Haider was not able to enjoy the 
same success which, previously, had been based on a negative 
campaign criticizing the government (Luther, 2003).  Following 
Haider’s resignation as leader and his subsequent departure from the 
party, the FPO was beset by internal disputes which saw its 
performance dramatically reduced, although the party was still part of 
the government coalition.  Subsequently, this was to end, following the 
results of the 2006 legislative election in Austria, when its share of the 
vote fell to 11 per cent giving it only 21 seats. 
 
However, despite the apparent split in the far right in Austria, both the 
FPO and the BZO-Liste, Jorg Haider enjoyed considerable success.  
The FPO, under the leadership of Heinz Christian Strache, won 34 
seats in 2008 with Haider’s party winning 21 seats 
(electionresources.org, 2008).  This resurgence of the far right vote 
prompted calls from members of both parties for the FPO and BZO to 
unite into one far right party.  The two parties were seen to appeal to 
differing voters, with the FPO gaining a following amongst working 
class voters in urban areas AND with the BZO appearing to gain 
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support amongst more middle class and rural voters.  Yet, shortly after 
the elections, Haider was killed in a car crash, prompting further 
possibility that the two parties could unite, as Haider himself was seen 
as the main obstacle to stop this from occurring (Hashash, 2008).   In 
December 2009, the FPO and BZO announced that they would form a 
nationalist union and campaign jointly in the 2012 national elections 
(EU Times, 2009). 
 
Belgium 
The major far right party in Belgium is Vlaams Belang (formerly 
Vlaams Blok).  Vlaams Blok was founded in 1977 with the aim of 
defending Flemish interests and to fight for the creation of an 
independent Flanders (Roxburgh 2002).  Since the 1980s, the party 
has witnessed a steady increase in support throughout the Flanders 
region of Belgium. 
 
The party has a particular stronghold in the city of Antwerp, which has 
a high immigrant population. They had been prevented from making 
increasing gains due to a pledge for a cordon sanitaire from the other 
parties, which means they avoided having any dealings or alliances 
with Vlaams Belang.  However, this policy has fractured in recent 
years, leading to an upturn in fortunes for the party (Mudde, 2007).  
Vlaams Belang has been seen to take a hard-line stance, calling for 
the repatriation of all non-EU foreigners (Roxburgh, 2002; Mudde, 
2007).  
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The party has prominent members such as MP Felip Dewinter, who’s 
style is style to Jorg Haider through his confident oratory skills and 
respectable image (Roxburgh, 2002; Mudde, 2007).  The party has 
gained momentum by polling well in the city of Antwerp and has then 
built upon this success across the country, which has led to them 
winning 17 of the 150 seats in the Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives following the 2007 general elections 
(electionresources.org, 2007a).  In the 2010 election, the party won 
7.76 per cent of the vote, giving the party 12 seats (European 
Parliament, 2009).  The party won 2 seats in the European Parliament, 
following their 9.85 per cent vote share in the 2009 elections. 
 
Denmark 
The emergence of the far right party in Denmark, the Dansk Folkeparti 
(DF), allows us to include them in our study of far right parties at the 
national level.  The DF has seen its national performance consistently 
increase under the leadership of Pia Kjaersgaard, a politician who is 
seen to be level headed and respectable, in contrast to other far right 
leaders (Roxburgh, 2002; Carter, 2005).  The party has enjoyed 
increasing success in the past four national elections and won 25 out 
of 175 seats in the 2007 elections for the Danish Parliament 
(electionresources.org, 2007b).  In the 2009 European elections, the 
party won 15.3 per cent of the vote, giving the party two members in 
the European Parliament.  Despite their strong representation in the 
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Danish Parliament, the party was not part of any coalition, yet carried 
enough strength for the mainstream parties to try and earn its support 
for policy implementations, thus allowing the party to develop a 
powerful voice in the Parliament (Rydgren, 2004).  This can be seen in 
the tough laws on immigration and asylum that were adopted by the 
centre right coalition, in order to maintain the support from the DF, 
which led to criticism from fellow countries in Scandinavia over the 
stringent nature of such policies (Roxburgh, 2002). 
 
France 
The Front National (FN) is one of the oldest far right parties in Europe, 
having been formed in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen.  Le Pen remains 
its controversial leader who has survived scandal and in-fighting to 
remain leader.  The split in the party in 1999 with former deputy Bruno 
Mégrét, who subsequently formed the Mouvement National 
Républicain, led commentators to predict the end for the FN 
(Hainsworth, 2000).  Yet in 2002, Le Pen caused a shock by defeating 
Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin, to win through to the second round 
of the presidential election to face Jacques Chirac.  The party had 
consistently polled well in the national and local elections since the 
early 1980s, and has benefited from mainstream deals and in fighting 
to win support from both working and middle class voters (Fysh and 
Wolfreys, 2003).  In 2007, Le Pen finished fourth in the first round of 
voting for the presidential election, with the party suffering similarly 
disappointing results in the legislative elections, failing to win a single 
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seat.  The party won 6.3 per cent of the vote in the 2009 European 
elections (European Parliament, 2009b).  Le Pen’s daughter, Marine 
Le Pen is expected to succeed her father as leader of the FN in 2011 
(Lichfield, 2010). 
 
4.5 The party structure 
An examination of the party structures of these far right parties 
highlights particular areas which allow us to help define the 
characteristics of the far right in Western Europe.  Certainly, it can be 
argued that these parties can be said to have evidence of mass party 
structures (Ignazi, 2003) where the key element of a mass party 
structure in the far right parties, is namely, that these are membership 
parties with strong vertical organisational bias, with the parties 
exclusively funded through membership and collateral activities 
(Espindola, 2002). 
 
Hence, a key aspect for the far right parties appears to be the network 
of branches that are often geographically spread throughout the 
country.  It is also clear, however, that there is a leadership structure 
to the parties, which sees the senior leaders controlling the party 
structure with a high level of authority. Indeed, such a structure may 
be considered optimal, given the factions which can occur in the far 
left and the far right.  For example, the Front National place particular 
importance on the role of branches and local organisations to 
encourage membership.  These events can include dinners and 
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parties, which can provide the party with a chance to encourage new 
members and allow for fund-raising opportunities for the parties (Fysh 
and Wolfreys, 2003).  Similarly, Vlaams Belang have encouraged the 
development of a party branch system to encourage party unity, 
(though the party executive assumes a tight control), with the party 
council being responsible for the election of local leaders and the 
nomination of candidates (Mudde, 2007). 
Thus, whilst the far right parties may contain elements of a mass-party 
structure, there have also been attempts by them to move to a more 
electoral-professional model of party (Luther, 2003).  In the electoral 
professional model, the central role is played, not by bureaucracy and 
the members, but by professionals.  Here, the stress is more on the 
personality and leadership of the party.  This was witnessed in Austria 
when Haider attempted to change the structure of the FPO, partly in 
an attempt to strengthen his own leadership (Luther, 2003).   
 
Yet Griffin has also attempted to bring the party into line with the other 
far right parties, by organising a network of regional branches to 
improve the organisation of the party nationwide (Copsey 2004:106).  
The BNP are similar to the other far right parties in terms of the 
structure of their party, in that there is a clear structure with a national 
chairman, deputy chairman, national officers of the party and regional 
party organisers.  The Council acts as a forum for the party’s 
leadership to discuss vital issues to set the party agenda.  However, 
the leadership pyramid seen in the BNP can be said to mirror other far 
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right parties, in that such a structure is in place, so that the national 
officers or regional organisers cannot hinder the chairman’s ability to 
make the final decision on all matters. 
 
4.6 Policy 
The issue of party policy is now examined with a view to discussing 
whether the BNP is in line with their West European neighbours, in 
terms of their policy pledges at election times, given that the BNP 
have previously been viewed as having policies deemed as being 
more extreme than other far right parties (Kitschelt 1995; Ignazi, 2000; 
Eatwell, 2000; Carter, 2005).  Previously they had been seen to be a 
more extreme and classically racist party displaying a deeply fascist 
ideology and “barely hidden allegiance to biological racism and Jewish 
conspiracy”(Copsey,2004:98).
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Table 4.1 The policies of the far right parties in Western Europe 
 
Party Immigration Education 
 
Europe Crime Finance Environment Transport Foreign Policy 
BNP 
UK 
Border 
Controls at 
all ports. 
No 
immigration 
from East 
Europe or 
Middle East. 
Emphasis 
on culture 
and values. 
Abolish 
Education 
Authorities. 
Eliminate 
‘nonsense’ 
subjects. 
 
National 
Service 
restored. 
 
Withdrawal 
from the 
EU. 
Introduction 
of corporal 
punishment 
for petty 
criminals and 
capital 
punishment 
for serious 
crimes. 
Abolition of 
income tax to 
be replaced 
by 
consumption 
tax based on 
income 
spent. 
Tariffs on 
foreign 
manufactured 
goods. 
End 
development 
on Green 
Belt land. 
 
Maintain 
high taxes 
on petrol. 
Ban out of 
town retail 
parks. 
 
Promote 
public 
transport. 
 
Abolish 
road fund 
tax. 
Reverse 
‘Islamification’ 
in Europe. 
 
Aid 
developing 
world by 
resettling 
immigrants 
back in their 
homeland. 
Withdraw from 
NATO 
Front 
National 
France 
 
More 
benefits for 
French 
families over 
immigrants. 
Establish 
more border 
controls. 
Pull out of 
Schengen 
agreement 
and EU 
policy on 
asylum. 
Bring back 
values to 
school. 
Government 
must take 
main role in 
maintaining 
high 
standards in 
school. 
No to EU 
constitution. 
 
Re-
negotiate a 
Europe of 
sovereign 
states 
based on 
common 
interests 
and hold a 
referendum 
in France. 
Recruit 5000 
more 
magistrates. 
 
More prisons 
to be created 
and police. 
Immigrants 
who commit 
offences to be 
expelled from 
country. 
 
Re-establish 
the Franc. 
 
Introduce 
quotas for 
imports in 
particular 
sectors. 
 
Research 
into the 
effects of 
GM crops. 
 
Encouraging 
education 
into 
recycling. 
 
No VAT for 
non-GM 
products. 
Ban cars 
from major 
town and 
city 
centres. 
Improve 
security on 
public 
transport. 
Tax for 
foreign 
lorries to 
enter 
France. 
Defend 
francophone 
countries. 
 
Aid 
developing 
world by 
resettling 
immigrants 
back in their 
homeland. 
Withdraw from 
NATO. 
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Freedom 
Party 
Austria 
Restore 
border 
controls. 
State run 
education 
for all. 
 
Improve the 
training to 
teachers. 
No to 
Turkey’s 
entry into 
the EU. 
 
No intrusion 
of EU policy 
in Europe. 
No to death 
penalty. 
 
Tougher on 
crimes such 
as sexual 
assaults. 
Introduce 
compensation 
for victims. 
Promotion of 
free market 
economy. 
 
Limit the 
power of the 
banks. 
Reform of the 
stock 
exchange. 
Maintain 
land to grow 
crops and 
maintain 
pure water 
supplies. 
 
Eco-taxes to 
reduce 
pollution. 
 Co-operation 
with other 
German 
language 
states. 
 
 
Vlaams 
Belang 
Belgium 
Repeal of anti-
racism and 
anti-
discrimination 
law. 
 
Deport all 
immigrants 
who fail to 
integrate. 
Preserve the 
current 
education 
system. 
Reform of the 
EU. 
 
No to 
Turkey’s 
entry into the 
EU. 
 
Closer links 
with the 
Netherlands. 
Law of self-
defence. 
Flat tax to be 
created to 
exempt low 
income 
families from 
taxation. 
 
Pension 
system to be 
reformed. 
  Reverse the 
Islamification 
in Europe. 
 
Independence 
for Flanders. 
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Folkeparti 
Denmak 
Oppose 
Islamification 
of Denmark. 
 
Favour the 
cultural 
assimilation 
of 
immigrants. 
 Oppose 
Turkey’s 
entry into 
the EU. 
Stricter 
punishment 
for serious 
crimes 
such as 
rape and 
assault. 
 
Abolish 
blasphemy 
clause. 
Maintain the 
Danish 
Krone. 
 
Support free 
trade policy. 
Support 
market 
based 
agricultural 
policy. 
 Support of war 
on terrorism. 
 
Grants for 
research into 
terrorism. 
 
Support for 
Israel. 
Sources: BNP, 2005; FN, 2007; VB, 2007; DF, 2007; FPO, 2008 
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From the summary of key policy areas for the far right parties 
presented in Table 4.1, three principal aspects are now examined in 
greater detail. 
 
4.6.1 Foreign Affairs and Immigration 
Immigration remains the focus of the far right’s electoral platform, 
being central to party policy (Carter, 2005). Indeed, whilst parties are 
developing policies in all areas, immigration remains the “issue par 
excellence” (Hainsworth, 2000:4).  It is unsurprising that immigration 
plays a major role for all the parties, as it has long been viewed as one 
of the main traits of the far right party family (Hainsworth, 2000; 
Mudde, 2000).  However the parties generally do not base their 
policies on some form of biological racism, but, rather, through the 
alleged effects of immigrants on the culture and social welfare of the 
citizens of that particular country (Hainsworth, 2000; Carter 2005; 
Mudde 2007). Consequently, all the parties considered in this chapter 
have tougher policies concerning immigration, with border controls 
being a common policy for most.   
 
Thus, whilst immigration is one of the cornerstones of the far right 
platform, it can perhaps be distinguished from a classic racism, of 
which the far right in Western Europe are particularly keen to avoid 
(Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007; Eatwell, 2008).  Hence, it would appear 
that the BNP and their fellow far right parties, now wish to avoid the 
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accusation of racism, as can be noted by the way in which they 
carefully discuss the policy of repatriation.  However, whilst the 
manifestos are, perhaps, more cautiously worded, policy on 
immigration remains strong, particularly amongst parties such as the 
BNP who wish to end immigration from Eastern Europe, and Vlaams 
Belang who seek to deport immigrants who fail to ‘integrate’.  It also 
appears that there is a growing anti-Islamic sentiment in the parties, 
with the notion of ‘Islamification’ being raised which has notably been 
used since the attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001.  The far 
right appear to believe that they are able to use this anti-Islam feeling 
as a means of playing on the fear of electors and, therefore, 
increasing their appeal to sections of the electorate (Roxburgh, 2002).  
This is particularly strong in the case of the DF, who wish to oppose 
what they see as an ‘Islamification’ of Denmark. 
 
In contrast, far right policy with regard to Europe, highlights a 
difference of opinion with regard to the role of the EU.  Whilst the BNP 
are, in fact, the only party to press for the withdrawal from the EU,  the 
other far right parties in this study do not advocate withdrawal from the 
EU, but, instead, either wish to reform the EU, or for countries to have 
a stronger say on what the EU controls.  However, the rejection of 
Turkey’s entry into the EU also appears to be a common feature 
amongst the parties.  Therefore, in general, whilst the far right parties 
are keen to defend their country’s position and independence, they 
recognise the potential benefits of being a member of the EU. 
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4.6.2 Crime 
Crime and personal security is another area on which far right parties 
have traditionally campaigned heavily (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003, 
Rydgren, 2004).  The manifestos display that the parties of the far 
right look to be tougher on crime, with the proposal of stricter 
sentences for serious crimes and increases in the number of police 
officers.  However, they also develop a link between crime and 
immigration in manifestos, such as that of the FN, who threaten to 
expel any immigrants who are found guilty of committing crimes, 
echoing the campaign used by Le Pen in the 2002 presidential 
elections.  The BNP appear to be in line with their European 
counterparts in proposing tougher sentences in the form of corporal 
punishment for minor crimes and capital punishment for more serious 
crimes.  Indeed, tougher sentences for serious crimes appear to be 
another common feature of the far right manifestos. 
 
4.6.3 Tradition 
The analysis of the manifestoes also reveals that traditional values 
appear to be a key to far right policy.  The far right parties are keen to 
protect the status of the family, which can be seen in the financial 
benefits offered to families.  Other institutions, such as the church, are 
promoted by the far right in France and in Denmark.  Moreover, the 
parties use the notion of tradition and democratic values in a bid to 
explain their plans.  They reject the idea of multi-culturalism, which 
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can be seen in the policies with regard to the revoking of the anti-
discrimination laws; this being the case in Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Denmark.  Whilst the BNP do not place an emphasis on issues 
such as religion and church, the notion of tradition can be interpreted 
into a number of their policies, notably with regard to the banning of 
out of town retail parks in favour of the local shopkeeper and teaching 
with an emphasis on culture and values in schools. 
 
In conclusion, it can be argued that there are many similarities 
between the BNP and other far right parties in Western Europe, in 
terms of the policy being put forward in manifestos.  Far right success 
in Western European countries has been based on the ability to 
present itself as a credible alternative to the mainstream and, one key 
aspect to this, is providing a wide-ranging policy on a number of policy 
areas.   This study of manifestos demonstrates that the parties are 
clearly presenting themselves in a more moderate light in a bid to 
attract voters.  Consequently, the far right parties are focusing on 
policy areas which perhaps would not have previously been covered, 
namely in areas such as environment whereby, the BNP, FPO, DF 
and FN all refer to implementing measures in a bid to protect the 
environment  
 
Whilst doubts may remain about how much the far right parties have, 
in reality, moderated their policies, on the surface, they are looking to 
present themselves as a real alternative and more than single issue 
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parties.  Whereas far right parties traditionally had policies of 
xenophobia, racism and anti-democracy, and called for stringent 
measures on immigration, these have been adapted to attempt to 
display a degree of moderation (Mudde 1995; Fysh and Wolfreys, 
2003; Carter, 2005).   This is seemingly linked to the notion that, if a 
far right party attempts to display themselves as moving towards the 
centre right political space, then there is a greater possibility that more 
of the electorate may support the party, as has been witnessed in 
Austria and France (Kitschelt, 1995; Carter, 2005). 
 
4.7 Examining the lack of success for the BNP at the national 
level 
 
Section 4.2 of this chapter has displayed that the BNP has not 
performed successfully under the leadership of Griffin at a general 
election.  To understand why there has been this occurrence, factors 
regarding the role of the mainstream parties, image and leadership are 
now compared to examine if there are any factors contributing to the 
BNPs lack of success in general elections.  
 
4.7.2 Role of the mainstream 
Across Western Europe, a particular feature, with regard to the 
relationship between the centre right and far right, has been that of a 
cordon sanitaire. This means that there has never been any attempt to 
make any political deals with the far right, in order to boost their 
 106 
respective party’s standing at the expense of another throughout 
Europe (Carter, 2005).  However, the cordon sanitaire which has 
traditionally been set in place across Europe, has been broken by 
political parties.  This was the case in France, where the mainstream 
right parties were hit by internal factions and, in an attempt to prevent 
voters from slipping away, deals were made with the far right, in a bid 
to prevent the Socialists from taking a number of seats at the local 
level (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  However, this allowed the FN to 
develop as a party, and to enhance their claims as a legitimate 
political force in the country. Moreover, in Belgium, the mainstream 
centre-right parties have been strong to maintain the cordon sanitaire, 
yet there is some suggestion that less formal links exist between the 
far right and the mainstream (Coffe et al, 2007). However, questions 
remain about how effective the cordon sanitaire has been in 
preventing far right gains in Belgium as the VB continue to make 
increasing gains in all levels of elections (Coffe et al, 2007; De Lange, 
2007). 
 
With regard to the West European countries studied, where the far 
right have performed well at a national level, centre-right parties have 
also been seen to take a tougher stance on issues of immigration and 
asylum.  However, the crucial difference in the adoption of these 
tougher policies has been that they have often been implemented 
following the success of a far right party at an election (Roxburgh, 
2002).  This is particularly the case in Denmark and France, where 
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tougher policies on immigration and crime have been adopted, thus 
leading to the far right parties accusing their centre-right rivals of 
merely copying their policies (Roxburgh, 2002).  An example of this 
was in Demark in 2002, where the centre right coalition brought out a 
series of tough proposals with regard to immigration in the country.  
These policies included tougher policies such as a halving in welfare 
benefits for asylum seekers and the law which stated that no Dane 
was allowed to bring in a spouse from outside the EU, if the Dane or 
the spouse is under the age of 24 (Roxburgh, 2002).  These policies 
attracted criticism from leading groups and politicians across Europe, 
who viewed the policies as being too strict (Roxburgh, 2002).   
 
In France, the 2007 Presidential election campaign and the image of 
Nicolas Sarkozy, perhaps reflected a feeling amongst the centre-right 
to take a tough stance on immigration and nationalist issues 
(Marthaler, 2008).  The centre-right were arguably aware of the threat 
of Le Pen, following his success in the first round of voting at the 2002 
Presidential election and how he had profited from the issues of 
immigration and insecurity in particular.  Furthermore, the personal 
image of Sarkozy himself echoed that of Thatcher as a no-nonsense 
politician, who would be tough on such issues (Boulangé and 
Wolfreys, 2007).  For example, during the riots of 2005, Sarkozy 
gained a ‘tough-cop’ image, following his swift reaction to the riots in 
the banlieues across France.  Following the rioting in Paris, Sarkozy 
chose to visit the scene personally and labelled the rioters as racaille 
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(rabble) and talked of using a karcher (power-hose) to deal with the 
rioters (Economist, 2007).  Additionally, Sarkozy, in his spell as Interior 
Minister, was tough on crime and illegal immigrants, which would have 
appealed to those voters who perhaps voted for Le Pen at the 2002 
presidential elections.  Sarkozy’s subsequent success aligned to Le 
Pen’s poor showing in the polls, could, therefore, suggest that 
Sarkozy’s bid to regain the right had worked against Le Pen 
(Marthaler, 2008). 
 
In Britain, with regard to the mainstream parties, there is an argument 
that the Conservative Party has contributed to the far right’s lack of 
success in Britain, as “the ideology of the Conservative Party has 
served to defuse the far right appeals.” (Eatwell, 1998;186)   
 
Indeed, Conservative Party ideology has traditionally been seen to be 
right of the political spectrum, playing on traditional far right themes 
such as immigration and nationalism (Eatwell, 2000).  In the 1970s, 
the Conservatives had right wing groups such as the Monday Club, 
which were seen as being more extreme right than the official party 
policy (Eatwell, 2000; Sykes, 2005).  The issue of immigration had 
reached the British political agenda since the small sporadic electoral 
successes of the far right in local elections in the 1970s and the ‘rivers 
of blood’ speech made by Enoch Powell in 1968, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.3.   The small advances of the British far right in the 1970s, 
were said to have led to a strong anti-immigrant manifesto from the 
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Conservatives, in reaction to the far right (Eatwell, 1998).  Therefore, 
the Conservatives notably under Thatcher, were seen as taking a 
hard-line stance on issues such as immigration and law and order, 
both through the means of speeches made to the media and in their 
election manifestos, thus denying the far right any opportunity to profit 
from immigration (Hainsworth, 2000).   
 
Furthermore, in the 1980s, nationalism was also to be a key theme for 
the party during the 1983 general election campaign, largely due to 
the war with Argentina in the Falklands.  The Conservatives also 
continued the notion of nationalism in their 1983 general election 
manifesto, vowing to maintain institutions such as the House of Lords.  
Hence, a strong sense of nationalism and traditionalism was seen to 
increase support amongst the working classes (Butler and Kavanagh, 
1983).   
 
Indeed, race and immigration issues were to return to the forefront of 
British politics at the turn of the new century, when William Hague 
made asylum one of the Conservative Party’s major issues at the 
2000 local elections.  This right wing stance on immigration and 
asylum has carried on through the leadership of Iain Duncan Smith 
and Michael Howard to such an extent that the literature of the 
Conservatives at local elections on the issues of asylum and 
immigration has been accused of mirroring that of the BNP (Copsey, 
2004:147).  In 2005, the Conservative manifesto, again, had a strong 
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focus on issues such as immigration and crime, areas earlier identified 
to being key policy areas for the far right.  The manifesto made a 
pledge for controlled immigration in Britain, including policies such as 
surveillance at ports and a limit on the number of asylum seekers 
decided by Parliament (Conservatives, 2005).  This manifesto also 
emphasised the need for discipline and a tougher attitude on crime.   
 
In terms of their electoral campaigning, the Conservative Party was 
said to have failed to move away from their traditional strengths of 
crime and immigration (Butler and Kavanagh, 2005).  The party was 
arguably divided in its use of the immigration issue, with suggestions 
that Howard wished they had used the theme more at the end of the 
campaign as opposed to MPs such as David Cameron, who felt that 
the issue took away the spotlight from other Conservative policies 
(Butler and Kavanagh, 2005:186) 
 
The 2010 general election, as in 2005, saw immigration play a major 
role in campaigning from the Conservatives.  As in 2005 the 
Conservatives focused efforts on immigration, with the party manifesto 
stating “Immigration is too high and needs to be reduced. We do not 
need to attract people to do jobs that could be carried out by British 
citizens, given the right training and support” (Groves and Hazelton, 
2010).  Again the rhetoric used by David Cameron showed the 
Conservative Party as being tough on immigration "Immigration in this 
country has been too high for too long and that’s why we have a very 
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clear approach to cut it and cut it quite substantially" (Northern Echo, 
2010). 
 
Therefore, where the British case differs from its West European 
counterparts is that the Conservatives have maintained a tradition of 
being strong on traditional far right issues involving nationalism and 
immigration, thus preventing the far right from claiming space on the 
right of the political spectrum. This is important as “the conditions for 
the rise of extreme-rightist parties become favourable if moderately left 
and right parties converge towards the median voter” (Kitschelt, 
1995:vii).  This differs from the FN, VB, FPO and DF who appear to 
have been able to dominate debate on immigration in their respective 
countries and, therefore, gain the political space they desired, 
prompting claims from the far right parties that their policies were 
merely being copied by the mainstream. The far right in Western 
Europe, seemingly, had a perceived sense of political legitimacy, 
which the BNP has not been afforded. 
 
4.7.3 Leadership 
In addition to examining the policies of the far right parties in Europe, 
the question of leadership is also a factor that has been taken into 
consideration by academics (Ignazi, 2000; Carter, 2005).  Leadership 
qualities are arguably more important in parties of the far right than of 
the mainstream, due to the nature of the make up of the far right 
parties in terms of their organisation and structure, namely because 
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far right parties are often “prone to factionalism and infighting” (Carter, 
2005:65).  Far right leaders therefore, need to curb any possible 
infighting and attempt to lead a united party.  Another aspect of far 
right leadership, regards the question of image and respectability of 
the leaders.   If the far right parties are seen to be closer to the centre-
right, then this can increase their chances of electoral success (Carter, 
2005).  One such way this can be achieved is if the leader of the party 
is seen as being a more respectable and moderate politician (Ignazi, 
2000; Carter, 2005).  Furthermore, a far right leader must have some 
element of dynamism and personality in order to create a public profile 
for the party (Carter, 2005).  Moreover, the leadership must be 
capable of exploiting opportunities with which they are presented 
(Kitschelt, 1995).  
 
Dominant leadership has been in evidence in France, where the FN 
has faced accusations of simply being a one man party (Charlot, 
1986), although this argument has been refuted in other works (Fysh 
and Wolfreys, 2003). However, Le Pen has also had to overcome 
serious splits in his party, notably in 1999 when a major disagreement 
amongst party leaders led to FN deputy leader Bruno Mégret forming 
a breakaway Mouvement National Républicain (MNR).  This was a 
particularly brutal split in the party, with many members deserting the 
FN in favour of Mégret’s party (Hainsworth, 2000; Fysh and Wolfreys, 
2003).  Arguably, it was the leadership of Le Pen which had been the 
catalyst of such splits in the party, with Le Pen’s often erratic and 
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bombastic behaviour causing concerns amongst FN members (Fysh 
and Wolfreys, 2003).  In particular, Le Pen had been suspended from 
standing in the European elections, following an attack on a Socialist 
candidate, leading him to nominate his wife at the head of the party 
list, as opposed to Mégret (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  Moreover, with 
Le Pen being 71 years of age, there was concern over his appeal to 
voters, with Mégret seemingly seen to be the leading candidate to take 
over the FN leadership (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  There also 
appeared to be ideological differences regarding the future of the 
party.  The Mégretistes were keen for the FN to establish a less 
extreme position in an attempt to come more in line with the centre-
right parties (Hainsworth and Mitchell, 2000).  However, Le Pen saw 
off the challenge of Mégret after a long legal battle and any signs of Le 
Pen and the FN returning to the background of French politics were 
shaken in April 2002, when Le Pen rocked the political landscape by 
winning through to the second round of the French Presidential 
elections at the expense of Socialist candidate Lionel Jospin, thus 
maintaining Le Pen’s place at the forefront of French far right politics 
(Fysh and Wolfreys. 2003).  Le Pen’s success was largely based on 
his skills as a politician and ability as a public speaker (Marcus, 1995).  
Le Pen was quick to portray himself very much as the alternative to 
the system, drawing heavily on the notion that the mainstream 
candidates were very much the same (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  
Indeed, Le Pen had appeared to have toned down his image in the 
build up to the first round of voting of the 2002 Presidential election, 
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preferring, instead, to present himself as the wise father figure of 
French politics (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  Le Pen continued to 
portray this toned down image in subsequent elections.  Indeed, 
Marine Le Pen, who is widely expected to win the FN leadership in 
January 2011, is seen to be keen to present the FN as a more 
moderate party (Lichfield, 2010). 
 
A similar situation occurred in Austria, when Jorg Haider faced 
opposition after he took control of the FPO from the liberals in the 
party, who did not agree with his moving of the party towards the far 
right (Luther, 2003).  Additionally, Haider faced criticism from those 
who were unhappy about the promotion of young newcomers and 
professionals into the party (Luther, 2003).  However, Haider 
successfully maintained a strong leadership, by continually having 
those closest to him in the key roles in the party, meaning that party 
advancement was dependent on Haider himself (Morrow, 2000:49).  
Consequently, this led to a strong internal discipline in the party, 
allowing no room for any disenchantment or challenges to the 
leadership, as rivals were forced out to the margins (Morrow, 
2000:49). The personality of Haider has also been argued as the 
greatest appeal of the FPO (Morrow, 2000).  Haider successfully built 
up a strong anti-establishment stance and portrayed himself as the 
honest man and the outsider, showing him to be ever image 
conscious.  Moreover, Haider was successful as he enjoyed 
something which other far right leaders had previously failed to enjoy, 
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namely positive media coverage.  Art (2004) notes that Haider 
received twice as much coverage as any other politician in the national 
Austrian newspaper, Krone Zeitung, when he was only polling 3 per 
cent in the polls, approximating to free advertising.  This was important 
to Haider, as it gave him the opportunity to attract new voters across 
the nation (Morrow, 2000; Art 2004). Such was the influence of 
Haider’s personality and leadership that he returned to the forefront of 
Austrian politics at the 2008 general election, with his new BZO party.  
The popularity of Haider was further demonstrated in the numbers that 
turned out for his funeral in the town of Klagenfurt. A ceremonial 
funeral was afforded to Haider, with the funeral being broadcast on 
television, with an estimated 25,000 people attending in the capital, 
Vienna, to watch the funeral on large TV screens (CNN, 2008).  
 
Further examples of strong leadership have been in evidence in the 
other parties.  The Danish Folkspareti has been run with minimal 
factionalism or in-fighting under the leadership of Pia Kjaersgaard 
(Carter, 2005).   Kjaersgaard has proved to be responsive to the 
needs of the electorate and has displayed “considerable political 
acumen” (Carter, 2005:91)  Where Kjaersgaard perhaps differs to the 
leadership style of Fortuyn, Haider and Le Pen, is in what has been 
described as her “apparent-level headedness” that appeals to voters 
(Roxburgh, 2002:213).  Kjaersgaard’s style displays a good degree of 
political acumen in her leadership, an aspect which is more likely to 
appeal to the electorate, as it displays a more moderate image to her 
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far right party (Carter, 2005).   This political acumen and skilful 
leadership has also been seen to be in evidence by Fillip Dewinter.  
Dewinter was credited with making the party structure become more 
efficient and also for having a unifying effect on the party, with dissent 
becoming minimal amongst members (Carter, 2005). 
 
Much of the rise of the BNP has been put down to the leadership of 
Griffin who has attempted to modernise the party, which was seen as 
out of touch and too extreme under Tyndall (Copsey, 2004).  Griffin 
has faced party discontent on two notable cases; firstly, when newly 
appointed as leader of the BNP, he faced a division amongst party 
members between hardliners, and those more moderate members, 
over policy and strategy in the party (Carter, 2005).  More recently, 
there appears to have been the first serious challenge to the 
leadership of Griffin with a party split emerging, which has seen 
dozens of local organisers form their own separate right wing party 
calling themselves The Real BNP.  These members have become 
disillusioned with the manner in which Griffin has been ruling the party, 
notably in the Yorkshire region (BBC, 2007).  However, Griffin was 
strong to discipline dissenters in the party, displaying the strong 
leadership skills that has been in evidence amongst fellow far right 
leaders, who have also received challenges and in-fighting in their 
respective parties, such as Le Pen, and Haider (Fysh and Wolfreys, 
2003; Luther, 2003).  However, the 2010 general election campaigning 
was dominated by elements of factionalism within the party which saw 
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Nick Griffin accusing members of his party of a plot to kill him and 
which saw publicity director Mark Collett arrested (Gabatt and Taylor, 
2010).   
 
Furthermore, in comparison to his European counterparts, and as 
noted in Chapter 2.6, Griffin has struggled with regard to his image 
amongst the British electorate, facing accusations of being a holocaust 
denier and also accusations with regard to his extreme past, including 
being a “Strasserite Nazi” (Copsey, 2004:110).  Griffin has been 
caught on a BBC Panorama documentary expressing racist views, 
which led to two court cases where he was accused on two counts of 
using words or behaviour likely to stir up racial hatred, in speeches 
filmed in West Yorkshire in 2004 (BBC, 2004).  The public image of 
Griffin therefore, is quite far removed from the ‘respectability’ image 
associated with leaders such as Kjaersgaard and Haider.   
 
4.7.4 Party image 
Linked into the question of leadership image, is that of the party 
image.  The far right parties in Western Europe are, arguably, now 
seen as being legitimate parties due to steps taken to present 
themselves as more moderate.  Notably, they have been able to 
attract politicians who have been with the mainstream parties, 
particularly the centre right, in a bid to enhance their image and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate.  Examples of this include the 
FN in the 1980s, who were able to attract politicians from the centre-
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right, amongst them Bruno Mégret.  Whilst in Austria, young politicians 
saw their career chances enhanced by moving to the FPO whereby its 
respectability increased and, in turn, led to them becoming a highly 
organised and wealthy political party (Art, 2004).  Haider was also 
conscious of the image of his party and specifically brought in female 
candidates in order to present the party as a party for all Austrians.  
Non-party professional experts were brought in to establish areas 
such as communications and also in a bid to train-up existing 
functionaries.  However, the parachuting in of these professionals 
brought about great dissatisfaction amongst the long-standing 
members of the party, who feared a change in party ideology in a bid 
to attract the electorate (Luther 2003:209).   
 
Yet the BNP have struggled to present a similar image.  Whilst Griffin 
has portrayed himself as a more moderate leader and, indeed, has 
been able to attract candidates with professional backgrounds, such 
as Michael Newland, who stood as London Mayoral candidate in 
1999, the party are still dogged by accusations of violence and 
extremism in some candidates’ backgrounds (Copsey, 2004).  This 
poses problems for the party, as Griffin has acknowledged, whereby 
the public “will never support a party which has about it anything which 
gives credibility to the inevitable media smear of Nazi” (Copsey, 
2004:110) 
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The 2010 general election highlighted the lack of professionalism 
amongst the party particularly with regard to their campaigning. The 
BNP website, considered by the party to be a key element in their 
campaigning, was closed by website manager Simon Bennett, 
accusing Griffin of being “pathetic, desperate and incompetent” 
(Hamilton, 2010).  A subsequent message from Griffin was put on the 
website, but with nothing else on the site. The party’s cause was 
further hindered by footage of Bob Bailey, candidate for Romford, 
brawling with Asian youths whilst out canvassing, which featured 
across the national media days before the election (BBC, 2010b). 
 
Furthermore, there have been questions raised with regard to the 
performance of BNP councillors when in office, since the BNP have 
experienced problems at the local level (Unison, 2008).  The poor 
record of BNP councillors could, arguably, play a part in the future 
possibility of success at the national level as voters may deem that the 
BNP do not have the ability to produce effective and competent 
candidates to represent them (Copsey, 2004).  Indeed, these 
problems had been seen with other far right parties in Europe, such as 
the FPO, where the party took on board anyone who was willing to 
stand as a candidate in its early years.  Consequently, this led to 
problems for the party, as the sometimes controversial backgrounds of 
the candidates were often exposed (Luther, 2003).  This appears to be 
the problem for the BNP and their bid to obtain the credibility as a 
serious alternative to the mainstream.  
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4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter set out to establish the position of the BNP at the national 
level with regard to two specific aims, firstly with a view to 
understanding how Griffin attempted to bring his party into line with 
those of other West European parties.  The subsequent comparison 
reveals a number of key ideas.  Firstly, that Griffin has made an effort 
to modernise and professionalise his party, to make it similar in style 
and structure to other West European far right parties.  The policies of 
the BNP suggest that the party campaigns on similar issues to other 
Western far right parties, although there are areas where the BNP 
could be perceived as still having an element of being more extreme. 
 
Secondly, it would appear that, whilst Griffin has made these efforts to 
present a more moderate image for his party, the failings at general 
elections point towards a party unable to shed an image of racism, a 
party lacking political legitimacy and faced with a strong centre-right 
who dominate the agenda on traditional far right issues, such as crime 
and immigration.  Furthermore, Griffin has not been able to match the 
leadership skills of other far right leaders in Western Europe, in terms 
of displaying political acumen and skilful leadership of his party.  With 
regard to the BNP at the local level, it, therefore, suggests that there 
must be local level specific factors which are allowing the party to win 
seats in local elections.  These factors will be subsequently 
investigated in the next chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter Five: Press coverage of the BNP at the 2006 local 
elections 
5.1 Introduction 
The role of the written media has come under close scrutiny when 
academics examine the rise of the far right in the Western Europe with 
debate centring on the press’ role in relation to the increasing support 
of the far right (Roxburgh, 2002; John et al, 2006).  This chapter 
examines how the BNP have had a potential effect on the coverage 
from the written press, and whether the press have actually aided this 
effect, through the way in which the BNP were reported and in terms 
of the amount and style of coverage that they received.   The focus of 
this chapter is on the written press, thereby specifically omitting other 
forms of the media, notably local radio and local television.  These 
forms are omitted due to the time-consuming manner and resources 
that providing suitable evidence would take (Moy et al, 2004; 
Druckman, 2005). 
The chapter has chosen to examine press coverage as the BNP could 
have profited more from press coverage as opposed to traditional 
campaigning methods, due to the power of the press to give them 
exposure (Baimbridge and Anderson, 2008).  Moreover, the written 
press has been chosen as newspapers are more partisan in their 
coverage compared to television and radio which are bound by issues 
of impartiality in their broadcasting, for instance, political advertising is 
not allowed on radio or television but is allowed in the British press 
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(Curtice, 1999; Mughan, 2000).  Britain can be seen as good place to 
test newspapers due to their partisanship and their high readership, 
particularly in relation to other West European countries (Brynin and 
Newton, 2003).  Furthermore, the partisanship of British newspapers 
is significant, in that they will not always follow specific traditional links 
as was seen at the 1997 British general election when the Sun 
switched its support from Conservative to Labour (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1997).  This partisan de-alignment by the national press 
therefore allows us to explore the question of just how much influence 
the press could hold over the voters at a time of an election.   
Additionally, following Nick Griffin’s appointment as BNP chairman in 
2001 and his attempts to establish the BNP as a more moderate and 
respectable political party, there has been a focus on the way the 
party now interacts with the media.  Griffin is widely seen as being 
media-savvy, placing particular importance on the way that the party is 
seen through the eyes of the press (Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).  The 
BNP now has a Media Monitoring Unit, which assesses all press 
reports regarding the BNP and then makes a response to these 
stories through the form of letters to the editor, or through a response 
from Griffin himself (StoptheBNP, 2007).   
As press coverage of the BNP in the national and the local press could 
take a number of different forms, a number of aspects are examined in 
this chapter.  Firstly the press coverage of the party itself is examined, 
studying how the members and policies of the far right party are 
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presented.  Secondly, the reporting on issues such as asylum and 
immigration is studied, in order to establish whether this form of 
coverage is merely presenting an opportunity for the BNP to gain 
further support.  Thirdly, the way in which the mainstream parties have 
reacted to the growing impact of the BNP through the press is 
considered, which examines the argument that all publicity for the 
BNP is good publicity Fieschi (2004).  Finally, the 2006 UK local 
elections are studied in more detail, using both national and local 
press coverage, such as the use of opinion polls by the press, the 
number of the articles on the BNP itself, and the type of coverage 
which the party received in the local press.   
5.2 The influence of the press at election times 
One possible factor as to why the press carry influence at election 
time is that the loyalty to mainstream parties appears to be in decline, 
which as a consequence is leading to declining numbers in party 
membership (Kavanagh, 1995; Seyd and Whitely, 1994; 2002).  
Indeed, the interviews conducted by the researcher with local party 
leaders in Calderdale prior to the 2006 elections (see appendix) 
highlighted a struggle to campaign in all the wards in the region due to 
a lack of party activists, with candidates often having to rely on their 
family and friends to help with any direct campaigning, rather than 
party members and activists.  Consequently, a reduction in party 
campaigning could be seen to reduce the profile of both the party and 
election itself.  The role of the press, it could therefore be argued, is 
significant as it provides parties with a good way of getting across their 
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message to the most people possible, and it will also provide many 
voters with their only access to the election debate, allowing them to 
identify with a particular party.  No amount of campaigning can 
compare with the millions of people who will read the newspapers, 
suggesting that the coverage of the press is vital to a successful 
election campaign (Patterson, 1993; Kavanagh, 1995; Mughan, 2000). 
Moreover, local authorities have taken to advertising in the local press 
to encourage voters to turnout in higher numbers at a local election.  
This could perhaps be seen as an attempt to combat the 
nationalisation of the local elections and to re-establish the role of 
politics at the local level amongst the electorate.   However, research 
has suggested that in areas where the local authorities attempted to 
increase voter turnout at elections through adverts in the local press, 
there was no significant increase in the voter turnout (Electoral 
Commission, 2008).   
The 1992 British general election was significant with regard to press 
coverage given to the political parties in the days leading up to voting.  
The strong anti-Labour stance taken by the Sun in particular led the 
paper to exclaim, following the outcome of the results, that “It was the 
Sun wot won it.”  The tabloid editors were seen as “heroes” by those in 
the Conservative camp for their fierce and often personal attacks on 
Labour leader Neil Kinnock and other leading Labour figures 
(Kavanagh, 1995:185).  The importance of the Sun attacks on the 
Labour Party was such that it was exposing many working class 
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voters, who would perhaps traditionally vote Labour, to a paper which 
was coming out strongly in support of the Conservatives (Kavanagh, 
1995; Linton, 1995). 
At the 1997 British general election, the press were not seen to exert 
as much influence on its outcome (Scammell and Harrop, 1997; 
Curtice, 1999).  In this election, the Sun, which had been supportive of 
the Conservatives in 1992, switched support to New Labour, alongside 
other tabloids such as the Star.  In particular, the Sun had become 
increasingly critical of John Major and the numerous scandals which 
affected the party at the time, leading to the decision to support 
Labour, following a meeting between Rupert Murdoch and Tony Blair 
(Wring, 2005:3). 
Additionally, broadsheet papers such as the Times even refused to 
back the Conservatives, instead advising its supporters to vote for 
Euro-sceptic MPs (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997).  However, despite 
these switches in support from major newspapers, the impact of the 
press on influencing the result is less clear, with the general feeling 
amongst academics being that the heavy Conservative defeat was 
down to the weaknesses of their party organisation and leadership, 
with the newspapers just reinforcing the views of the general public 
(Scammell and Harrop, 1997; Curtice, 1999; Mughan, 2000; Street, 
2001). 
With regard to the local elections, the local press has been accused of 
taking such a national angle in its coverage to an extent that it could 
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be accused of a nationalisation in its reporting, with little regard given 
to consequences for the local authorities.  Reporting has now become 
centred on the implications for the political parties and any future 
general elections (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997).  Consequently, this 
could lead to long term effects on role that local authorities play.  If the 
local elections were to solely become a yardstick for the popularity of 
the government, then this could lead to a break up of local politics, and 
less interaction between the community and the political parties.  If 
political campaigning is reduced further at the local level, this could 
potentially open up more opportunities for a party which campaign at 
grassroots, such as the BNP, and enable them to garner support.  
This could be as a consequence of the lack of contact with the 
mainstream parties and the electorate, as voters may be prepared to 
vote for the BNP if they are seen to be taking an active role in the 
community, best representing their voice at the local level. 
5.3 The ability of the press to affect the electorate 
It would, however, appear that caution must be exercised in making 
judgements about the ability of the press to potentially have an effect 
on the electorate.  As far as political coverage is concerned, the 
reasons behind choosing a newspaper cannot be simply attributed to 
the coverage the newspaper gives to politics. Likewise, it would 
appear certainly more reasonable to assume that readers were more 
likely to buy the newspapers that fit with their own political views, as 
opposed to those of a contrasting style (Brynin and Newton, 2003).  
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Subsequently, it would be unwise to assume that newspapers are 
holding an influence over their readers; indeed the argument can be 
that the newspapers, increasingly concerned about maintaining their 
circulation levels, are more likely to try and align their coverage into 
what they feel their readers will want to read (Curtice and Semetko, 
1994).  There is certainly some sense therefore, that the newspapers 
are merely “preaching to the converted” (Mughan, 2000:245, Street, 
2001).  
This leads to another important notion of the views of the voters 
themselves.  It would be unreasonable to assume that the voters are 
going to believe and be influenced by the politics coverage in the 
press and cannot be treated as “mindless dupes” (Nineham, 1996).  
Indeed, there appears to be a growing scepticism amongst the 
readers with regard to the coverage of politics in the press, particularly 
with regard to coverage in the tabloids (Street, 2001).  
5.4 The style of political coverage in the written press 
The coverage of local and national elections by the press has evolved 
over time, whereby a major factor for the change in reporting styles 
has been the emergence of the power of television, particularly with 
twenty-four hour news channels, which are now able to be first with 
reporting on the campaign.  The written press is consequently unable 
to compete with television in the real time reporting of election 
campaigning, leading them to change to a more analytical style 
(Harrop, 1986; Patterson, 1993).  Whereas previously, newspapers 
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would report on the campaign merely by printing the speeches and 
actions of the party leaders, they now appear more willing to run a 
more detailed analysis of the elections, with the use of pollsters and 
political experts (Patterson, 1993; Kavanagh, 1995; Negrine, 1998).  
Moreover, these detailed critiques of the election campaign has given 
rise to a suggestion that the press are now reporting campaigns with a 
negative, almost distrusting style, with the written press being 
“responsible for alienation, cynicism, distrust, political withdrawal and 
apathy” (Norris, 2000:4) 
Consequently, the written press is looking for new angles on which to 
report the election.  One such style therefore, has been to move away 
from issues of the election and to focus more on the personality of the 
candidates involved in the election.  This would include looking at 
personality issues, sound bites from the candidates, and the behaviour 
and personal lives of the candidates (Postman, 1987; Dahlgren, 1995; 
Mughan, 2000).   
Additionally, there would appear to be a struggle for space in both the 
local and national press to cover politics in as much detail as 
previously possible (Brynin and Newton, 2003).  Politics coverage now 
has to fight for space alongside other articles in many newspapers and 
as a consequence, coverage is not as extensive as it was formerly.  
This has been seen to occur in the tabloids and in the local press, 
which has witnessed a growth of lifestyle articles, which are more 
light-hearted stories and tend to focus more on celebrity and showbiz 
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rather then politics.  Seemingly there is a case to argue at both local 
and national level that the growth of lifestyle stories has come about 
as readers are no longer seen to be interested in politics and would 
rather be reading lifestyle items in the press (Franklin and Murphy, 
1998).  Thus due to the high competition in the British press, editors 
are forced to go with what they believe will sell the most newspapers 
and invariably this could possibly mean less politics (Franklin and 
Murphy, 1998).  Additionally, at the local level the resources available 
to the newspapers are in decline, leading editors to take into account 
the need for advertising in the papers, which can take up space 
previously allocated to news stories (Franklin and Murphy 1998; 
Negrine, 1998).  
Therefore it would appear that press reporting at election times has 
seemingly evolved, in terms of the style of coverage.  Newspapers are 
under pressure to make their coverage as interesting and innovative 
as they can, due to a high competition from other forms of media.   
However, despite this, the written press still has an important role to 
play in the coverage of elections.  Political parties still rely on the 
support from the written press.  The apparent reduction in traditional 
campaigning leads to a suggestion that the written press represents 
the best chances for the parties to get their opinions and policies 
across to a large audience. 
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5.5 Press coverage of the BNP 
The national press has previously been seen to take a strong stance 
against the far right, notably throughout the 1970s and the 1980s with 
the press taking a stand against the National Front (Eatwell, 2000; 
John et al, 2006).  However, it would appear that despite these 
attempts by the BNP to present the party in a more moderate way, 
negative coverage and the conduct of its members still dominates its 
press coverage (Mirror, 2003).  Paradoxically, there are concerns that 
the exposure given to the BNP by the national press is not justified, 
and is only serving to give the BNP free publicity.  This can be seen in 
the way the media cover the issues of asylum and immigration and 
indeed the manner in which the mainstream parties have responded to 
the threat of the far right success at election times (Copsey 2004; 
Fieschi, 2004; Eatwell, 2005) 
Moreover, in the build up to the 2006 local elections, columnists in the 
Daily Mail such as Richard Littlejohn sympathised with voters who 
were prepared to vote for the BNP (Littlejohn, 2006), whilst Sir Andrew 
Green, chairman of Migration Watch UK, wrote that the BNP were 
being supported in Barking not due to their policies but due to their 
frustrations with the Labour government (Green, 2006).   Whilst these 
columnists were not advocating voting for the BNP, there was an 
attempt to understand the frustrations of some voters, and trying to 
establish why the BNP no longer only attracted ‘extremists’ to the 
party.  Thus it would appear that whilst the reporting of the party itself 
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is still heavily negative, critical articles of the mainstream parties 
coupled with reporting by the press on other issues such as 
immigration and asylum appear to demonstrate understanding from 
the written press as to why voters are turning to the BNP at election 
times.  
 
5.5.1 The press reporting of asylum and immigration 
The media’s reporting of asylum and immigration issues has been 
criticised in that it has given parties of the far right an opportunity to 
establish themselves as a household name in British politics (Eatwell 
2006:212).  In recent years, the national press has been accused by 
anti-fascist groups and academics alike of exaggerating and 
sensationalising the issues of immigration and asylum, which could be 
to the benefit of the BNP (Roxburgh, 2002; Renton, 2003; Fieschi, 
2004; Copsey, 2004, Eatwell, 2006).     
 
This accusation is based on the notion that the BNP are given further 
scope to develop their immigration policies, as they can point to the 
media coverage as a means of justifying such policies.  There is also 
an accusation that the press coverage of immigration is giving rise to a 
sense of ‘Islamophobia’, which only serves to heighten  existing racial 
tensions in communities (Eatwell, 2005).  Additionally, whilst the 
sensationalist headlines and language regarding immigration and 
asylum have traditionally been associated with the tabloids, there is 
evidence to suggest that the striking headline warnings about the 
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threat of mass immigration are no longer confined to the tabloids, but 
are also in evidence across the range of national press (Daily 
Telegraph, 2006; Times, 2006).   
 
5.5.2 The response from the mainstream parties to the BNP 
Another impact resulting from the press coverage of immigration and 
asylum is that the major parties feel increasingly obliged to address 
these issues.  A MORI poll in 2005 showed that immigration had 
become the major election issue for readers of the Express, the Sun 
and the Mail (Eatwell, 2005).  Yet it would seem that the mainstream 
parties are uncertain about how to deal with the growing importance of 
the immigration issue and the presence of the BNP.  The British 
general election of 2005 particularly showed this to be the case when 
Michael Howard and the Conservative Party received criticism from 
the Guardian newspaper over the party’s stance on immigration during 
their election campaign.  Media opinion was split as to whether 
Howard was correct to publicly take on the challenge of the BNP, or 
whether he was just giving them undue publicity (Tempest, 2004a&b). 
Kavanagh and Butler (2005:76) note how Peter Hain called the 
Conservative’s immigration stance at the 2005 election “scurrilous, 
ugly, right-wing tactics.”  However, they also acknowledge that whilst 
immigration was the main theme of just one Conservative press 
conference during the 2005 election campaign, immigration was the 
issue which caused most consternation amongst its own party 
members and the press (Kavanagh and Butler, 2005:76-77). 
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The Labour Party addressed the issue of asylum, again causing much 
debate amongst party members as to how to deal with the issue of 
immigration and the BNP.  In the Labour Party, Margaret Hodge 
notably received press coverage for her comments regarding the 
potential BNP vote in her constituency of Barking (Dodd and Wintour, 
2006).   
 
5.6 The national press coverage of the BNP at the 2006 local 
elections 
 
5.6.1 Methodology 
All major national daily newspapers are examined for their number of 
articles about the BNP with the exception of the Financial Times, 
which is regarded as a predominantly business and financial 
newspaper (Baimbridge and Anderson, 2008).   
 
The papers are divided into two groupings firstly whether they are 
tabloid or broadsheet, secondly whether they can be deemed as being 
on the left or right wing regarding their perceived political bias.  The 
categorising between tabloid and broadsheets is based on an 
assumption that broadsheet newspapers will be more likely to report 
on issues of current affairs than tabloids, are they are regarded as 
being more upmarket and serious. 
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With regard to dividing the newspapers into a left-right grouping, this is 
done so as the newspapers could be argued to be reporting on the 
BNP with different agendas.  The right wing press may report on the 
BNP with a view to how they affect the Conservative vote.   
Furthermore, the left wing press could be said to be reporting from a 
viewpoint that they have a “moral duty to expose the image of 
respectability that the BNP have sought to develop in recent years” 
(Baimbridge and Anderson, 2008:7).  In this study therefore, the 
Independent, Guardian and Mirror are categorised as left wing, with 
the Sun, Mail, Express, Telegraph and Times categorised as right 
wing 
 
In 2003, the BNP were four years into the leadership of Griffin, whose 
plans to increase the national awareness for the party were beginning 
to have some effect on the national media, with coverage for the party 
beginning to appear consistently around the time of the May election.  
Table 5.1 shows that at this time they were beginning to gain coverage 
in the broadsheet newspapers, notably in the Independent and the 
Guardian, alongside high levels of reporting in the Mirror, Mail and 
Express.  Coverage of the BNP appears to be less in the Star and 
Sun, which is not perhaps surprising given the nature of the 
newspapers, but also in the Telegraph, which only totals 27 articles 
between January and July 2003. 
 
 
 135 
Table 5.1 Press coverage of the BNP at the 2003 Local elections 
 
Source: LexisNexis 
Date Express Guardian Independent 
Daily 
Mail Mirror Star Sun Telegraph  Times 
          
Jan-03 9 9 9 5 14 4 10 6 14 
Feb-03 1 6 11 3 2 5 2 6 8 
Mar-03 1 3 4 5 1 1 1 0 0 
    Apr-03 13 15 14 19 3 2 4 5 5 
May-03 21 20 23 18 18 7 16 8 16 
Jun-03 1 5 2 0 7 1 1 1 3 
Jul-03 3 5 1 1 4 2 2 1 2 
Total 49 64 64 51 49 22 36 27 48 
Average 7 9.1 9.1 7.2 7 3.4 5.1 3.8 6.8 
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The national coverage of the party increased the following year when 
the local and European elections took place in June 2004 (Table 5.2).  
In the month before the elections the BNP received considerable 
coverage in some newspapers, such as the Guardian and 
Independent, yet received little coverage in many of the other national 
newspapers, either the tabloids (Express, Mail, Mirror, Sun, Star) or 
the broadsheets (Guardian, Independent, Telegraph, Times).  
However, the average number of monthly articles increases for all 
newspapers compared with the averages from 2003. 
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Table 5.2 Press coverage of the BNP at the 2004 Local elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: LexisNexis
Date Express Guardian Independent Daily Mail Mirror Star Sun Telegraph  Times 
          
Jan-04 3 7 2 0 4 3 2 0 1 
Feb-04 8 13 6 3 26 3 5 9 12 
Mar-04 7 10 7 10 18 4 14 3 11 
Apr-04 10 16 22 11 21 6 15 5 8 
May-04 9 27 23 11 18 6 7 7 12 
Jun-04 3 49 38 20 17 4 3 12 22 
Jul-04 13 15 12 11 14 10 18 10 11 
Total 53 137 110 66 118 36 64 46 77 
Average 7.5 19.5 15.7 9.4 16.8 5.1 9.1 6.5 11 
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By 2006, the BNP were receiving significantly higher coverage from all 
newspapers, suggesting an increase in awareness of the party 
nationally, with the results suggesting that the party was beginning to 
establish a higher profile in the national press (Table 5.3).  Whereas in 
2003, the average monthly number of articles featuring the BNP did 
not get into double figures for any paper, in 2006, just two 
newspapers, the Express and the Star did not reach double figures in 
their average monthly coverage of the party. 
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Table 5.3 Press coverage of the BNP at the 2006 local elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Source: LexisNexis 
Date Express Guardian Independent Daily Mail Mirror Star Sun Telegraph Times 
          
Jan-06 5 16 9 3 5 5 6 5 11 
Feb-06 10 19 14 12 10 6 9 14 10 
Mar-06 1 8 7 6 1 1 3 2 2 
Apr-06 23 40 33 32 23 17 30 35 23 
May-06 17 39 31 27 17 14 25 29 25 
Jun-06 5 19 9 4 5 0 2 1 7 
Jul-06 1 13 5 7 1 0 1 2 5 
Total 62 154 108 91 62 43 76 88 83 
Average 8.8 22 15.4 13 8.8 6.1 10.8 12.5 11.8 
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By examining the number of articles that the BNP received in 2003 
and 2006, it is clear that the BNP are starting to have an effect on 
local elections.  The results in Table 5.4 demonstrate just how much 
the coverage of the BNP has increased across the national written 
press, from 410 hits in 2003 to 767 hits in 2006.  The results also 
reveals that the increase in national press coverage of the BNP has 
not been confined to any particular area of the press, be it left or right 
wing, or tabloid or broadsheet.  Every newspaper has an increase in 
coverage of the party, with notable increases in the broadsheets, 
particularly the Guardian and Telegraph.    It would appear, therefore, 
that regardless of the agenda that the newspaper may have when 
reporting the BNP, the party are viewed as being more newsworthy 
and thus, offers a suggestion that their growing presence at local 
elections is contributing to this increase in coverage. 
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Table 5.4 Average number of BNP article reporting in the  
national press, 2003-2006 
 
Paper 2003 2006 
Express 49 62 
Guardian 64 154 
Independent 64 108 
Mail 51 91 
Mirror 49 62 
Star 22 43 
Sun 36 76 
Telegraph 27 88 
Times 48 83 
Total 410 767 
 
 
Source: LexisNexis 
 
To further demonstrate the difference in reporting between tabloid and 
broadsheet reporting, coverage of the BNP from January to June 2006 
is charted, to show the differences in the coverage given to the BNP.    
To obtain these results demonstrated in Figure 5.1 below, the results 
were weighted by forming an average monthly number of articles for 
tabloid and broadsheet.  The graph confirms how the average 
coverage from the broadsheet newspapers is higher than that of the 
tabloids throughout this period. 
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Figure 5.1 Broadsheet and tabloid coverage of the BNP, January 
to June 2006 
Average monthly BNP articles for broadsheet/tabloid 
newspapers
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Source: LexisNexis 
 
The tabloid press have in the past been accused of misleading and 
often overplaying the potential threat of the BNP and also of the 
asylum and immigration situation (Eatwell, 1995).  Yet it is perhaps not 
surprising that the broadsheets cover the BNP more than the tabloids.  
Possible explanations for this occurrence include the notion that the 
broadsheets tend to cover the elections and politics in general in a lot 
more detail than the tabloids.  The tabloid press will often focus on the 
‘lifestyle issues’ and even where election coverage is concerned, 
coverage is often given over to issues of personality as opposed to 
policy.  The broadsheets, in contrast, are more likely to focus on policy 
 143 
issues as much as campaign issues in their coverage (Franklin and 
Murphy, 1998).  Furthermore, it is equally as important to note that on 
average, broadsheet papers are more likely to have a greater number 
of articles in the paper than any tabloid; subsequently the broadsheet 
may have more articles than the tabloid on any topic.   
 
The same test was carried out between the papers deemed left wing 
and right wing, again weighted in order to provide an average monthly 
number of articles to compare political orientation of coverage.   The 
coverage of the BNP has traditionally been linked more to right-wing 
newspapers, due to the views of these newspapers with regards to 
issues such as asylum and immigration (Eatwell, 2000).  Figure 5.2 
indicates that is the left wing newspapers which on average covered 
the BNP more times around the time of the 2006 local elections.   
Nevertheless, the left-wing newspapers appear to focus more on the 
BNP, particularly in the months of April and May.  This adds weight to 
the argument that the left-wing newspapers are seemingly the 
newspapers which are apparently more concerned about the threat of 
the BNP at the local elections and are more determined to highlight 
this threat (Guardian 2006).  The left-wing newspapers are also more 
likely to be sympathetic towards issues of immigration and asylum, 
which in turn leads to the tougher stance against the far right.        
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Figure 5.2 Coverage of the BNP by left/right orientation 
newspapers, January to June 2006 
 
Source: LexisNexis 
 
These findings demonstrate just how much the coverage of the BNP 
increased from March to April. There was an even sharper fall in 
articles in the aftermath of the election, in the months of June and 
July.  This suggests that the BNP appeared to receive more coverage 
in the build up to the election, as opposed to the aftermath of the 
election.  One such explanation for this occurrence is that, despite the 
BNP recording their best results in the 2006 local elections, the 
number of councillors they had nationwide was still a small number 
(53); therefore the impact that they make following the election results 
can be minimal.  A sign of the BNP’s electoral appeal can be seen by 
the coverage that the party received in the month following the 
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election, which drops sharply again, only reaching double figures in 
the Guardian.  Indeed, coverage of the BNP between elections is 
nominal.   
 
It is, therefore, the campaign that appears to attract the most press 
coverage for the BNP, indeed the BNP, received the publicity they 
were craving in the 2006 election campaign following the John et al 
(2006) report, which examined the potential support for the BNP in the 
local elections and also set out to examine where the party were 
making gains, alongside the strategies they were using to attract 
potential voters (John et al, 2006).  This publicity came just under two 
weeks before the election began, giving the BNP an opportunity to 
gain extensive coverage in both the broadsheets and the tabloids, 
something which it is unlikely that they would previously have had 
otherwise (Jenkins, 2006).  
 
Moreover, studies have suggested that the BNP seemingly tend to 
focus on campaigning which is much more local, often focusing on 
contentious issues, and stirring up feelings amongst the electorate, as 
opposed to a strategic national campaign (John et al, 2006).  The 
newspapers may therefore merely be reporting on BNP campaigns in 
isolated cases and not at a national level like the mainstream parties.   
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5.7 Local press coverage of the BNP 
In addition to the national press coverage of the BNP, an analysis of 
the local press is now considered.  Local newspapers have often led 
campaigns urging readers to reject far right parties.  An example of 
this was in Barking in 2006, where the local written press led a strong 
campaign against the party.  This type of campaign has been 
replicated across the country, where the BNP have attempted to gain 
a foothold (Copsey, 2004). 
However, local newspapers have also been accused of unwittingly 
carrying out campaigning for the BNP, much in the same way it can be 
argued national newspapers have done (Copsey 2004).  For example, 
the local written press’ coverage of the perceived BNP presence in a 
town or district is often disproportionate in terms of the actual BNP 
presence.  Often the party may receive detailed coverage on its 
intention to field candidates when in fact only one or two candidates 
are being put forward. Thus Copsey (2004) notes the Oldham 
Chronicle’s reporting of Asian groups’ attacks on whites which 
inadvertently played into the hands of the BNP.  It was the Chronicle’s 
reporting on the attacks alongside stories of extra funding for Asian 
communities which provided the BNP with an opportunity to increase 
its presence in the town, with Copsey noting that it was “hard not to 
overdo the significance of the Chronicle’s reporting” (2004:148).  
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The BNP is, therefore, generally unable to campaign in a positive 
manner through the local media.  However, there appears to be a 
trend throughout the country, whereby BNP members and supporters 
will write in to local newspapers, either backing the party and its 
policies or criticising the local councillors (StoptheBNP, 2007).  The 
Stop the BNP (2007) campaign group highlighted the concerns of a 
local councillor that the addresses of the supposedly concerned 
residents were not actual addresses.  The local press therefore, 
provides a clear opportunity for BNP supporters and campaigners to 
get their opinions noted, which may not be possible on other media 
forms such as television and radio.  
5.7.1 Examining the local press coverage of the 2006 local 
elections  
An examination of two local newspapers in West Yorkshire allows us 
to develop more of an understanding about the way in which local 
politics is reported.  The newspapers examined in this study are the 
Halifax Courier (circulation 26,000), which serves the Calderdale 
region and the Telegraph and Argus (circulation 44,000), which is the 
local newspaper for Bradford (Press Gazette, 2010). The BNP has 
enjoyed electoral successes in Bradford and Halifax since 2002, with 
the party enjoying its first success outside Lancashire with the victory 
of Adrian Marsden in the Mixenden by-election in 2003.  The electoral 
support for the BNP in Bradford at the local level seemingly began to 
grow at about the same time as it did in Calderdale, with the party 
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taking advantage of the racial tension and the riots which occurred in 
July 2001 (Copsey 2004).  The party fielded six candidates in the 2003 
local elections and whilst they did not return any candidates to 
Bradford council, their strong performances suggested that they would 
pose a real threat to the mainstream parties in future elections.  The 
growing presence of the BNP in Bradford was confirmed a year later 
when four councillors were elected representing the wards of Bradford 
South, Queensbury, Keighley West and Wibsey.  In 2006 the BNP 
won a seat in the Queensbury ward, along with polling well in a 
number of other wards.  A study of these wards based on data from 
the 2001 census highlights similarities with wards in Calderdale where 
the BNP have enjoyed success.  The similarities are in terms of a lack 
of employment and a higher number of people receiving benefits. 
(Census 2001) 
5.7.2 Methodology of analysis  
The newspapers featured were both analysed over a period of one 
month, from 7th April 2006 to 9th May 2006.  This was done to allow an 
examination of the progression and the nature of the press coverage 
in the period leading up to the election on May 4th, and the reaction in 
the aftermath of the results.  The newspapers are published from 
Monday to Saturday every week and every day of publication was 
examined. 
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5.7.3 Analysis of the local press in West Yorkshire 
Firstly, the weekly amount of politics coverage in the month leading up 
to the election and its immediate aftermath was examined (Table 5.5).  
This revealed that in the month leading up to the election on the 4th 
May, there is a lack of coverage covering political articles of any type.  
When referring to politics, all aspects related to politicians such as 
their personal lives, political parties and policy at both a national or 
local level was considered as political coverage.  Indeed, the only in 
depth coverage the elections received was following their outcome on 
the 6th May when three to four pages in both papers were devoted to 
looking at what happened and the fortunes for all the parties 
(Telegraph and Argus, 2006b).  In the days before the election, 
whereas the Telegraph and Argus published a list of candidates 
standing for election, there was no such equivalent in the Halifax 
Courier, with it common to find no mention of the election or indeed 
any political stories in the Courier only a fortnight prior to elections.   
In general, politics is kept off the front page in both local newspapers.  
The Telegraph and Argus featured politics on the front page just twice, 
with politics on the front page of the Halifax Courier just three times in 
the period of analysis.  Moreover, the stories that do make the front 
page are associated with the image of councillors, focusing on the 
private life of a local councillor and the theft of anti-BNP papers being 
linked to a local BNP councillor (Halifax Courier, 2006a&b). 
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Table 5.5 Weekly breakdown of articles relating to politics 7 April- 
9 May 2006 
Dates Halifax 
Courier 
Telegraph 
and Argus 
Total 
7-14th 
April 
7 7 14 
15th-22nd 
April 
5 8 13 
23-30th 
April 
3 11 14 
1st-9th 
May 
17 16 33 
Total 32 42 74 
Weekly 
average 
8 10.5 18.5 
 
Source: Own analysis 
Where there is coverage of politics, it appears that it is the image of 
the candidates standing which appears to receive the greater 
coverage.  In total, 55.2 per cent of coverage across both the Courier 
and the Telegraph and Argus concerns image, as opposed to 
programme or campaign. Mughan (2000) discussed that the election 
coverage has evolved to an extent that the image of the candidate 
plays a more important role in each national election, and this appears 
to now be the case at local level.  Hence it appears to be the suitability 
of the candidate as a person to be a politician, rather than their 
policies, which is more important to the press.   
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Table 5.6 Principal themes of reporting in the local press 7 April- 
9 May 2006 
 Image Campaign Programmes 
Halifax Courier 15 (55.6%) 10 (37%) 2 (7.4%) 
Telegraph and 
Argus 
22 (52.3%) 5 (11.9%) 15 (35.7%) 
Total 37 (55.2%) 15 (22.3%) 17 (25.3%) 
Source: Own analysis 
 
The content analysis carried out demonstrated that where there is 
coverage of the BNP, this too is predominantly concerned with the 
image of the candidates (Table 5.7).  The local press therefore are 
arguably following the trend which we have seen from the national 
press in Britain, in which coverage of the BNP has tended to focus on 
the backgrounds of the candidates and members of the party.  The 
Courier also focused more on the lack of suitability of candidates to be 
councillors, such as highlighting the court appearances of candidates 
and BNP members (Halifax Courier 2006c).  
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Table 5.7 Principal themes of reporting of the BNP in the local 
press   7 April- 9 May 2006 
               
BNP Image Campaign Programmes 
Halifax 
Courier 
6  1  1  
Telegraph and 
Argus 
9  1  1  
 
Source: Own analysis 
5.7.4 Local press coverage of the BNP 
The Telegraph and Argus has often been at the forefront of 
campaigning against the BNP and this proves to be the case in the 
build-up to the 2006 local elections.  The BNP is the party received the 
most negative coverage out of all the political parties standing in the 
area (see Table 5.8).   In particular, the newspaper concentrated on 
the campaign group Stop the BNP, who were targeting Bradford as an 
area to prevent the BNP vote (Evans, 2006:).  It carried photos of their 
rallies and concerts in the city in the build up to the election and 
included interviews with the leading figures of the campaign.  The 
Telegraph and Argus also printed messages from key figures in the 
local community, such as local religious and community leaders, 
including the Archbishop of York, whilst the mainstream parties also 
put forward a united message against the BNP (Telegraph and Argus 
2006:a).  In the week building up to the election, editorials and articles 
by journalists again took a similar theme to the previous articles 
criticising the BNP.   
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The Halifax Courier had eight articles focusing on the BNP, all of 
which were negative in orientation.  Like the Telegraph and Argus, the 
Courier featured some of this coverage on the front page, notably 
highlighting the theft of anti-BNP leaflets (Halifax Courier 2006a).   
Table 5.8 Party coverage in the Telegraph& Argus 1 7 April- 9 May 
2006  
 Conservative Labour Lib 
Dem 
BNP Green All 
parties 
Negative 
coverage 
3  10  0 11  0 3  
Positive 
coverage 
3  0 0 0 1  0 
 Source: Own analysis 
Table 5.9 Party coverage in the Halifax Courier 7 April- 9 May 2006 
 
 Conservative Labour Lib 
Dem 
BNP Green All 
Negative 
Coverage 
6  10 1  8  0 0 
Positive 
Coverage 
2  1   1  0   0 0 
Source: Own analysis 
However, it is important to note that other political parties also 
received negative coverage in both papers.  The Labour Party 
received more negative press than the BNP in the Halifax Courier and 
a similar level of criticism in the Telegraph and Argus which focused 
on the Home Secretary, Charles Clarke, who was under fire due to a 
                                                 
1
 At the 2006 local elections, Bradford Council was led by the Conservative, whilst in Calderdale 
there was no overall control of the Council. 
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released criminal re-offending in Bradford (Telegraph and Argus, 
2006b) resulting in a campaign calling for change to these policies.  
Negative coverage of the Conservative Party was centred on sleaze 
allegations involving local councillors in Bradford, alongside the 
reporting of the case which also dominated Conservative coverage in 
Calderdale, of two Conservative councillors caught up in a scandal 
involving postal votes (Telegraph and Argus 2006c).  The negative 
coverage of all the parties therefore shows that this is not something 
confined simply to the BNP. 
 
A further way of measuring any effect of the press coverage in relation 
to the BNP is to examine the results of the May 2006 local elections.  
Table 5.10 below shows the total number of councillors represents the 
number each party had following the 2006 elections, with the number 
in brackets representing the gains or losses in councillors from the 
2004 elections.  The candidate success rate represents the number of 
candidates elected from the total number of candidates which stood 
for the party in the two areas.  The total votes for 2006 is the 
combined total for each party in the two regions with the share of 
votes being calculated from the total number of ballot papers returned.   
 
Indeed it appears that the coverage, or lack of coverage, given to a 
particular party does not appear to have much an effect on the 
performance of the parties at the local elections.  The performances of 
the Labour Party in Bradford and Calderdale appear to support this 
 155 
observation whereby the BNP received criticism from both the Halifax 
Courier and the Telegraph and Argus, yet their performance in the 
2006 local elections in Calderdale and Bradford saw them gain 
councillors, likewise the Liberal Democrats received minimal 
coverage, yet they too also suffered no losses in Bradford or 
Calderdale following the election. 
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Table 5.10 Party coverage in the local press and election results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Party/Location 
 Total 
councillors 
after 2006 
election 
Candidate 
success rate 
at 2006 
election 
Total 
votes 
2006 
Share of 
votes 
Press 
articles 
for each 
party 
 
Negative 
Articles 
Conservative 
Bradford 
33 (-1) 35.4% 42,635 31.4% 6 3 
Labour 
Bradford 
37 (+5) 46.8% 43,347 31.9% 10 10 
Lib Dems 
Bradford 
14 (0) 12.9% 25, 048 17.9% 3 0 
BNP 
Bradford 
2 (-1) 6.25% 18,212 13.4% 11 11 
Conservative 
Calderdale 
20 (-1) 35.2% 15,675 29.7% 8 6 
Labour 
Calderdale 
 
10 (+1) 22.2% 12,779 24.2% 11 10 
Lib Dems 
Calderdale  
10 (+1) 22.2% 13,661 25.9% 2 1 
BNP 
Calderdale 
2 (-1) 12.5% 5,162 9.8% 8 8 
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The results show that there does not appear to be any strong 
correlation between negative coverage and electoral performance.  
The BNP lost a seat in both Calderdale and Bradford, although it 
cannot be solely put down to the negative press coverage of the BNP.  
For example, other factors such as local campaigning by the 
mainstream parties have to be taken into account, whilst there could 
also be some dissatisfaction with the performance of the BNP 
councillors in those wards, leading to reluctance to vote for the party.  
Additionally, although the BNP did not make any gains in the number 
of seats, it is notable that they managed to win a seat in Queensbury 
in Bradford, an area where they had not previously won a seat, thus 
suggesting that the Telegraph and Argus’ negative coverage of the 
BNP did not deter new voters for the party. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to establish press coverage of the BNP at both 
and national and local level.  In taking a unique method of analysis 
using the LexisNexis package, the chapter has demonstrated the rise 
of the BNP in the national press.  This rise has not been restricted to 
one particular grouping but has been witnessed across all forms of 
press, regardless of tabloid or broadsheet, or left/right orientation.   
Whilst coverage of the BNP has been predominantly negative, it 
appeared that national editors viewed the rise of the BNP as 
newsworthy and interesting to their readership. The consequence of 
such a rise in coverage for the BNP between 2004 and 2006 however, 
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is that it raises questions regarding the oxygen of publicity that can be 
said to have provided the BNP.  As the BNP only had 53 councillors in 
2006, it suggests that the amount of coverage for the party was 
perhaps not entirely justifiable.  Yet the rise in coverage that the party 
received does lead to a suggestion that the BNP were beginning to 
capitalise on any publicity through either opportunism or through a 
more organised structure, such as their Media Monitoring Unit.  Such 
methods were leading to the party getting their name in the paper 
more frequently.  Indeed the increase in coverage can be put down to 
an awareness from the public that the BNP were beginning to win 
support nationwide, the coverage that the party received in the 
national press as a consequence of the publishing of the John et al 
(2006) report demonstrates the public’s growing awareness of the 
presence of the BNP. 
 
Furthermore, a content analysis of press coverage at the local level 
raises an issue which is that of lethargy with regard to elections.   The 
lack of coverage given over to local elections would appear to suggest 
that coverage of politics is not deemed as being of importance for 
readers and therefore suggests that local politics is not viewed as 
important to the electorate.  These findings therefore raise questions 
about the BNP at the local level, in terms of why they are raising their 
profile in the media in the build up to local elections.  It also highlights 
an issue regarding the way in which local elections are now viewed by 
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the electorate.  These issues will be investigated in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
 
Certainly, the study of BNP coverage in the Courier and Telegraph 
and Argus shows signs of the newspapers wishing to lead a campaign 
to prevent voters from turning to the far right.  However, any negative 
coverage for the BNP is seemingly matched by equally negative 
coverage for the mainstream parties, raising further questions about 
the way in which local politics and politicians are viewed by the 
electorate. 
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Chapter Six: BNP campaigning at the local level 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The comparative perspective in Chapter Four established that there 
have been failings from the BNP at the national level, particularly with 
regard to factors concerning the negative image of the BNP and 
leader Nick Griffin and the role played by the mainstream parties in 
preventing the far right dominating debate on immigration.   Yet, whilst 
the BNP are yet to have displayed any significant effect on the general 
elections in Britain, the changed at the local level, where the party 
have enjoyed periods of success, notably in Dagenham and Barking, 
where the 12 seats won in 2006 saw the party become the official 
opposition on Barking council.  Following the 2010 local elections, the 
party had 24 local councillors across England which is still a relatively 
small number, in comparison with other minor parties such as the 
Green Party, who had 126 seats.   
 
This chapter examines the BNP at the local level, where the party 
have enjoyed electoral successes in direct comparison to their 
performance at the national level.  The chapter will look to establish 
why the BNP have been able to enjoy such electoral success by 
focusing on a number of aspects, such as the state of local 
democracy, the activism of the mainstream parties at the local level 
and the campaigning and activism of the BNP at the local level. 
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6.2 The BNP at the local level  
The far right’s first seat at the local level occurred when the British 
Union of Fascists won one council seat in the 1930s; however, that 
proved to be the only success for the far right until the 1970s.  In the 
1960s National Front and BNP candidates stood around London, but 
had little electoral success, however, in the 1970s, increasing support 
for the National Front saw candidates being put forward in 
metropolitan areas. In 1973, the NF contested 68 wards, polling 
particularly well in the towns of Blackburn and Leicester, and 
averaging 15 per cent in contested wards, subsequently, a year later, 
the number of candidates contesting seats had risen to 164, 
concentrating mainly in the West Midlands and West Yorkshire 
(Rallings and Thrasher, 1997). 
 
However, by 1983, the fractious nature of the British far right saw the 
NF unable to build on increasing support, leading to the party 
contesting less than one tenth of 1 per cent of wards (Rallings and 
Thrasher, 1997; Copsey, 2004).  Subsequently, it wasn’t until 1993 
that the far right were to make an impression at the local elections, 
when the BNP won a seat in the Tower Hamlets ward, taking 
advantage of racial tensions in the area, (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997; 
Smith, 2009).  This success proved to be short-lived, with Labour 
recapturing the seat in 1994 without any far right challenge, 
consequently, in 1995, just 25 candidates contested seats, “none 
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came anywhere close to being elected” (Rallings and Thrasher, 
1997:180). 
 
Yet the rise in BNP candidates between 2000 and 2007 following the 
appointment of Griffin, suggested that the BNP were having an effect 
in local politics.  From 17 candidates standing in 2000, the party had 
grown to 744 candidates in 2007, with 292,911 votes (UAF, 2007).  
The BNP were to rise from its primary electoral successes in the North 
West, in 2002 and 2003, where the party was able to build on small 
pockets of support which had existed under the leadership of John 
Tyndall, to a party who were able to field candidates and win seats 
across Britain (Copsey, 2004).  In 2006, the party fielded a total of 363 
candidates across 78 councils and won 222,389 votes nationwide, 
with 33 councillors being elected (UAF, 2007).  Whilst the number of 
BNP candidates was to increase to over 50, the number was to fall 
slightly in 2008 and 2009.  In 2010, the party had 27 councillors 
defeated across the country, leaving them with 24 councillors.  In 
Barking and Dagenham, the party lost all 12 seats which it had won in 
2006 (BBC, 2010b).2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The exact number of BNP councillors who contested seats is not known, due to splits in the 
party, whereby some former BNP candidates stood as independents (Norris, 2010). 
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6. 3 The BNP’s campaigning methods 
There are signs BNP campaigning has become more modernised and 
sophisticated, following Nick Griffin’s appointment as party chairman in 
1999. The party are now particularly keen to present itself as a 
respectable political party, even urging supporters to refer to the party 
as the British National Party as opposed to the BNP, due to what they 
perceive as negative connotations of BNP in the national press.  
Furthermore, the party advises all members to be smartly dressed, 
allowing for no “unshaven scruffs or skinhead haircuts” (BNP, 2008:2).     
 
In particular, its approach to local campaigning has been claimed to be 
based on more modern canvassing tactics previously used by the 
Liberal Democrats; whereby the party now seeks to establish itself as 
playing a major role in local community politics, immersing into the life 
of the local community, in order to work with the voters to find out what 
issues are important, in a bid to establish a “local legitimacy” (Copsey, 
2004:137; John et al, 2006).  They have done this by establishing a 
“helping hands” leaflet and “grumble” sheets, which they distribute 
before the start of campaigning, in order to understand the issues that 
concern local residents (BNP, 2008:3).  Another way in which the 
party attempts to become active in local politics, is by joining local 
groups and committees. Indeed, the BNP leadership encourages 
prospective councillors to become community project leaders (BNP, 
2008).  The party also proposes local BNP groups hold days of action 
during the local campaign, such as “clean up days”, where the local 
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neighbourhood is cleaned up of litter, in order to present the party in a 
positive light (BNP, 2008:3).  This type of publicity has proved to be 
successful for the party, with Steve Smith in Burnley highlighting his 
local charitable work as a major focus of his successful campaign in 
2002 (Copsey, 2004).  
 
In 2008, the party further developed its canvassing techniques by 
establishing a direct mailing campaign, something which had been 
unprecedented for a far right party in Britain (BNP, 2008).  
Additionally, the BNP website provides specific instructions on how to 
canvass, which includes identifying interested voters and inviting them 
to attend social events to follow up their interest, encouraging 
candidates to leave calling cards with voters and to also promote the 
sale of the party newspaper, Freedom (BNP, 2008).   
 
Furthermore, the party are also careful to avoid canvassing on 
households with members of ethnic minorities. Instead, they will 
identify potential voters from initial canvassing and will return to 
canvass interested voters in order to maximise their vote share 
(Copsey, 2004).  They will then bring in activists from outside the area 
to help with the campaigning in those particular wards in order to have 
as great an impact as possible. 
 
Moreover, traditionally it was thought that the BNP was attracting 
votes, notably from “young men through effective grassroots 
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campaigning” (Vision21, 2004:23).  However, the BNP are seeking to 
win votes from all ages of voters, making them likely to win support 
from the elderly as well as younger voters, as elderly voters are 
worried by what they perceive as a decline in society and concerned 
that their area has changed due to the change in ethnic 
demographics, two issues on which the BNP campaign strongly 
(Goodwin, 2008). 
 
Thus, it appears that the BNP leadership wish to have their candidates 
take an interest and active role in local politics and local issues.  
Indeed, whilst national issues are seen to be predominant in the press 
at local elections, local issues have traditionally been important. Miller 
(1988) found that 56 per cent of respondents claimed to be influenced 
in local elections more by local, than national issues.  There is also a 
suggestion that the actions and image of the local politician 
themselves matters more to residents in the local elections (Miller, 
1988). 
 
The party maintain links former far right groups in Britain by looking to 
target particular seats that they believe will give them electoral 
successes (Copsey, 2004; John et al, 2006).  Such an example of this 
can be witnessed in Burnley, where the BNP were said to have 
targeted the town in order to take advantage of the running of Burnley 
council by Independent councillors to further their own successes 
(Copsey, 2004).  In terms of which voters the party are targeting with 
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regard to previous party allegiance, it has been claimed that the aim is 
to target Labour voters who have become disillusioned with Labour 
(Copsey, 2004). The BNP are less likely to campaign in safe seat 
wards, instead they seek to move into volatile wards, where perhaps 
there is less party competition, in order to maximise their vote-share 
(John et al, 2006).  Whilst the party perhaps aims to target voters who 
have normally voted for Labour, there is a long held convention that 
they attract support from all the mainstream parties (Vision21, 2004; 
John et al, 2006).  It would appear therefore, that the BNP are wining 
voters from across the mainstream parties and not just the Labour 
Party. Indeed, whilst the party generally stands in urban areas where 
the Labour Party have traditionally been strongly supported, this can 
arguably be linked to the profile of potential far right support more than 
the current state of the Labour Party (Eatwell, 2006; John et al, 2006).   
 
6. 4 Activism in local politics 
In addition to the BNP attempting to professionalize and bring an 
image of respectability to its campaigning, the state of politics at the 
local level can potentially provide a platform for the BNP to make 
electoral gains.  Indeed, the very nature of the local election in Britain 
has appeared to undergo an evolution in terms of partisanship and 
voter alignment, in terms of the support for the mainstream parties.  
Such an evolution has witnessed a “weakening of voter ties” in Britain 
(Rallings and Thrasher, 1997:85).  Therefore, fewer voters are now 
identifying themselves with the major political parties, thus leading to 
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the possibility of minor parties such as the BNP, winning a greater 
share of votes.  Furthermore, the local elections have also become an 
opportunity for the electorate to express such a freedom from previous 
party ties, prompting the possibility that some voters may therefore 
vote for a party in a local election which they would not normally 
consider a vote for in a general election (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997). 
 
Hence, local elections can benefit the minor political parties, as they 
can often provide opportunities for movements away from national 
trends.   Specific issues relevant to one particular ward thus become 
the dominant theme of a campaign, with national issues playing no 
major role in deciding the electoral outcome, indeed “the ability of 
national level influences to explain local electoral outcomes had 
declined markedly” (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997:168). 
 
Moreover, the lack of local political activism can appear to be a 
contributory factor to the success of the BNP at the local level.  A 
Joseph Rowntree report (2005) examined local politics in Harrogate 
and Burnley and found that local politics, (that being the number of 
people involved in campaigning and running the local political parties), 
is effectively kept alive by just 100 people in each district.  Hence, 
there is a strong case that local democracy could cease to be viable 
due to the decline of the mass party membership (Panebianco, 1988). 
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Furthermore, the image of local councillors in Britain has been 
described by Wilson and Game (2006) as not being a particularly 
positive one, particularly on television, where programmes such as 
Coronation Street have often depicted councillors in a negative and 
even corrupt manner.  They further describe the incentives for being a 
councillor as ‘meagre’.  This has potential consequences for local 
democracy, as it means that local councillors tend to be retired or part-
time workers, as full-time workers and younger voters cannot afford to 
give their time over to council duties for such low remuneration levels 
(Wilson and Game, 2006).  In 2009, local councillors in Bradford were 
paid a basic amount of £12,759 plus expenses for items such as 
laptops and travel expenses (Winrow, 2009).   Higher ranking 
councillors were earning between 30 and 50 thousand pounds a year 
(Winrow, 2009). 
 
Additionally, British electoral turnout at the local level is the lowest in 
Western Europe (Joseph Rowntree, 2005; Wilson and Game, 2006).  
Indeed it was noted that in 2003, more people voted on the reality 
television show Big Brother than in the local elections (Hinscliff, 2003).  
This is of particular significance when considering far right support, 
since evidence in other countries, notably France has suggested that 
a low turnout has often been seen as a possible factor in allowing far 
right gains (Fysh and Wolfreys, 2003).  The notion that a low turnout 
can profit the far right has been one which has been used by anti-
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fascist campaigns and mainstream parties in a bid to raise the turnout 
levels at local elections (Husbands, 2000).   
 
6.4.1 The mainstream parties at the local level 
The decline in local democracy has affected the mainstream parties 
with both the Conservative and Labour Parties suffering a drop in 
membership numbers.  The Labour Party membership hit a peak of 
405,200 in 1997 at the time of Tony Blair’s general election success, 
but had fallen to 198,026 ten years later (Kirkup and Prince, 2008).  
The Labour MP, John Cruddas, has called for the party to reconnect 
with the electorate, and rebuild at grassroots level (Kirkup and Prince, 
2008).  Similarly, the Conservative Party have seen a decline in 
membership figures, estimated at 290,000 in 2008, down from an 
estimated 750,000 under John Major’s Premiership in the early 1990s 
(Kirkup and Prince, 2008).  These figures suggest that there are 
reduced resources in terms of both finance and party workers 
available to the mainstream parties, which could severely effect 
campaigning at the local level.  Subsequently, this provides the BNP 
with an opportunity to move into areas where the mainstream parties 
perhaps do not have a strong association due to the aforementioned 
lack of resources and that allows them to build a connection, and 
consequently, an electoral support. 
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6.4.2 Party competition at the local level 
Therefore, having noted how there is seemingly a decline in activism 
and membership at the local level, the effect that it has on the possible 
BNP vote can be demonstrated in examining an area where the BNP 
performed well, to understand whether there was a lack of party 
competition which could lead to such successes. 
 
Barking and Dagenham has been selected, due to the election results 
in 2006 where the party became the official opposition after having 12 
councillors successfully elected.  Barking and Dagenham is an area of 
East London that has witnessed a decline in its traditional industries, 
of fishing and car manufacturing, which has led to the area becoming 
one of the 50 most deprived areas in Britain (Goodwin, 2008).  The 
area suffers from low levels of educational qualifications and has the 
lowest average income level in the capital (London Councils, 2008).  
Barking and Dagenham has also seen a strong rise in the number of 
immigrants into the area.   
 
The success of the BNP in 2006 in Barking and Dagenham was a 
landmark election result for the party regarding the number of 
candidates who stood for election and the number of candidates who 
were elected.  Only one candidate who stood for the BNP was not 
elected in the area, which appeared to demonstrate the increasing 
popularity and standing of the party in the local area.  When examining 
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the results in more detail, the decline of participation in party activity 
appears to be in evidence. 
 
Indeed, there can be a suggestion that the BNP benefited from the 
decision from major parties not to field candidates in a number of 
wards.  In Barking and Dagenham there are parties who did not stand 
candidates at all in a number of wards, notably the Liberal Democrats, 
who did not stand in four wards, whilst the Conservatives did not stand 
in two wards (See Table 6.1).  There are perhaps two possible 
explanations for the occurrence.  Firstly it may be argued that, due to 
the reduction in members and activists for the mainstream parties, the 
parties did not have the resources in terms of finance or manpower to 
field a candidate in that area.  Secondly, linked to the first explanation 
is the fact that the parties may have felt that they did not have any 
chance of winning that particular seat; therefore that party may not 
have chosen to put forward a candidate in order to concentrate on 
wards where they feel there is a better chance of winning.   
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Table 6.1 Mainstream parties’ non-presence in the Barking and 
Dagenham 2006 local elections 
 
Ward with elected BNP councillors Non-competing parties 
Alibon Lib Dem 
Eastbury Conservative 
Goresbrook Lib Dem 
Mayesbrook Lib Dem 
Parsloes  
Valence Conservative, Lib Dem 
Village  
 
Source: Barking and Dagenham Council, 2006 
 
However, one possible effect of parties such as the Liberal Democrats 
not standing at the local level regards that of the protest vote.  If voters 
wish to make a protest vote against a party in government, then there 
is more chance that they will turn to a minor party in order to register 
their protest vote.  It has been argued that voters are perhaps more 
likely to register a protest vote for a minor party such as the BNP at 
the local level, than at the national level, as such a vote will not effect 
the national government, yet can serve as a wake-up call to the 
mainstream parties (Carter, 2005). 
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These arguments display greater credence when examining the 2010 
local elections in Barking, when the BNP lost all their seats in the 
district (BBC, 2010c).  Whilst in 2006, the mainstream parties did not 
field candidates in many of the wards where the BNP stood, in 2010 
there were candidates from the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and 
Labour standing in every ward, thereby providing stronger competition 
to the BNP in all wards and perhaps illustrating the need from the 
mainstream parties to take on the BNP to prevent further election 
successes (Barking Council, 2010).    
 
6.4.3 The BNP and UKIP 
Additionally, another aspect which needs to be taken into 
consideration with regard to the performance of the BNP in the local 
elections was the role of the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP).  In recent years, UKIP have been said to have “stolen the 
thunder away from the BNP” (Margetts et al, 2004:4) subsequently 
taking 2.2 per cent of the votes nationwide at the 2005 general 
election.  In the 2010 election the party put forward 572 candidates, 
gaining 920,334 votes, with 3.1 per cent of the vote share.  
 
Although UKIP has not been regarded as far right in the same sense 
as the BNP, there are some similarities in the policies and the rhetoric 
of the two parties.  Chapter Two described the far right as being 
xenophobic, and desiring a strong state.  It can be argued that whilst 
the anti-European Union stance taken by the party certainly displays 
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some xenophobic elements, there is no element of an anti-democratic 
stance taken by the party.  Therefore, people would perhaps be more 
likely to vote for UKIP as opposed to the BNP, as the party are seen to 
be less extreme in terms of their image and their policies (Margetts et 
al, 2004). 
   
However, there is also evidence to suggest that voters who vote for 
either the UKIP or BNP will have sympathies for the other party.  This 
has been displayed in the 2004 European elections where Margetts et 
al (2004:4) found that 87 per cent of UKIP voters may vote BNP in 
future elections and likewise 91.3 per cent of BNP voters may vote 
UKIP.  Consequently, voters may possibly see them as similar, 
despite efforts by the parties themselves to distinguish themselves 
from each other (Margetts et al, 2004).     
 
Indeed, it can be argued that the BNP see UKIP as a potential threat 
to their vote share by their bid to form an electoral pact with UKIP at 
the 2009 European elections.  The BNP had wished to put into place a 
pact which would see the BNP fight the election in the North of 
England, whilst UKIP would campaign in the South of England (BBC, 
2008).  The BNP were keen for this pact in order not to split the anti-
federalist vote.  However, UKIP leader Nigel Farage rejected any 
proposal of an electoral pact by stating that, under no circumstances 
would there be a deal between the two parties, with Farage 
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suggesting that people who vote UKIP would not be interested in 
voting for the BNP (BBC, 2008b).   
 
6. 5 The BNP and the local by-elections 
Additionally, one further aspect of local elections which can provide 
the BNP with an opportunity to make further gains, is through local by-
elections. By-elections at the local level can be called for a number of 
reasons, notably due to the death or resignation of a councillor, 
moreover, by-elections can be held due to a councillor’s non-
attendance at meetings.  Timing of by-elections can be dependant on 
the wishes of the local authority.  Indeed, local authorities are 
permitted to delay by-elections until the following May if a councillor 
leaves office after September (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997:172) 
 
The very nature of by-elections have been viewed as being unique 
political events, which have been too idiosyncratic to be worthy of 
serious study by academic political scientists (Rallings and Thrasher, 
1997:175).  Additionally, local by-elections results can be the result of 
one or more influencing factors arising from both a national, and 
indeed, local perspective, notably the national mood, the timing of the 
election, and the role of the media (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997).   
 
However, local by-elections are still looked upon with importance as 
they can be “closely observed gauges of the nation’s political 
temperature” (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997:189).   Consequently, this 
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has seen the importance of by-elections increase and has, thus, led to 
campaigning in such by-elections to be more intensive and 
widespread in comparison with campaigning at regular elections. 
 
Historically, by-elections can be seen as providing an opportunity for a 
minor party to increase both their support and publicity, as was seen 
with the Liberal Democrats in the 1980s, where the party “established 
themselves as major players in local government by-elections” 
(Rallings and Thrasher, 1997:180).  Indeed, the BNP benefited from a 
by-election success in Tower Hamlets in 1993, a success which 
consequently “renewed public interest in the role of such 
parties….within the British political system” (Rallings and Thrasher, 
1997:183).  Furthermore, by-elections have been the catalyst for BNP 
success in regions of England, with the by-election success for Adrian 
Marsden in the Mixenden ward in Calderdale providing the BNP with a 
foothold in Yorkshire (Copsey, 2004).  The nature of the by-election for 
that reason, can possibly allow the BNP to achieve strong results, 
notably in areas where they have previously not polled well, or indeed 
even stood candidates. 
 
Therefore, to fully demonstrate the very nature of how a by-election 
can provide the BNP with an opportunity to make an electoral gain 
which perhaps would not be so possible in the standard local 
elections, we examine two by-elections where the party have been 
able to successfully have a councillor elected; namely the wards of Mill 
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Hill in Darwen, Lancashire in 2002, and Swanley St Mary’s in 
Sevenoaks, Kent in 2008.  These two wards have been selected as 
they represent BNP successes in two differing areas of the country 
and also in different years, as a result allowing an analysis of the BNP 
campaign in the two areas and to allow us to understand the impact of 
the party in the local area.  Therefore, such an analysis can lead us to 
draw some preliminary conclusions from the two by-election results. 
 
Firstly, the first comparison to be made between the two wards reveals 
the nature in which the BNP have previously come from a seemingly 
unnoticeable position, in relation to previous years.  In both cases, the 
BNP had previously not fielded a candidate in the particular ward, yet, 
despite this, their respective candidates were still able to win the ward.  
In Mill Hill, the Liberal Democrats, who had occupied the seat and 
Labour, both witnessed a sharp fall in their vote share. Furthermore, 
Swanley St Mary’s had been seen as a traditional Labour enclave in 
Sevenoaks, yet the Labour vote share dropped by 21.7 per cent with 
the Liberal Democrats not putting forward a candidate, reflecting a 
similar occurrence, as discussed earlier with reference to the 2006 
local elections in Barking and Dagenham.   Moreover, in the previous 
election in the ward in 2007, UKIP had fielded a candidate, something 
which they did not repeat in the 2008 by-election and had gained 19.8 
per cent of the vote.  Indeed, the fact that a lack of UKIP and Liberal 
Democrat candidate meant that the BNP could win possible protest 
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votes, as they could position themselves as the only alternative to the 
two mainstream parties. 
 
Table 6.2 Mill Hall by-election result, 2002 
 
Party 
 
Score 
Vote share percentage 
(+/- from previous 
election) 
BNP 578 32.1 (+32.1) 
Labour 562 31.2 (-16.3) 
Conservative 154 8.6 (8.6) 
Lib Dem 505 28.1 (-24.4) 
 
Source: Yonwin, 2004 
 
 
Table 6.3 Swanley St Mary’s by-election result, 2008 
 
 
Party 
 
Score 
Vote share 
percentage (+/- from 
previous election) 
BNP 408 41.3 (+41.3) 
Labour 332 33.6 (-21.7) 
Conservative 247 25 (+0.1) 
Source: Sevenoaks council, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 179 
 
Secondly, both by-election results are a reflection of the levels of 
campaigning put into the wards by the BNP.  In both cases, the BNP 
carried out an extensive campaigning by bringing in activists from 
outside the area to aid carrying out canvassing. Additionally, the 
Swanley St Mary’s campaign was run by Eddy Butler, the National 
Campaigns Officer for the BNP.  Such was the intensity of the BNP 
campaign, that, in Swanley St Mary’s, a Labour Deputy Leader of the 
council noted how the BNP had up to 40 people canvassing the area 
every day,  as the Labour Party did not do enough to win the support 
of the area through their canvassing (Dartford Times, 2009). 
 
Moreover, the campaigning had similarities in terms of the BNP 
focusing on a major issue relevant to that particular ward, in an 
attempt to provoke the feeling of fear amongst voters.  In the Mill Hall 
ward, the campaign centred around the proposed building of an 
immigrant hostel in the area, alongside calls to end alleged 
preferential funding for Asian areas in the town (Copsey, 2004, 
Eatwell, 2006).  Such policies were the result of doorstep campaigning 
in order to find out local grievances (Eatwell, 2006).  Similarly, in 
Swanley St Mary’s, BNP campaigning focused on the recent number 
of job losses in the local area, with over 700 jobs lost at Glaxo Smith 
Kline and a paper mill in nearby Dartford (Dartford Times, 2009).  The 
BNP linked such closures to its campaign for British jobs for British 
workers, playing on the fears of local residents worried about further 
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job losses, (Dartford Times, 2009).  It, therefore, appears that both 
campaigns appeared to have strong immigration themes and played 
on fears of voters running through the campaign and canvassing.  
Furthermore, the BNP was successful, despite a strong anti-fascist 
campaign being mobilised at both by-elections.  In Blackburn, a strong 
anti-fascist campaign was mounted by a combination of trade unions, 
the local press, mainstream parties and anti-fascist groups, with the 
local newspaper carrying a message from Tony Blair urging voters not 
to vote for the BNP (Copsey, 2004).   
 
6.6 Immigration, ‘Islamification’ and fear 
Of further relevance to allowing an understanding of the growth of the 
BNP at the local level, is the question of immigration, which still 
remains the major issue of the far right “par excellence” (Hainsworth, 
2000:4).  Immigration continues to be dominant in BNP campaigning, 
as the party appears to play on fears of residents in towns and indeed, 
urban areas by such tactics as warning of areas becoming inhabited 
by immigrants and asylum seekers and ethnic minorities receiving 
more benefits and money from the local councils (Goodwin, 2008). 
 
Such attitudes were underlined in a 2009 study by the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, which highlighted growing 
discontent on housing estates in areas of Birmingham, Milton Keynes, 
Thetford, Runcorn and Widnes (NCF, 2009).  In this report, concerns 
by white residents were raised with regard to availability of housing, in 
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that there appeared to be a common belief that refugees can be found 
houses more easily than white working class people (NCF, 2009).  
 
The BNP have been accused of playing on such fears of voters about 
immigration in order to make their own advances (Copsey, 2004).  
One such area where this occurred was in Oldham where the BNP 
took advantage of growing tensions in the town between white and 
Asian residents.  In 2001, the party were said to have run a highly 
innovative campaign in the area, focusing on the reports in the 
Oldham Chronicle of white victims of crimes led by Asians gangs 
(Copsey, 2004).  The party also played heavily on the notion that the 
local council and government were prioritising funding and support for 
Asian communities over white communities (Copsey, 2004).  Other 
examples of such a policy were in evidence in Birmingham at the 2006 
elections, where the party used the local elections to make a 
“referendum on Islam” (Herbert and Dugan, 2006).  Leaflets depicting 
the London bus blown up in the 7/7 London bombings alongside 
pictures of Muslims protesting against the Danish cartoons underneath 
a slogan “enough is enough” were distributed across the city (Herbert 
and Dugan, 2006).  The BNP again attempted to play on fears of white 
voters by suggesting that Birmingham could become an Islamic city 
under sharia law within 20 years (Herbert and Dugan, 2006). 
 
The BNP also faced allegations from anti-fascist group Searchlight. 
Further claims made by the BNP included that a library would be 
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turned into a mosque in Sandwell and that Africans were being given 
£50,000 to buy property in the Essex area, with such claims made in 
locally specific leaflets (Lowles, 2006).  Opposition parties have made 
complaints against the claims of the BNP, with anti-fascist 
campaigners arguing that the failure for action being taken against the 
BNP for making these allegations has led to the lies becoming seen as 
facts in the communities (Lowles, 2006). 
 
Yet it can be argued that is not necessarily areas where high numbers 
of ethnic minorities live, where the BNP enjoy electoral success, but 
rather in areas where they can play on the immigration and fears of 
ethnic minorities. Burnley is a market town in Lancashire with a 
population of approximately 88,500.  Whilst the town was once a 
thriving industrial area, the decline of the textile industry has had a 
negative impact on the town.  Manufacturing in the town had fallen 
drastically, throughout the 20th century, and has led to social 
deprivation in the town (Goodwin, 2008).   In Burnley, the majority of 
Muslims live in the Daneshouse ward, therefore one possible 
explanation for strong BNP support could be based on building on 
fears and tensions amongst white voters in neighbouring wards.  
Evidence of this came in the BNP’s 2002 election campaign which 
suggested that residents of the Daneshouse ward were receiving 
more benefits and grants than other wards in Burnley (Copsey, 2004).    
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More recently, the BNP have been accused of attempting to capitalise 
on a number of wildcat strikes by workers protesting about the 
employment of foreign workers, perceived to be taking the jobs of 
foreign workers (Sawer, 2009).  The wildcat strikes spread around the 
country, with strikes taking place at oil refineries and at Sellafield 
nuclear plant and were notable for the threat which they posed to the 
level of Britain’s energy supplies (Sawer, 2009).  The BNP reportedly 
took advantage of these strikes by canvassing at the picket lines in 
attempt to show solidarity with the workers, calling on members to 
assist the strikers, despite trade unions reportedly concerned at the 
party attempting to hijack the strikes for their own political gain (Sawer, 
2009).  Indeed the BNP website was, at the time, dominated by the 
slogan “British jobs for British workers, when we say it, we mean it”, 
with the party identifying itself as the only political party who 
maintained support for the striking workers (Sawer, 2009). 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to demonstrate the factors as to why the BNP 
have enjoyed electoral success at the local level.  It would appear that 
the BNP encounter a different political environment to that at general 
elections, both in terms of voters’ attitudes and the participation in 
politics at local elections.  Therefore, the cumulative effect of these 
trends in participation and turnout appear to paint a picture of a 
decline in participation in local politics. 
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Moreover, it suggests that there are serious failings and a general 
lethargy which could allow a well run local campaign by the BNP to 
gain a foothold and, indeed, enjoy possible electoral success.  Indeed, 
the BNP’s campaigning in recent years has appeared to place the 
candidate into the heart of the community, as a means of establishing 
personal contact with voters, who may not receive contact from 
mainstream parties.  It is a combination of the decline in participation 
and the BNP’s community campaigning which has arguably provided 
the party with electoral gains in the past ten years.  Such a 
combination is allowing the BNP to move into areas where they 
traditionally not have been expected to poll well.  Moreover, the 
opportunities provide by local by-elections arguably provides a 
platform for the BNP to win support, either through extensive 
campaigning from the party, or through the means of a protest vote. 
 
However, the chapter illustrates that the BNP cannot be seen to be 
moving into the centre right in terms of their campaign themes.  Key 
far right issues of immigration and asylum remain dominant in the 
campaigning.  Indeed, there is evidence to argue that the BNP are 
looking to play on fears of white residents who may be concerned by 
issues of race relationships and immigration.  Chapter Seven will 
examine if any of these factors are in evidence in Calderdale.    
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Chapter Seven: The BNP in Calderdale 
7.1 Introduction 
The research in this thesis has established thus far, that key themes 
have appeared to emerge when examining the BNP, namely that the 
party has become a more professional and organized party under the 
leadership of Nick Griffin.  Indeed, whilst the party is yet to make a 
breakthrough in national elections, an apparent decline in participation 
in local politics, allied to a more professional approach from the BNP 
at the local level has increased its ability to make gains, and that 
issues of immigration, particularly with regards to the idea of an 
‘Islamophobia’ and playing on fears of residents are prevalent in BNP 
local campaigning (Eatwell, 2006).  Therefore, this chapter applies 
these themes to the district of Calderdale in West Yorkshire.  The 
district of Calderdale has witnessed the presence of the BNP on the 
local council since 2003.  The chapter aims to establish whether any 
of the arguments arising from the previous chapter’s work studying 
possible causes of BNP success can be applicable to the performance 
of the party in Calderdale. 
 
7.2 Methodology  
The chapter uses a mix of both qualitative and quantitative data in 
order to establish contributions to the BNP performance in Calderdale. 
Socio-economic data is taken from the 2001 census is used in order to 
examine whether there is any correlation in the types of wards in 
which the BNP choose to put forward candidates, thus allowing for 
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conclusions to be drawn regarding the relationship between these 
variables and BNP support in Calderdale3. A number of socio-
economic variables will be studied, amongst them ethnicity, social 
groups and unemployment.  Additionally, the ward boundaries of 
Calderdale are shown in order to determine whether the geographic 
location of BNP targeted wards can offer any explanation as to a 
reason why certain wards may be targeted by the party.  Furthermore, 
campaign expenditure data from the 2010 local election is used to 
understand how the BNP will campaign in Calderdale.  With regard to 
the ward data, it must be noted that from 2004, boundary changes 
were brought into Calderdale, which saw the wards of Illingworth and 
Mixenden merge into one ward, and the creation of a Town ward, 
effectively replacing the ward of St John’s, thus explaining the gaps in 
the data for these wards.  Consequently, in 2004 all fifty-one council 
seats were up for election, with seats available for each ward.  In 
2001, 2005 and 2009, council elections did not take place in the 
Calderdale area. 
 
The qualitative data is taken in the form of semi-structured interviews 
carried out with the local leaders of the mainstream parties at the time 
of the 2006 local elections.   The local leaders of the mainstream 
parties in Calderdale were chosen for interviews as they were deemed 
to be the best placed to discuss issues affecting their party at the local 
                                                 
3
 .    This data was obtained in the form of ward profiles from the office of 
the Chief Executive at Calderdale Council on the 20th April 2006. 
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level.  The interview questions focused on the state of local politics in 
the region. The full transcript of the interview schedule is found in the 
appendix.  The interviews conducted with the councillors guaranteed 
their anonymity; consequently the Labour councillor will be referred to 
as Councillor A, the Liberal Democrat councillor as Councillor B, and 
the Conservative councillor as Councillor C.  The interviews took place 
before the 2006 local elections, in person with Councillors A and B 
and a telephone interview with Councillor C.  A request for an 
interview with the leader of the BNP in Calderdale was turned down.   
 
Furthermore, in examining the performance of the BNP in Calderdale, 
quantitative data is used in the form of the local election results in 
Calderdale from 1999 until 2010, as this includes all elections where 
BNP candidates have stood under the leadership of Nick Griffin.  This 
is used to firstly allow the opportunity to mark out any rise and decline 
in popularity of the BNP in Calderdale since the appointment of Griffin 
as party chairman in 1999, secondly it allows for an examination of the 
BNP performance in relation to the other mainstream parties, so to 
establish whether the BNP have had an effect on their respective 
electoral performances.  
 
7.3 Introduction to the region of Calderdale 
The area of Calderdale is situated in West Yorkshire, to the west of 
major cities Leeds and Bradford and to the north east of Manchester, 
covering an area of 140 square miles with a population of 
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approximately 201,100, a figure which is expected to rise by 10,000 
over the next five years, due to a predicted rapid growth of the 65+ 
age range. (Calderdale Council, 2010).  Calderdale comprises a mix of 
residential areas and countryside.  The major town serving Calderdale 
is Halifax, with other towns in the region including Elland, Todmorden, 
Hebden Bridge, Sowerby Bridge and Brighouse.  The Council is the 
sixth largest metropolitan area in terms of land area, yet the seventh 
smallest area in terms of population (Calderdale Council, 2010). 
 
Figure 7.1 Map of Calderdale 
 
Source: Calderdale Council, 2010b 
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Calderdale is the most prosperous of the West Yorkshire metropolitan 
areas and ranks at 100th out of the 354 districts in England in terms of 
prosperity (Calderdale Council, 2010c).  Subsequently, 20.3 per cent 
of its workers were classed in Social groups A/B, that being 
professionals and middle managers, predominantly due to pockets of 
new housing developments in rural and semi-rural areas which benefit 
from good communications, allowing easy commuting to the major 
cities of Leeds and Manchester (Calderdale Council, 2010c).   
 
However, such is the socio-economic contrast, is that Calderdale has 
pockets of deprivation, in wards such as Illingworth and Mixenden, 
Ovenden and Park.  Furthermore, Calderdale has rural areas which do 
not enjoy good communication and thus experience higher levels of 
deprivation. The findings from the 2001 census revealed that 18.9 per 
cent of adults in Calderdale are semi and unskilled workers, with a 
further 16.4 per cent either unemployed or on benefits (Census, 2001).
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7. 4 The BNP in Calderdale 
The rise of the profile of the BNP in Calderdale seemingly mirrors the 
national rise of the party under the leadership of Nick Griffin.  Table 
7.1 displays the BNP’s electoral performances in Calderdale since 
1999.  In 1999, the BNP polled just 59 votes in the Mixenden ward 
thus reflecting the relatively weak position of the party across Britain.  
The following year showed no sign of an increase in the fortune of the 
party, as only one candidate was fielded in the Todmorden ward, 
gaining 86 votes. 
 
Yet as Griffin put into place his plans for modernisation of the party, 
Calderdale began to witness an increasingly higher profile of the BNP 
as a consequence of the riots in the northern towns of Bradford, 
Oldham and Burnley, towns all in close proximity to the Calderdale 
area.  Chapter Three noted that these riots played a major contribution 
to putting the BNP under Griffin’s leadership into the national spotlight 
for the first time (Copsey, 2004).   
 
The first elections following the 2001 riots were the 2002 local 
elections, with the party failing to put forward any candidates in 
Calderdale.  However in 2003, Calderdale was to witness the first BNP 
success outside of Lancashire, with the success of BNP candidate 
Adrian Marsden at the January 2003 Mixenden by-election.  
Marsden’s victory was based on the campaigning of the BNP 
supporters with Copsey (2004) noting that “teams of canvassers 
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tirelessly worked the streets and distributed no less than seven 
leaflets”, adding that “it was the party’s most sophisticated local by-
election campaign in its history” (2004:144).  This was highlighted in 
the different styles of the leaflets delivered to residents.  Marsden 
delivered different leaflets designed at winning the votes in the council 
estates and also the middle class voters on the edge of the Mixenden 
ward and was particularly keen to be seen as taking a real interest in 
local issues (Copsey 2004:144).  In addition to what can  
be described as the traditional far right policy issues on which the 
party canvassed, such as asylum and crime, local issues such as the 
raising of council tax were also high on the agenda for the BNP 
(Copsey 2004). 
 
This seemingly more sophisticated and professional campaign 
continued following the Mixenden by-election was adopted by more 
candidates standing in the region.  In addition to this, from 2003 
onwards the BNP have adopted community politics which academic 
studies have previously attributed to the Liberal Democrats, which is 
building a platform in local politics by engaging in surveys and 
meetings with local voters to find out their concerns (Copsey, 2004; 
John et al, 2006).  Indeed, the 2003 local elections later that year saw 
the party establish a presence in Calderdale, when they fielded 
candidates in nine wards, averaging 738.6 votes per candidate 
(Calderdale Council, 2003). 
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In 2004, the BNP put forward 14 candidates in 8 wards, and were 
successful in having two candidates elected in the Illingworth and 
Mixenden wards (Calderdale Council, 2004).  Consequently, by the 
2006 local elections, the campaigning by the BNP was beginning to 
establish a major presence in local politics in Calderdale.  The party 
kept its seat in the Illingworth and Mixenden ward following the re-
election of David Wallace. 
 
Therefore, the growing strength of the BNP in Calderdale saw 
increasing representation in 2006, standing in 8 wards and again 
enjoying success in Illingworth and Mixenden.  This subsequently led 
to the strongest representation from the party at the 2007 local 
elections, standing in 13 of the 17 wards in the district.  This was 
perhaps the strongest sign yet that the BNP was becoming a major 
influence on local politics in Calderdale.  However, the overall average 
vote for the party dipped, perhaps as a consequence of the increased 
number of candidates, although the party was not successful in any of 
the wards.  Furthermore, the party was unsuccessful in the Illingworth 
and Mixenden by-election held earlier in the year.  Indeed the number 
of votes for the party appeared to drop in most wards  
 
In 2008, the number of candidates fielded by the party stood at nine.  
Furthermore, the number of votes appeared to be falling again in the 
wards, although notably this was not case in Illingworth and Mixenden 
where the BNP candidate was successfully elected.  In the 2010 local 
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elections, the number of candidates standing for the BNP had fallen to 
six, with none of the candidates successful in being elected with the 
BNP remaining with one councillo
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Table 7.1 The BNP electoral performance in Calderdale, 1999-2010 
Ward 
 
1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008 2010 
Brighouse 
 
      361   
Calder 
 
         
Elland 
 
         
Greetland and 
Stainland 
 
      251 229  
Hipperholme 
and Lightcliffe 
         
Illingworth and 
Mixenden 
    1314, 
1206,1186 
1075 974 1323 1226 
Illingworth 
 
103   896      
Mixenden 59   700, 
801, 
679 
     
Luddendenfoot 
 
    700 570 426 316 398 
Northowram 
and Shelf 
   1119 1007 830 515 322 521 
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Ovenden 86   618 938, 900, 
894 
796,795 691 564 727 
Park 
 
         
Rastrick 
 
      278   
Ryburn 
 
      256   
Skircoat 
 
    582  317   
Sowerby Bridge 
 
   711, 
600 
714  539 357  
St Johns 
 
216   480      
Todmorden 
 
78 103    647 424 408  
Town  59  782 1095, 
1041, 
1023 
748 537 403 678 
Warley 
 
    854 496 336 433 550 
Total 
 
542 162  7386 13454 5957 5905 4355 4100 
Average 
 
108.4 81  738.6 896.9 661.8 454.2 483.8 683 
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7.5 Socio-economic statistics and BNP support 
An examination of the socio-economic figures for the Calderdale 
region is now made, with regard to establishing as to whether we can 
determine if there is any correlation between BNP support and the 
socio-economic data for the 17 wards.  An academic study of the BNP 
with regard to socio-economic statistics has previously been carried 
out, notably in the John et al’s (2006) report, thus allowing for 
preliminary conclusions to be made with regard to BNP support.  An 
analysis of socio-economic data allows for far right support to be 
studied in another means, given that “most surveys, especially those 
in the UK, have small numbers of respondents who say they vote for 
far-right parties” (John et al, 2006:13). 
 
The 17 wards have been divided up into BNP wards and non-BNP 
wards in order to aid us to draw conclusions with regard to allowing us 
to make these observations based on dividing up the wards where the 
BNP have fielded the most candidates between 1999 and 2010.  
These wards are Illingworth and Mixenden, Luddendenfoot, 
Northowram and Shelf, Ovenden, Sowerby Bridge, Todmorden and 
Town.  The socio-economic results will give indications as to particular 
areas where the BNP may stand.  However, whilst the limited numbers 
of wards available to study means that the results cannot allow us to 
draw any strong conclusions with regard to socio-economic conditions 
which favour the BNP, the diverse social groupings in the Calderdale 
region will allow for preliminary conclusions to be made.  
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Subsequently, it will provide scope for further study on a greater scale 
with regard to correlations between BNP support and the socio-
economic conditions. 
 
Social class and its relationship to BNP support was studied in John et 
al (2006) on the appeal of the BNP.  This study concluded that it is not 
so much the poorest level of social class (E) that are more likely to 
vote for the BNP, but conversely what they termed as the lower middle 
classes, (that is C1 and C2) who form the base of the BNP support 
(John et al, 2006).  Consequently, the report found that the BNP did 
not perform as well in areas where Group E had the highest group of 
workers, but instead in groups C1 and C2.  If John et al’s (2006) 
argument is applied to the Calderdale region; the BNP could enjoy a 
greater potential support due to a higher number of workers in the C1 
profile.  
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Table 7.2 Social Profile of Calderdale in the 2001 Census 
A/B Professional and middle managers 20.3% 
C1 Other non-manual workers 28.1% 
C2 Skilled manual workers 16.3% 
D Semi and unskilled workers 18.9% 
E Unemployed/ On Benefit 16.4% 
 
 Source: Census, 2001 
 
Therefore, when examining social status in Calderdale, there given the 
conclusions of the established literature with regards to BNP support, 
BNP support would be expected to concentrate on wards with the 
social groups C1 and C2 (Copsey, 2004; Carter, 2005; John et al, 
2006, Borisyuk et al, 2007).  However, the Calderdale results also 
show that the BNP are not necessarily avoiding areas where there is a 
relatively high percentage of social group A/B compared to other 
wards, including those where the BNP did not stand.  This can 
particularly be seen to be the case in Northowram and Shelf where the 
percentage of people in the social group A/B is 25.1%, which stands 
as one of the highest in the Calderdale region.   
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Table 7.3 Social Groups in BNP wards in Calderdale 
 
Ward 
 
 
A/B 
 
C1 
 
C2 
 
D 
 
E 
 
Illingworth and 
Mixenden 
 
13.8 24.7 19.7 24.2 17.7 
 
Luddendenfoot 
 
23.9 30.6 16 14.4 15.1 
Northowram and 
Shelf 
25.1 32.2 15.8 12.4 14.5 
Ovenden 
 
10.8 23 18.9 29.3 18 
 
Todmorden 
 
18.6 27.9 17.4 20.4 15.6 
 
Town 
 
13.5 24.8 18.3 22.4 21 
 
Sowerby Bridge 
 
16.1 28.6 17.3 21.5 16.5 
 
Average 
 
17.40 27.40 17.63 20.66 16.91 
 
 
 
Source: Census, 2001 
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Table 7.4 Social Groups in BNP and non-BNP wards in Calderdale 
 
 
Ward 
 
A/B C1 C2 D E 
Brighouse 
 
21.9 28.6 13.7 18.4 17.4 
Calder 
 
27.4 29.8 15 13.4 14.3 
Elland 
 
16.7 27.1 18 21 17.2 
Greetland and 
Stainland 
 
26.8 29.2 16.2 16.5 11.3 
Hipperholme 
and Lightcliffe 
 
27.8 32.5 12.8 13.5 13.9 
Park 
 
11.1 21.9 15.7 28 23.4 
Rastrick 
 
22.3 29.4 15.9 17.4 15 
Ryburn 
 
27.7 27.5 15.8 14.3 14.6 
Skircoat 
 
30.7 32.1 12.1 11.8 13.2 
Warley 
 
15.7 30.4 18.2 19.1 16.6 
Average 
 
22.81 28.85 15.34 17.34 15.69 
 
Source: Census, 2001 
 
As Adrian Marsden’s campaigning in Mixenden demonstrated, the 
BNP delivered a campaign aimed at both the working and middle 
class residents.  Therefore, it can be said that the BNP are arguably 
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now prepared to adopt different strategies depending on the type of 
ward in which they are standing.  This means that perceived wealthier 
wards will not be necessarily be ignored by the party, and there is no 
definite focus on where the party will field candidates, based on class 
status of the residents.  The party does not appear to be making 
efforts to solely target the poorest areas of Calderdale and there are 
signs that the party can win votes from across the spectrum of social 
status. 
 
7.5.1 Qualifications in Calderdale 
Following the examination of social status, the potential link between 
qualifications and BNP support is now examined.  Chapter Two of this 
thesis noted how previous academic literature on the far right in Britain 
demonstrated that the support for movements were traditionally young 
working class males who do not have high levels of education 
(Husbands, 1983; Eatwell, 2000; Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).  These 
voters may look to the far right as a means of getting their voice heard, 
due to a feeling of being disenfranchised from mainstream politics 
(Copsey, 2004; Sykes, 2005).  However, in contrast to this, Chapter 
Two also presented literature that argued social classes are no longer 
so clearly defined; therefore the far right will be just as able to draw 
support from more educated voters (Kitschelt, 1995; Ignazi, 2003; 
Carter, 2005). 
 
Consequently, by examining the relationship between BNP support 
and qualifications in Calderdale, we can see if there are wards with 
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less qualified voters where the BNP appear to perform better than in 
wards with more qualified voters.  It also provides an initial insight into 
the examination of the question as to whether the support of the BNP 
in Calderdale can demonstrate whether the boundaries in class are 
less radically defined, thus in turn leading to an increase in far right 
support.   
 
Table 7.5 No Qualifications in BNP Wards in Calderdale 
 
 
 
 
Ward 
 
Ward 
 
No Qualifications 
 
Illingworth and Mixenden 
 
39.8 
 
Luddendenfoot 
 
 
25.3 
 
Northowram and Shelf 
 
 
25 
 
Ovenden 
 
 
41.8 
 
Sowerby Bridge 
 
 
32.6 
 
Todmorden 
 
 
30.7 
Town 
 
37.2 
Average 
 
33.2 
 
Source: Census, 2001 
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Table 7.6 No Qualifications in non-BNP wards in Calderdale 
Ward No Qualifications 
Brighouse 29.9 
Calder 23.2 
Elland 33.7 
Greetland and Stainland 23.6 
Hipperholme and Lightcliffe 24.8 
Park 46.4 
Rastrick 29.6 
Ryburn 26.2 
Skircoat 21.8 
Warley 33.5 
Average 29.3 
 
Source: Census, 2001 
 
Table 7.5 demonstrates that there are wards in Calderdale where the 
BNP enjoy their highest support that are also amongst the highest in 
the area with regard to no qualifications.  In Illingworth and Mixenden 
and Ovenden, two wards where the BNP record their best results, 
residents with no qualifications stand at 39.8 per cent and 41.8 per 
cent respectively.   Other wards such as Town register a similarly high 
number of residents without qualifications in the region.  At first 
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glance, these results seemingly suggest that there is still what could 
be termed a ‘traditional’ far right support still evident in Calderdale, 
that being working class, unskilled workers. 
 
However, no clear pattern emerges with regard to the BNP specifically 
attracting voters with no qualifications.  Tables 7.5 and 7.6 reveal that 
the averages for BNP and non-BNP wards are not too dissimilar, with 
the BNP regularly standing in areas such as Northowram and Shelf 
and Luddendenfoot, which have relatively low levels of residents with 
no qualifications.  Certainly, it would appear that the BNP in 
Calderdale will not simply target a traditional voter type, they look to 
gain support across a broader social spectrum. 
 
7.5.2 Unemployment in Calderdale 
Whilst Calderdale was traditionally an industrial area, the 
manufacturing and banking sectors are the largest employers in the 
area with regard to number of employees, with the largest private 
group of employers in the region being HBOS (Calderdale Council, 
2010).  Indeed, the large number of employees at HBOS has 
potentially a number of consequences for the area. In 2009, the region 
came under the spotlight due to the banking crisis which affected 
HBOS, with threats of thousands of jobs at risk at the company 
headquarters in Halifax, which the possibility of potentially large 
unemployment in the area (Yorkshire Evening Post, 2009; Halifax 
Courier, 2009).  With regard to the issue of the BNP support in the 
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local area, such a large number of job losses could potentially provide 
the party with an opportunity to win support, as unemployed voters 
may turn to the BNP as a means of registering their disapproval for the 
mainstream parties, who they may feel have contributed to the 
financial crisis.  Yet Tables 7.7 and 7.8 subsequently examine if there 
has been a possible link between BNP support and unemployment in 
the Calderdale area taken from the last Census.  It finds that there is 
no particular correlation between unemployment and wards where the 
BNP have stood.  The highest rate of unemployment in a Calderdale 
ward was 16.7 per cent in the Park ward.  This area houses the 
largest Asian area in the district and has never seen a BNP candidate 
stand.  Indeed, there is little difference between the average rate of 
unemployment in BNP and non-BNP wards.  Thus, it tends to suggest 
that it not possible to simply explain BNP presence through socio-
economic factors.  There may be other factors such as an 
opportunistic attempt from the party to win support in a particular ward 
or even simply that the party may have supporters who live in a ward 
and therefore stand as councillor.  Certainly, the party do not appear 
to following to any particular social trend in the wards where they field 
candidates.  It would remain unclear therefore, whether the BNP 
would benefit from any increase in these figures as a result of the 
redundancies facing local workers in the banking industry. 
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Table 7.7 Unemployment in BNP wards in Calderdale 
 
Ward Unemployed 
Illingworth and Mixenden 7.8 
Luddendenfoot 4.1 
Northowram and Shelf 2.7 
Ovenden 8.6 
Todmorden 6.1 
Town  7.6 
Sowerby Bridge 5.2 
Average 5.99 
 
Source: Census, 2001 
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Table 7.8 Unemployment in non-BNP wards in Calderdale 
 
Ward Unemployed 
Brighouse 3.8 
Calder 4.8 
Elland 4.3 
Greetland and Stainland 
 
3.3 
Hipperholme and Lightcliffe 
 
2.8 
Park 16.7 
Rastrick 4.2 
Ryburn 3.8 
Skircoat 3.7 
Warley 5 
Average 5.24 
 
Source: Census, 2001 
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7.6 The BNP performance in Calderdale 
It would appear therefore, that BNP success in Calderdale cannot be 
simply attributed to certain socio-economic conditions.  Subsequently, 
BNP performances are now examined with a view to establishing the 
area of the region where they stood and any potential effect that they 
have had on the other mainstream parties in the region.  In order to 
establish the areas in Calderdale where the BNP perform strongest, 
Table 7.9 displays average number of votes per BNP candidate in 
each ward where a BNP candidate has stood from 1999 to 2010.  The 
results show that the core BNP support in the area is particularly 
strong in Illingworth and Mixenden, Town, and Ovenden.  These 
wards have traditionally seen the Labour Party enjoying electoral 
success.  These initial findings are not particularly surprising, given 
that previous academic studies have suggested that the BNP will 
generally perform better in areas where the Labour Party are strong, 
due to both parties potentially appealing to the same voters, notably 
young working class voters (Copsey, 2004; John et al, 2006; Goodwin, 
2008).  However, the results also suggest that the BNP perform 
strongly in the ward of Northowram and Shelf, which traditionally 
returns Conservative councillors.  Subsequently, this suggests that the 
BNP are not necessarily only a challenge to the Labour Party in 
traditional working class wards, but can pose an electoral challenge to 
other mainstream parties in what can be described as more middle 
class wards as well (John et al, 2006).
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Table 7.9 Average votes per BNP candidate, 1999-2010 
 
Ward Average votes per candidate 
Illingworth and Mixenden 1179.6 
Town 804.1 
Northowram and Shelf 758.6 
Ovenden 698 
Sowerby Bridge 584.2 
Warley 529.75 
Luddendenfoot 503 
Skircoat 449.5 
Brighouse 361 
St Johns  348 
Todmorden 328.6 
Rastrick 278 
Ryburn 256 
Greetland and Stainland 240 
Source: Own analysis 
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Having established that the major support for the party appears to be 
in Illingworth and Mixenden, the rise of the BNP and the effect they 
may have had on the mainstream vote is explored, by comparing the 
support for parties in the ward, firstly as Mixenden between 2000 and 
2003 and then when the ward merged with Illingworth, to become 
Illingworth and Mixenden in 2004 (Figure 7.2). 
 
The BNP has become a major presence in the wards of Mixenden and 
Illingworth and Mixenden following their by-election success in 2003.  
Prior to the 2003 result, there had been little or no presence in 
Mixenden.  Yet the election and by-elections in the ward in 2003 saw 
the party’s support match that of the Labour support, which saw their 
first councillor elected. 
 
Figure 7.2 Average votes per candidate in Mixenden/Illingworth 
and Mixenden 1999-2010 
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Source: Calderdale Council, 2000-2010 
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It would appear that once the party had gained this presence in the 
ward, the merging of the ward with Illingworth did not stop BNP 
support.  Indeed, Figure 7.2 shows the BNP maintaining strong 
electoral performances in the ward.  Furthermore, it would appear that 
between 2004 and 2008, it is the Liberal Democrat support which 
drops heavily whilst the BNP support remains strong.  The 
performance of the BNP in Illingworth and Mixenden demonstrates 
that whilst the BNP vote may traditionally have consequences for the 
Labour vote, due to similarities in the social profiles of the target 
electorate, the BNP vote actually affects the vote for all mainstream 
parties. 
 
7.7 Political participation in Calderdale 
In Chapter Six, a fall in activism in local politics was put forward as an 
effect as to why the BNP has had the possibility to enjoy electoral 
success at the local level.  Interviews with the local mainstream party 
leaders brought up a number of key themes regarding issues at local 
level, namely that of the response to the BNP, a decline in 
membership and the campaigning at the local level.  These issues are 
discussed below. 
 
7.7.1 The response to the BNP 
Firstly, the interviews established that in Calderdale, the party most 
concerned with tackling the rise of the BNP is the Labour Party.  This 
is not surprising, as Table 7.2 showed that the BNP is performing 
 212 
strongest in wards with Labour politicians. When asked whether the 
BNP directly affected his/her own party, Councillor A replied; 
 
“Well I think that it certainly has because there are three BNP 
councillors, two of whom are up for election.  Both are standing in 
Wards where there are sitting Labour councillors and in that one has 
two Labour councillors, one with BNP, one with two BNP and one with 
Labour.  So the BNP probably are our priorities anyway as we would 
be looking to get a larger presence in wards we have already got 
sitting councillors.” 
 
The Conservative and Liberal Democrats did not see the BNP as such 
a major threat to their vote-share, mainly due to this factor of the BNP 
targeting seats in Labour councillor wards.  The Liberal Democrats in 
particular did not consider the BNP as a threat to their targeted wards 
in Calderdale mainly as they appear to be targeting different areas of 
Calderdale, Councillor B saying; 
 
“I don’t believe that the BNP are targeting any of the seats that we are.  
There is some evidence of BNP activity but they seem to be focussing 
very much on North Halifax and we are not.” 
 
7.7.2 Membership decline 
Furthermore, the previous chapter noted how the national figures of 
membership for the mainstream parties have fallen, subsequently 
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leading to a decline in activism throughout the country (Seyd and 
Whiteley, 1994; 2002).  It would appear that Calderdale has 
experienced these problems, with all party leaders commenting that 
there is greater difficulty in attracting members to help in activism.  
Moreover, getting prospective members to commit to joining the 
parties appears to be harder to do, thus leading to voters who may be 
prepared to help around the day of election time, but who will not 
make any long term commitment to local politics.  Councillors cannot 
be sure of a number of volunteers, but rather the number of 
campaigners depend on the particular circumstances, such as if one 
ward is being targeted for a day of campaigning.   
 
Councillor A; 
“I can’t give you exact figures but there has been a decline in party 
membership…I haven’t really got much idea.  I know that when we 
have all targeted one Ward for leaflets we can get about 25 to 30 
people out leafleting at any one time but probably more than that as 
they tend to stay in their own areas.” 
 
Councillor B; 
“The party around here has been pretty static for the last few years.  It 
goes up and down.  It is at a reasonable level at the moment… It is 
certainly more much difficult to get volunteers than it used to be.  You 
have to be much more forceful in going out and finding them.  But 
what we have often found is that people are very willing to help us to 
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deliver leaflets, to canvass but will not join the party.   People seem to 
think that is a really big step.” 
 
Councillor C; 
“It’s really very difficult to say.  We have got people who only come 
and help us on election days and people who run their cars for us on 
election day.” 
 
Therefore, as a result of the lack of members in each local group, the 
mainstream parties were not able to have a branch for each ward, as 
would be ideal for them due to a lack of numbers.   Many branches 
have to combine to double up in wards or possibly cover even more of 
the wards in Calderdale.  Furthermore, activists appear to cross over 
into other electoral boundaries in order to help out with activities such 
as leafleting.  The Liberal Democrats had six branches covering both 
single and multiple wards, whilst the Conservatives and Labour Party 
had around 12 branches covering the Calderdale region.   The 
doubling up of wards does not necessarily lead to a weakness in 
campaigning in the eyes of the councillors, conversely the councillors 
interviews cite examples where a doubling up of branches has been 
perceived to have been just as successful as an individual branch 
would’ve been.  However, Councillor A sounds a note of caution with 
regard to whether the doubling up of branches could have long term 
success. 
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Councillor A; 
“Well some combined branches have worked very well.  Two failing 
branches do not make one successful branch, that is fairly clear.  It 
can work well but the experience is patchy.” 
 
7.7.3 Campaigning methods 
Chapter Six noted the BNP’s strategy of targeting areas and wards 
where they believed they would be most successful.  The interviews 
argue that the practice of targeting local wards is something which the 
mainstream parties will also carry out as a consequence of falling 
numbers of activist at local elections.  Therefore, some seats 
contested may not be campaigned as vigorously as other more 
winnable seats.  All interviewees admitted to having particular seats 
where they will campaign more vigorously than in other areas.  
Subsequently, it would appear that the Labour Party and Liberal 
Democrats in Calderdale have areas in which they believe best 
represents the chance to win seats on the local council. 
 
Councillor A; 
“We have targeted specific Wards and that should be the Labour 
Party’s strategy everywhere but some areas are more instant but no 
we have had to target bearing in mind results and the fact that we 
have some key seats and we want to hold them.” 
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Councillor B; 
“We can’t campaign in every Ward at the moment.  We are gradually 
moving out into different Wards.  I think that we have got a realistic 
chance of gaining the target seats but it depends what happens to the 
Labour vote but yes we do have target Wards and those are the ones 
that get the financial resources and the other Wards don’t... we 
concentrate our resources where we think we can win.” 
 
Therefore, if mainstream parties are not campaigning in all wards, 
then it allows an opportunity for the BNP to establish their presence in 
wards without great competition.  Thus, it can be argued that in 
Calderdale, there is potential for the BNP to make a connection with 
the electorate in the wards where mainstream parties may not 
campaign as strongly.  This situation was seen in Barking, as 
displayed in Chapter Six, when the BNP moved into a position as 
official opposition on the council in 2006 as a consequence of a lack of 
competition from mainstream parties in some wards. 
 
7.8 Local campaign expenditure 
The campaign expenditure published by all political parties at the 2010 
general election highlighted the problems that the BNP face in 
mounting a strong campaign on a national level.  
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Table 7.10 Campaign expenditure at the 2010 general election 
 
Party Campaign Expenditure (pounds) 
BNP 29,460 
Conservative Party 16,682,874 
English Democrats 35,792 
Green Party 325,425 
Labour Party 8,009,483 
Liberal Democrats 4,787,595 
UKIP 732,790 
 
Source: Electoral Commission, 2010. 
 
 Table 7.10 reveals the BNP’s inability to compete with the 
mainstream parties with regard to campaign expenditure.  The 
Conservative Party spent over 16 million pounds on their campaign 
expenditure, whilst the Labour Party spent over 8 million, and the 
Liberal Democrats spent just under 5 million pounds.  It is not 
surprising to see that the BNP cannot compete with the mainstream 
parties in terms of how much they spend, given the size of the BNP in 
comparison with these parties. 
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However, what is perhaps somewhat more surprising is that the BNP 
spend less than other parties who can be regarded as minor parties in 
the UK political system.  The Green Party and UKIP spend £325,425 
and £732,780 respectively, whilst the BNP spend even less than the 
English Democrats, a party similar in ideology to UKIP. Therefore, 
these figures can suggest that the party face issues in being able to 
perform effectively on the national level due to a lack of funding, which 
in turn can prevent the party from running an effective election 
campaign.  Campaigning, it appears, will seemingly depend more on 
the local efforts of members, as opposed to any strong national 
campaigning organisation run by the party. 
 
Yet at the local level, we can see that in 2010, this scenario is not 
necessarily repeated across local wards in Calderdale.  The figures 
regarding local campaign expenditure in the 2010 local elections in 
Illingworth and Mixenden show that in individual cases, the BNP can 
match the mainstream parties in terms of campaign expenditure. 
Table 7.11 reveals that the BNP spent the second highest amount in 
terms of campaigning expenses in the ward, a higher amount than the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat candidates. 
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Table 7.11 Campaign expenditure in the Illingworth and Mixenden 
2010 local election. 
 
Candidate Party Expenditure (pounds) 
Richard Mulhall BNP 750.00 
Andrew Tagg Conservative 661.47 
Sean Loftus Independent 85.39 
Daniel Sutherland Labour 859.88 
Philip Walters Liberal Democrats 0.0 
 
Source: Calderdale Council, 2010d 
 
Table 7.11 suggests the emphasis that the BNP put into campaigning 
in wards that they believe are winnable.  The BNP have traditionally 
polled well in Illingworth and Mixenden and these campaign 
expenditure figures suggest that the party look to maintain support, 
through attempting to run a more effective campaign in the ward. 
 
What is further revealing in Table 7.11 is that the Liberal Democrats 
did not spend any money in their campaign expenditure for the ward.  
Already in 7.7.3 of this chapter, the interview with Councillor B 
suggested that the Liberal Democrats will only put resources into 
wards that are winnable for them and this is highlighted by the Liberal 
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Democrat candidate not spending any money on the campaign, a sign 
that the party believe that they have no chance of success in the ward.  
Such a campaign decision reflects the differences between 
mainstream campaigning at local and national elections; at the local 
elections, mainstream parties simply no longer have the resources to 
carry out effective electioneering across all wards.  One possible effect 
of this therefore, is that the BNP have less competition in campaigning 
in the area, giving them more chance of winning support in the ward 
as they will not be in direct competition with the Liberal Democrats in 
campaigning. 
 
The Labour Party’s expenditure of £859.58 appears to demonstrate 
unsurprisingly that they view Illingworth and Mixenden as a winnable 
ward.  Furthermore, with regard to the BNP, it can be argued that the 
party need to spend that amount on campaign expenditure in order to 
campaign against the BNP.  The interview with Councillor A noted that 
the Labour Party were wary of the BNP threat in Calderdale and were 
taking steps to combat their rise through carrying out stronger 
campaigns in BNP wards.  Subsequently, the campaign expenditure in 
this ward displays evidence that the BNP are being taken as a serious 
threat to Labour in the local elections in Calderdale.  This campaign 
expenditure data demonstrates that the mainstream parties need to be 
prepared to put into place effective campaigning to counter the effect 
of the BNP in local wards, as the BNP will be prepared to run costlier 
campaigns if they believe they have a chance of winning the seats. 
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7.9 By-elections in Calderdale 
In Chapter 6.5, the role played by by-elections was argued to have 
potentially aided parties such as the BNP particularly with regard to 
establishing footholds in areas where previously they had not been 
able to do so, as the by-elections provide smaller parties to focus 
greater resources onto an election and also provides an opportunity 
for voters to register their disapproval with the government (Rallings 
and Thrasher, 1997).  Therefore, examining the by-elections in 
Calderdale can allow us to establish whether such a situation has 
occurred in the region whereby the by-elections have aided the BNP 
to make an impact which would possibly not occurred in a standard 
election. 
 
The first by-election contested by the BNP was the January 2003 
Mixenden by-election, which saw BNP candidate Adrian Marsden win 
the seat from Labour. As mentioned earlier in 7.3, this proved 
somewhat as a shock as the BNP had previously little presence in the 
Calderdale area.  Marsden won the seat narrowly from both Labour 
and the Liberal Democrat candidate, with the Labour vote arguably 
split due to the presence of former Labour candidate Redmond Mellett 
standing as an Independent candidate.  Furthermore, the timing of the 
by-election allowed Marsden to focus on national issues, such as the 
death of police officer Stephen Oaks following an anti-terrorism raid in 
January 2003, in addition to the campaigning methods and targeting of 
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certain areas as discussed in 7.3 of this Chapter (Yorkshire Post, 
2003). 
 
Table 7.12 Mixenden ward by-election, January 2003 
 
Candidate Party Votes 
Baines, Stephen Conservative 214 
Higgins, Michael 
Donald 
Labour 641 
Marsden, Adrian 
Paul 
BNP 679 elected 
Mellett, Redmond Independent 142 
Pearson, Stephen 
John 
Lib Dem 651 
 
Source: Calderdale Council, 2003a 
 
Subsequently, in October 2003 another by-election was announced 
following the death of Liberal Democrat councillor Stephen Pearson.  
Again the BNP put up another strong showing, polling over 800 votes, 
however the BNP candidate Heath Clegg was beaten into second 
place by Jennifer Pearson, wife of the late councillor and following a 
strong campaign by both the Liberal Democrats and anti-fascist group 
Searchlight, who’s presence in the area arose following Marsden’s 
success earlier in the year (Halifax Courier, 2003). 
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Table 7.13 Mixenden ward by-election, October 2003 
Candidate Party Votes 
Clegg, Heath BNP 801 
Coll, Daniel Alan Independent 474 
Loftus, Sean 
Vincent 
Labour 56 
Pearson, Jennifer Lib Dem 1210 elected 
 
Source: Calderdale Council, 2003 
 
Furthermore, in Illingworth and Mixenden four years later, the party 
were still performing strongly, here the BNP were edged out in a by-
election caused by the resignation of BNP councillor David Wallace 
who had been sacked by the BNP for agreeing to planning 
applications on green belt land in the ward (Halifax Courier, 2007).  
Subsequently the Labour councillor Judith Gannon beat the BNP 
candidate Thomas Bates by 1104 votes to 1034. 
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Table 7.14 Illingworth and Mixenden ward by-election, 2007 
 
Candidate Party Votes 
Bates, Thomas BNP 1034 
Elder, Michael 
Murray 
Lib Dem 150 
Gannon, Judith Mary Labour 1104 elected 
Hardy, John Cecil 
David 
Conservative 525 
Loftus, Sean Vincent Independent 68 
 
Source: Calderdale council, 2007a 
 
The by-election results show that the nature of a local council by-
election provided the BNP with an opportunity to gain a foothold into 
the Calderdale area with the January 2003 by-election victory in 
Mixenden for Adrian Marsden.  This was evident in the extensive 
campaigning carried out by the BNP, which may have not been 
possible if other seats were being contested in a normal round of 
elections. The party were consequently able to use this success as a 
springboard in both the subsequent by-election in October, where a 
strong showing was again put up by the party and in the 2004 local 
elections.  Indeed, the platform provided has led to the BNP constantly 
polling well in the ward since 2003, as seen in Figure 7.2.   
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7.10 The fall in BNP support 
So far in this chapter, the performance of the BNP has been examined 
with a regard to understanding how they made an impact in 
Calderdale, and the reasons behind the party gaining such a 
presence.  However, after seemingly enjoying a rise in results across 
the Calderdale region, the average vote per candidate appears to fall 
from 2007 onwards. Thus, this study aims to put forward a number of 
factors that can be put forward with regard to understanding why the 
BNP appeared to suffer a drop in votes. 
 
7.11 National issues at the local elections 
Firstly, one such notion for this occurrence could be that the decline of 
the BNP vote in Calderdale in 2007 and 2008 was as a result of 
national issues and changes in attitude towards key far right policy 
areas such as race, immigration and crime.  Therefore, to examine 
this notion MORI political monitor polls, taken at the time of the local 
elections in 2006 and 2008 are used to ascertain the issues which 
were deemed to be important to voters.  The question asked to voters 
“what is the most important issue facing Britain today.” 
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Table 7.15 MORI opinion poll, May 2006 
 
Issue Percentage 
Race relationships 19 
NHS 18 
Crime, law and order 11 
 
Source: MORI 2006 
 
The MORI polls demonstrate that the issues of race and crime, law 
and order, remain high, indeed in 2006, race relationships was 
deemed to be the most important issue to voters, with the NHS and 
crime, law and order second and third respectively.  Therefore, we can 
see that the issues of race and crime are seen as important issues for 
the British electorate.  These issues have been traditional policies for 
the far right and somewhat reflect the strongest ever showing by the 
BNP at the 2006 local elections.  
 
However, in 2008, the number of BNP candidates in Calderdale was 
to drop further, and the fall in candidates standing combined with a fall 
in the number of votes per candidate.  Table 7.16 demonstrates that 
this is not necessarily as a consequence of the issues of crime and 
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race not being important with the electorate, indeed the issues remain 
as important as in previous years.  
 
Table 7.16 MORI opinion poll, May 2008 
Issue Percentage 
Crime, law and order 25 
Economy 16 
Race relationships 15 
 
Source: MORI 2008 
 
Consequently, the effect of this, is that issues of crime, law and order 
and race relationships have been seen to be the main issues and 
policies that the far right will campaign on, therefore raising the 
possibility that if the public perceive these issues to be the most 
important issues facing Britain, then the far right can possibly benefit 
from such feelings from the voters.  However, it can be said that as 
there is no perceived national change in voters’ feelings regarding the 
issues of crime and race, therefore, there are perhaps other factors 
which cause the drop in BNP support in the Calderdale area as 
opposed to the issues facing the British electorate at election time.   
 
 
 228 
 
7.12 The performance of BNP councillors 
Therefore, whilst issues such as race and crime are still important to 
the British electorate between 2006 and 2008, local issues are 
examined to establish the drop in BNP support in Calderdale, firstly by 
looking at the issue of incumbency in the region.  Indeed, the BNP’s 
record as councillors at the local level has been much criticised by 
fellow councillors and anti-fascist groups, notably for their failure to 
attend meetings and to follow up residents’ problems thoroughly 
(Searchlight, 2006).  In Calderdale, the BNP have come under 
criticism from other councillors, the media and anti-fascist groups over 
their poor record as councillors in a number of cases (Halifax Courier, 
2006a).  Geoffrey Wallace was accused of only working 14.5 hours in 
his role of councillor for Illingworth and Mixenden between October 
2005 and February 2006 (Searchlight, 2006).  Furthermore, in the first 
six months of 2006, fellow Calderdale councillor Adrian Marsden had 
only attended three council meetings (StoptheBNP, 2006).   
 
Moreover, the conduct of BNP councillors was called into question on 
a number of issues.  Firstly, Richard Mulhall, the BNP leader in 
Calderdale was found guilty of a £3000 benefit fraud (Halifax Courier, 
2006e).  However, despite this conviction, Mulhall refused to resign his 
role as a councillor in the Illingworth and Mixenden ward although he 
was to lose his seat in the May 2007 local elections.  The background 
of other BNP councillors has also been exposed, with Mixenden 
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councillor Adrian Marsden having a number of criminal convictions 
and links with Combat 18, alongside facing accusations of stealing 
anti-fascist campaign material (Halifax Courier, 2006a).  Finally, a third 
councillor, Geoffrey Wallace was sacked by the party over 
disagreements with regard to party issues, over applications to build 
on green belt land (Halifax Courier, 2007).  The consequences of this, 
is that voters may be reluctant to vote for the BNP as they view their 
councillors of not being trustworthy or indeed that they are not being 
represented well by their councillors.  
 
Subsequently, this suggests that voters may be turning away from the 
BNP as a consequence of the councillors’ poor record.   However we 
can see that in Illingworth and Mixenden, despite the criticism of the 
councillors’ performance support for the BNP has remained strong, 
with the election of the BNP candidate in the 2008 local elections. 
Firstly, this leads to the argument that the people voting for the BNP 
are perhaps not interested as much in the performance of the 
councillor at local level but they are more interested in registering their 
vote arguably as a protest vote or to register their dissatisfaction with 
the mainstream parties.  Certainly it appears that these people feel 
that voting for the BNP is perhaps the best way of getting their voice 
heard.   
 
Secondly, as shown in Chapter Five, regarding the media in the 
Calderdale area, media coverage has also tended focused on the 
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private lives of local councillors, with mainstream councillors being 
embroiled in sleaze scandals amongst other reports (Halifax Courier, 
2006d).  Subsequently, there is an argument which can suggest that 
voters may be inclined to feel that there is no difference between the 
behaviour of the BNP councillors and that of the mainstream parties’ 
councillors. 
 
Therefore, the drop in support for the BNP could be argued to be as a 
consequence of the party fielding its highest ever number of 
candidates in the region and thus suffering from what could be seen 
as a saturation point, with the party unable to sustain the standing of 
thirteen candidates in the region.  With a high number of candidates, 
the BNP would also suffer from the problem facing the mainstream 
parties, in that they do not have the relevant number of activists to run 
substantial campaigns in all wards, thus reducing its impact from 
previous years when a smaller number of wards were targeted. 
 
7.13 Conclusion 
The chapter took a case study region of Calderdale to demonstrate 
whether the factors examined in Chapter 6 could be actively applied to 
an area of BNP success in order to demonstrate their value in 
understanding why the party have performed well in local elections. 
 
The research has shown that there were issues with regard to the 
activism in politics in the area.  The mainstream parties appeared to 
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have problems in effectively campaigning across the area, 
consequently providing the BNP with an opportunity to establish a 
connection with the electorate in wards where the voters may feel 
neglected by the mainstream parties.  Moreover, the election of Adrian 
Marsden in Mixenden in 2003, and the subsequent success and 
strong support for the party in the Illingworth and Mixenden ward 
argues that BNP campaigning methods were more sophisticated and 
they were able to build upon a core support in the district. The 
expenses figures from the 2010 local election in Illingworth and 
Mixenden gives credence to the argument that the BNP are putting a 
lot of effort in campaigning in these wards where they believe they can 
win seats and maintain good support. The support for the BNP 
appears to remain loyal over a number of years, as despite apparent 
failings from BNP councillors, the party poll consistently well in the 
Illingworth and Mixenden ward.  This illustrates an argument that the 
performance of the councillor is not necessarily important to BNP 
voters.   
 
The research suggests an evolving profile of the far right, who are no 
longer confined to winning votes from young working class males.  
Indeed the election results in wards with strong BNP support such as 
Northowram and Shelf and Illingworth and Mixenden highlight an 
ability of the BNP to win support at the expense of all major political 
parties.  Indeed, it would appear that the BNP are not afraid to put 
forward candidates in wards which are perceived to be perhaps more 
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middle class, as there is no apparent argument to state that support 
for the party is restricted to working class voters.  The BNP will not 
merely look to win support in wards that are perceived to be the 
poorest in the district; support for the party can come from all social 
groups. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
At the outset of this research, the major aim of the thesis was to focus 
on the development of the BNP under the leadership of Nick Griffin in 
a comparative perspective, to understand why the party had 
established a presence in local elections nationwide.  Such a 
perspective was chosen as it had been established through the study 
of the existing academic literature on the far right in Britain that the 
BNP had not enjoyed success at the national level on the same scale 
as its West European counterparts (Eatwell, 2000; Copsey, 2004; 
Carter, 2005).   
 
Subsequently, it would appear that a number of major themes emerge 
from the research which can lead to a greater understanding as to why 
the BNP has performed more strongly in local elections than in 
general elections.  There appear to be both national and locally 
specific factors which have contributed to the success of the BNP at 
the local level under the leadership of Nick Griffin.  There are for 
example clear elements in local politics which provide the BNP with 
opportunities for electoral success that they would not normally 
receive at a general election, notably with regard to the ability of the 
party to campaign, levels of party competition and the lack of activism 
from the mainstream parties. 
 
 234 
The first overlying theme to come out of the thesis is the manner in 
which the BNP have made steps to present themselves in a more 
moderate and respectable light.  This factor appears key to the party 
having an effect at the local level, in making the party more appealing 
to the British electorate.  
 
8.2 Leadership and Image 
By using a historical perspective in observing the past performances 
of the far right in the UK, the thesis demonstrated an overriding 
problem for far right groups in Britain which is that of in-fighting and 
factions within the party.  Throughout the post-war period, far right 
movements have suffered from these occurrences and indeed, it 
appears that the BNP are no different to previous groups.  However, 
during their development between 2001 and 2010, Griffin appeared to 
successfully defend any challenges to the party and splits in the 
leadership.  The historical perspective leads to a conclusion that there 
is no surprise that the BNP have been able to develop in terms of 
number of candidates put forward whilst there has been a period of 
reasonable stability in the far right. 
 
It would appear that the BNP’s electoral success in recent years has 
suggested an evolution in image of the far right in the Britain whereby 
the party can no longer be simply viewed as merely attracting young 
working class male voters.  The research has highlighted that the BNP 
are able to win support from all social groups and this is reflected in 
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the areas where the BNP will stand.  These are no longer simply 
urban inner city areas but can include more perceived middle class 
areas.  The BNP are seemingly more opportunistic in putting forward 
candidates, in areas where they would not normally expect to win 
seats, particularly in local by-elections as their candidates can often 
perform well. 
 
Moreover, a stable leadership can be seen to play a role in allowing 
the BNP to make gains in local elections in Britain developing and 
building on their early local election successes, whereas historically 
groups such as the NF failed to build on positive results due to the 
political in-fighting and a lack of a strong leadership.  In addition to his 
leadership skills in terms of uniting the party, Griffin’s style in 
comparison with John Tyndall can also be said to have brought the 
party forward.  Whilst Chapter Four discussed that Griffin still lacks the 
charisma of other far right leaders in Europe, he is certainly the most 
dynamic leader of a far right movement in Britain.  Chapter Four 
demonstrated how it is apparent that one of the factors leading to the 
BNP presenting itself in a more moderate light is the success of far 
right West European parties in the twenty-first century.  These parties 
have been characterised by charismatic and strong leadership, 
combined with a seemingly more moderate image to the voter, thus 
presenting voters with a credible alternative to the mainstream 
(Hainsworth, 2000; Mudde, 2000; Roxburgh, 2002; Ignazi, 2003; 
Carter, 2005).  Indeed, by using a content analysis of manifestoes and 
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then using a comparative perspective to analyse them, it can be seen 
that there are now similarities in the policies that the BNP and the 
West-European counterparts present at elections. 
 
Such a change of image, allowing the BNP to enjoy local election 
success, is seen in the display of respectability from the party through 
the behaviour of local candidates.  The innovative content analysis of 
BNP campaigning guides can lead to the suggestion that the BNP 
have polled well at the local level by seemingly adopting a strategy to 
place its candidates into the heart of the community life, be it through 
the organisation of local action days, serving on school committees or 
other local groups.  Subsequently, this thesis proposes that one of the 
major reasons for the BNP successes at the local level is due to this 
campaigning methods used by the party, which has seen BNP 
councillors and activists attempt to play a greater role in the 
community life.  This has been a crucial change in policy from 
previous far right movements.  It appears that the BNP are trying to 
bring a personal aspect to local politics, perhaps deflecting from the 
reputation that the party may have. 
 
However, the campaigning carried out by the BNP can still be seen as 
racist in its nature, with the accusation of ‘Islamophobia’ still very 
prevalent, notably in election material at the 2006 local elections and 
campaigning carried out by activists (Eatwell, 2006; Herbert and 
Dugan, 2006).  This thesis has established through the means of an 
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original content analysis of far right manifestos, that despite a more 
wide-ranging number of policies in their manifestos, it appears that 
immigration remains at the heart of them.  Therefore, whilst the BNP 
have displayed more moderate methods of campaigning at the local 
level, there is still a clear underbelly of extremism in the party, which 
could still prove to be an obstacle to its attempts of electoral success 
at both a local and a national level.    Moreover, the comparative 
method used in Chapter Four demonstrated that whilst members of far 
right parties in Western Europe can be said to have more ‘moderate’ 
images amongst the electorate, members of the BNP are still exploited 
for their BNP links.  Indeed, the codebook analysis in Chapter Five 
provided evidence of the local press looking to highlight any extreme 
pasts of BNP members.  Certainly, there is an argument that the 
BNP’s electoral rise has profited from issues of race dominating British 
politics in the past ten years   This can be seen notably in the manner 
in which the party can be said to have exploited the riots across 
northern towns and cities in 2001. 
 
8.3 The state of local politics 
Yet whilst the BNP can be seen to be portraying a more moderate 
image in order to win support, it can be argued that a major factor in 
the effect of the BNP can be put down to the decline of the mass 
membership party which in turn has led to a decline in participation in 
local politics.  Such a decline has arguably allowed for an opportunity 
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for a well organised local movement to establish a support in local 
communities, regardless of ideology. 
 
Chapters Six and Seven demonstrate that the BNP have seemingly 
benefited from the state of politics at the local level, through profiting 
from a decline in activism in local politics, a demise which is not yet as 
apparent at the national level.  Indeed, the study demonstrates that 
the mainstream parties have witnessed a fall in membership numbers, 
which has been most felt at the local level, such that the ability to raise 
candidates and campaign effectively has been affected.  
Subsequently, in many cases the BNP have benefited from 
mainstream parties being unable to field candidates in wards with BNP 
candidates, instead focusing candidates and resources where they 
feel there is a better opportunity to win.  Consequently, the BNP have 
put candidates forward who will often be seen as the only alternative 
to the current incumbent due to the lack of competition.  As Chapter 
Six highlighted, this was particularly the case in the 2006 local 
elections in Barking and Dagenham, where Conservative and Liberal 
Democrats councillors did not stand in competition against the Labour 
and BNP candidates. 
 
Additionally, the interviews conducted with the Calderdale councillors 
in Chapter Seven highlighted the difficulties that local members face in 
running effective campaigning.  The semi-structured interviews 
provided a frank acknowledgement of the stark issues that face the 
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councillors when making decisions regarding conducting electoral 
campaigns.  The interviews established how local councillors often 
need to rely on the help of family and friends in order to leaflet areas 
and that whilst door-to-door campaigning was a desirable means of 
campaigning, the lack of numbers in local associations meant that this 
simply was not possible.  Moreover, the number of branches which the 
mainstream parties have in Calderdale does not equate to the number 
of candidates standing in the region, thus leading to branches having 
to pool resources, by focusing on areas where they believe they will 
poll the most strongly.  Consequently, the BNP are able to have an 
effect at the local election through a strategy of targeting specific 
wards, where they believe that their vote share will be maximised as a 
result of the inability of mainstream parties to canvass particular 
wards. 
 
Furthermore, the interviews provided an innovative insight into the 
reaction of the mainstream parties to the presence of the BNP at the 
local level.  It appears that the BNP are perceived as a direct threat to 
the mainstream parties if they are in direct competition in a particular 
area.  The interviews established that there is a need for mainstream 
parties at the local level to take the development of the far right 
seriously, as results in Calderdale have shown how the BNP can 
establish a foothold in local wards and then build on the breakthrough.  
An example of this was demonstrated with the quantitative analysis in 
Chapter Seven regarding the support of the BNP in Illingworth and 
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Mixenden, whereby the BNP have maintained a consistently strong 
core support, despite controversies surrounding their councillors.   
  
8.4 Press coverage of the BNP 
The conclusions drawn from the research in Chapters Six and Seven 
regarding local politics suggest that the media now play a more 
important role than ever in informing voters at elections times, due to a 
lack of campaigning by political parties at local elections.  
Consequently, the local media potentially possess a greater 
importance in the ability to influence voters at the local level, as its 
reporting of local politics may be the only exposure to politics for many 
voters.   
 
Using the LexisNexis system explicitly demonstrated the rise in 
coverage of the BNP in the national media.  Whereas previous work 
focused on the right wing tabloids’ role in raising the profile of the BNP 
due to headlines regarding immigration (Eatwell, 2000), the 
LexisNexis system analysis ably demonstrated that the both left and 
right wing papers will now report on the BNP.   Indeed, the left wing 
broadsheets tend to cover the party more, as a means of raising 
awareness of the party’s development and growing threat.  Naturally, 
this again provides the question as to whether this coverage is 
disproportionate to the number of councillors the party have elected. 
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The press coverage of the BNP has shown that local elections provide 
the party with an opportunity that would not necessarily come its way 
at a general election, as they appear to benefit from increasing 
coverage from all national newspapers The subsequent issue arising 
from this coverage is the question of whether the BNP was being 
awarded the oxygen of publicity that they did not deserve, due to the 
small number of councillors that had been elected.  Consequently, the 
BNP are seemingly viewed as being newsworthy and headline 
making, in comparison to other minor parties such as the Green Party. 
 
As illustrated in Chapter Five, at the local level, it appears that the 
BNP are receiving predominantly negative coverage, although 
attempts have been made by activists to promote the party through 
the letters section in local newspapers.  However, by using a 
codebook analysis, it allowed for a detailed analysis of press coverage 
building up to local elections.    
 
The study of press coverage in Calderdale and Bradford saw little 
evidence of BNP activists being able to demonstrate their support for 
the party in the Halifax Courier or the Telegraph and Argus 
respectively which appeared to take strong stances against the BNP.  
This research therefore does not support any assertion that the local 
press could inadvertently play a role in building the profile of the BNP, 
as was argued with the reporting of the Oldham Chronicle (Copsey, 
2004; Sykes, 2005). 
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Hence, at first examination it appeared that the local media were 
conducting campaigns against the BNP.  However, after further study 
in this thesis, it can also be argued that despite such negative 
reporting of the BNP, this does not appear to have a negative impact 
on their electoral performances.  Indeed, negative coverage of the 
other mainstream parties illustrates that the BNP are not alone in 
receiving negative coverage in the local press.  By using a codebook 
analysis, the research also highlights a key issue in local politics 
regarding the idea of political apathy in the local media.  The lack of 
coverage for all parties, not only the BNP was of a surprise and 
provides questions for future research as to why the local press do not 
appear to cover local politics in any detail. 
 
8.5 The role of the mainstream parties 
In examining the BNP through a comparative perspective, it has also 
enabled us to note the change in attitude from the mainstream parties 
towards the BNP and issues of immigration and asylum.  The 
historical analysis of the BNP has demonstrated that strong action with 
regards to a far right threat is the key to preventing a development of a 
far right party.  Whilst in the 1980s, the Conservative Party in 
particular were seen to take a strong stance on such issues, it now 
appears that the mainstream parties are somewhat afraid of tackling 
the BNP for fear of giving the party the oxygen of publicity. 
Consequently, the increase in publicity and electoral support appears 
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to have created a dilemma amongst mainstream parties regarding the 
way to deal with the presence of the BNP.  It would appear therefore, 
that there are contrasting views as to whether to speak out against the 
BNP or not, as witnessed in the controversy regarding comments 
made by MPs David Blunkett and Michael Howard in recent years. 
 
However, in examining the rise of the BNP in local elections, this 
thesis argues that immigration and race relationships remain important 
issues for the British electorate.  Consequently, it appears that 
mainstream politicians do have a duty to address these issues, 
particularly in the areas where the BNP may be standing.  Indeed, it 
can be suggested that it would be naïve of the mainstream politicians 
to avoid the issue of immigration in areas where the BNP are standing, 
as it will be on the agenda for local residents, either as a direct result 
of the BNP’s campaigning or as a concern of voters.   
 
8.6 Future research of the BNP 
Following the conclusions made in this thesis, this has given rise to 
scope for further research about the BNP in a number of different 
areas, in a bid to discover more about the party under the 
chairmanship of Griffin.   
 
Firstly, with regard to Chapter Seven, it must be noted that a request 
was made for an interview with the BNP local leader in Calderdale but 
this request was subsequently turned down.  My intention had been to 
 244 
pose the same set of questions to the BNP leader as used in the semi-
structured interviews with the other party leaders, in order to establish 
whether the BNP adopted a similar style of campaigning as to that of 
the mainstream parties in terms of numbers of activists and strategies 
used in campaigning.   
 
However, the refusal of this interview perhaps demonstrated the 
position of the BNP at the time of the 2006 local elections, in that 
whilst they attempted to portray a more community based style of 
campaigning and a more moderate image, there was still some 
unease amongst party members to be interviewed, arguably as a 
consequence of activists suspicious of possible exposés.  However, 
recent academic studies have managed to gain access to BNP 
members for academic research (Goodwin, 2008) that perhaps 
demonstrate openness amongst the party to participate in academic 
research. 
 
Subsequently, future research could be conducted at the local level 
examining the role of the BNP in connection with the electorate.  Such 
an investigation could provide valuable evidence of the reasons 
behind the BNP’s popularity amongst local voters, through qualitative 
data with BNP members and local candidates, discovering their beliefs 
as to why they are making an impact at the local level and the reasons 
why voters were attracted to the party.  This research could examine a 
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number of locations across the country to establish whether there is a 
certain structure to BNP campaigning and activism. 
 
The thesis also highlighted the debate over the performance of the 
BNP, observing the role of the elected BNP councillors, with the 
suggestion that a number of BNP councillors have not performed well 
in the role.  This was countered with the argument that the 
performance record of BNP councillors may not be deemed as 
important to those who vote for the party, notably if the vote for the 
BNP is a protest vote against the mainstream.  Hence, future studies 
could take a detailed look at the performance debate surrounding the 
party, in order to establish whether the record of the BNP is preventing 
future success and whether with the growing professionalization of the 
BNP, the performance of the councillors have improved. 
Indeed, such questions are certainly more pertinent given the success 
of Griffin and Brons at the 2009 European elections.  Hence, this can 
be seen to be playing a key role into whether the BNP establish a 
lasting role on the British political scene, as performance will provide a 
key test for the party with regard to attracting the mainstream voters to 
the far right.  It can be therefore be argued that BNP successes in the 
future and thus their subsequent growth could be dependent on the 
ability to attract a more moderate and mainstream class and calibre of 
candidate to the party. 
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Chapter Five of this thesis examined the media coverage of the BNP 
at both the national and local level.  National coverage of the BNP was 
examined using LexisNexis, which is unique to research on the far 
right.  Such a method of examining the press coverage of the BNP has 
been further developed in Baimbridge and Anderson (2008), where a 
number of aspects with regard to causes for national coverage of the 
BNP was examined, such as the build up to elections, the riots of 
2001, and other external factors such as the success of Jean-Marie Le 
Pen in the 2002 French Presidential elections.  The paper also made 
an observation in terms of the differences in tabloid reporting between 
left and right wing newspapers and tabloids and broadsheets.  
Therefore, future study could centre on other aspects of reporting from 
the media such as coverage on immigration and asylum stories, in 
order to establish whether the rise of the BNP can be in any way 
linked to the increase in reporting.  Moreover, the negative coverage 
of the BNP could prompt a study of the media to be made in 
comparative analysis with the written media in other western 
European countries to discover, if the negative reporting of the far right 
is a European-wide trait or one unique to Britain. 
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Appendix 
Interview with Councillor A, 23rd April 2006 - 
 
How was the Labour Party campaign organised in Calderdale? 
 
The traditional organisation is through the Local Government 
committee which used to known as the District Labour Party.  We 
have for the last two or three years also set up a campaign committee 
as well and I think that was for the all out elections in 2004 which 
should take on a lot of responsibility in theory delegated to Branch 
level but now it tends to be more co-ordinated across Calderdale 
because simply the Branch tends to be smaller and less, fewer and 
fewer have really the capacity for the campaign themselves. 
 
Some parties base their campaign on personal contact with other 
people, such as door to door and leafleting.  Whilst other parties 
rely on getting their message through the media is there one 
method that the Labour Party tends to use? 
 
I would say that it is balanced but we still do focus a lot on personal 
contact and tend to have a campaign that would have regular 
newsletters throughout the year because we think that year round 
contact is important.  We still can do door to door canvassing but that 
tends now to supplement telephone voter I D and again it’s the 
number of people that you can contact and people are available so we 
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do supplement that with door to door canvassing.  I would have said 
that the media profile has been less significant but I think it is still 
there.  The main thing is the local newspaper and I think that we have 
profiling in terms of various press releases which are complimented by 
newsletters so it should be them all fitting together. 
 
Does the party try to target specific Wards in the election or is it 
just campaigning in every Ward? 
 
We have targeted specific Wards and that should be the Labour 
Party’s strategy everywhere but some areas are more instant but no 
we have had to target bearing in mind results and the fact that we 
have some key seats and we want to hold them.  We have also been 
influenced by the presence of the British National Party. 
 
Has that affected the party’s campaign? 
 
Well I think that it certainly has because there are three BNP 
councillors, two of whom are up for election.  Both are standing in 
Wards where there are sitting Labour councillors and in that one has 
two Labour councillors, one with BNP, one with two BNP and one with 
Labour.  So probably are our priorities anyway as we would be looking 
to get a larger presence in wards we have already got sitting 
councillors.  They, the BNP seem also to be targeting the ward that I 
represent Ovenden as well.  So those three wards are the wards that 
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have already selected themselves anyway but I certainly think that 
gives an added input all round and we do target to get key wards 
because then you can have much more impact than spreading 
yourself too thinly. 
 
Would you know approximately how many local volunteers you 
can get to help in the campaign work? 
 
I haven’t really got much idea.  I know that when we have all targeted 
one ward for leaflets we can get about 25 to 30 people out leafleting at 
any one time but probably more than that as they tend to stay in their 
own areas. 
 
Is it a problem finding them? 
 
It is and I think it is for all parties because of a reducing an aging 
profile, I think. 
 
Has there been a decline in party membership in Calderdale? 
 
There has in Halifax but I don’t know whether it is the same in 
Calderdale valley but it tends to settle at a particular level.  I can’t give 
you exact figures but there has been a decline in party membership. 
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Has the party tried to address this problem of falling 
membership? 
 
I think that in some ways the campaigning strategies have helped 
because they have got more people involved certainly around the 
general election and particularly when selecting the M.P. and getting 
people involved.  Unfortunately the selections tend to be rather bloody 
and unpleasant and turn off more people than it attracts.  We certainly 
have had recruitment campaigns.  I wouldn’t have said that we have 
sustained ones.  One thing that tends to work is that if people try to get 
one or two people they know to join.  One thing that has been used in 
other areas is targeting people through community action by targeting 
people who are active in the community to join the Labour Party. 
 
How many branches are there working across Calderdale? 
 
Right, I’ve done a quick bit of arithmetic.  There are seventeen wards.  
There won’t be as many as seventeen because some of those are 
combined, so let’s say about twelve. 
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Has that had an effect on campaigning over recent years, if 
branches have had to combine? 
 
Well some combined branches have worked very well.  I mean the 
Town and Skircoat ward where we have a high level membership in 
Skircoat but no realistic chance of getting councillors there but we 
have got two councillors in Town ward.  They have combined and that 
seems to have worked well.  I think that is because we had one fairly 
strong Ward there anyway.  Two failing branches do not make one 
successful branch, that it fairly clear.  It can work well but the 
experience is patchy. 
 
What happens to the party after the election?  Are there steps to 
capitalise on the successes at the election to attract more new 
members? 
 
Certainly that is the theory but I don’t know that we have ever been as 
effective at that as we should have been.  Of course, an election is a 
good focus to get people involved and I think that the presence of the 
BNP has got people very motivated and it has been very negative in a 
lot of ways but I think that one thing that is positive a lot of people 
have got very excited because they want to stop the BNP.  Again I 
think that we could probably have capitalised upon it more than we 
have.  Certainly what we have seen is that if we can get out into a 
ward just after election and try and get those people who have been 
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actively involved in the Party.  It certainly is a strategy but I think that 
one of the downsides is that people are generally just tired and 
washed out. 
 
How long have you been a member? 
 
I have been active since I was sixteen, which a number of years ago.  
Over 30 years.  I have been consistently a member since 1981.  Over 
25 years. 
 
How long have you been a Councillor? 
Since 1990. 
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Interview with Councillor B, 30th April 2006 
 
How was the Liberal Democrat Party campaign organised? 
 
It is organised on a ward by ward basis and, of course, we have a 
central organisation which has developed a manifesto and has 
decided upon which seats are to be targeted, but within each ward it is 
largely up to the party members and councillors who live in each ward 
to organise and run the campaign. 
 
Do the local campaign decisions get made locally or do you get 
advice from the national level? 
 
We get loads of advice.  We get suggestions and artwork we can use 
but at the end of the day we do our own artwork and we have people 
in each branch but two or three people across Calderdale area who 
are very good at designing leaflets and artwork which is what you 
want.  Probably about six of us now and we tend to share ideas across 
the Borough. 
 
Whilst some parties base their campaigns contact with the people 
such as canvassing door to door and leafleting and other parties rely 
on getting their message through the media is there one of these 
specific attempts that the party seems to rely on? 
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We do an awful lot of door to door work. We do a lot of leaflets and we 
don’t  just do them at election time, we do them at other times as well 
to let people know what’s going on.  We do canvass but it is between 
leafleting.  I used to think our wards are quite big but my partner’s 
fighting one in Leeds which are twice the size.  The average 
Calderdale electorate is about 8,500 and the Leeds’ electorate about 
16,500. 
 
Has the party targeted specific wards in the area or do you 
campaign in every ward? 
 
We can’t campaign in every ward at the moment.  We are gradually 
moving out into different Wards.  This year we are targeting two or 
three more seats than we did a couple of years ago in the last 
election.  I think that we have got a realistic chance of gaining the 
target seats but it depends what happens to the Labour vote but yes 
we do have target wards and those are the ones that get the financial 
resources and the other wards don’t.  So if any candidate in a non-
target ward wants to spend their own money then that’s fine.  If we can 
help them out we will but on the whole we concentrate our resources 
where we think we can win.  Unfortunately that is becoming a larger 
number each year.  Finally two years ago we broke out of just having 
seats in Calder valley constituency and we actually got seats in Halifax 
as well and we are hoping to increase that number this year. 
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Has the BNP presence affected the party’s campaign? 
 
I don’t think so because I don’t believe that the BNP are targeting any 
of the seats that we are.  There is some evidence of BNP activity but 
they seem to be focussing very much on North Halifax and we are not.  
We simply don’t have the resources to do it this year, next year 
perhaps- we’ll see.   
 
Has the party being doing anything to reach the electorate 
through the local media? 
 
We keep on eye on the local website and we respond stuff that comes 
down.  We sometimes initiate information to the public that way.  We 
use the local papers.  We respond to invitations for local radio if they 
have but to be honest local radio isn’t a big feature at least it probably 
is in some of the ethnic minority communities but it is not for the 
majority an issue.  People do not listen very much.  In any event, local 
radio never seems to regard local policies so they have been very 
poor. 
 
How many volunteers do you have working in the campaign? 
It’s really very difficult to say.  We have got people who are leafleting, 
we have people who stuff envelopes, people who canvass.   
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Are you finding it more difficult in recent years to get volunteers 
or are you still able to rely on them? 
 
It is certainly more much difficult to get volunteers than it used to be.  
You have to be much more forceful in going out and finding them.  
Sometimes people just volunteer and during this election campaign 
people have volunteered out of the blue to put up posters or deliver 
leaflets.  But what we have often found is that people are very willing 
to help us to deliver leaflets, to canvass but will not join the party.   
People seem to think that is a really big step. 
 
Has there been a decline in party membership? 
 
The party around here has been pretty static for the last few years.  It 
goes up and down.  It is at a reasonable level at the moment.  I am 
pretty confident that at the moment it is slightly increasing.  At the “all 
out” elections two years ago we recruited an awful lot more people into 
the party because anyone wanted to stand for the Council had to join 
the Party.  You can’t stand for the Council if you’re not in the party.  So 
as we put up 51 people that increased the membership of the party 
and most of them have stayed. 
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How many branches are there working across Calderdale? 
 
There are probably about six branches but some are much more than 
one ward.  There are three single wards, a double ward and two 
others which are multiple wards. 
 
Does that effect the campaigning that can be done if they are 
multiple wards? 
 
No not really because we don’t stick rigidly to boundaries people will 
cross over.  Sometimes someone will have an action day here and 
people will help and then there will an action day somewhere else and 
people will go there.  It is important that the ward is the electoral unit 
and therefore we have to make sure that the right leaflets go to the 
right wards. 
 
What happens within the party after the election, are there steps 
to capitalise their success? 
 
We have a post mortem whether we have been successful or not.  We 
look to find things that we have done well and things that we have not 
done so well.  And immediately we ask who is going to fight the Ward 
next year and of course if we have a particularly success we naturally 
make it very widely known. 
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How long have you been a member of the Party? 
 
42 years. 
 
How long have you been a councillor in Calderdale? 
 
In Calderdale – I think that this is my 20th year.  I had a period of 12 
years then I had a period of 10 years off, for good behaviour, and I 
think I’m now in my 8th.  I got back on the Council in 1998 and when I 
step down I will have done 21 years.  
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Interview with councillor C, 1st May 2006 
 
 
Some parties base their campaign on personal contact with other 
people, such as door to door and leafleting.  Whilst other parties 
rely on getting their message through the media is there one 
method that the Conservative Party tends to use? 
 
We still try and base our campaigning on door to door contact, though 
nowadays this is not always possible.  Leafleting is the most 
productive means given the resources we have available.  It is the 
local party members who form the campaign.  We may get some 
guidance from Central Office but ultimately we are responsible for 
running the local campaign. 
 
 
Has the BNP presence affected the party’s campaign? 
From a personal experience, I haven’t had any dealings with the BNP 
as they do not have a presence in my ward.  They tend to have a 
strong support in the Illingworth and Mixenden ward. 
 
 
How many volunteers do you have working in the campaign? 
 
It is difficult to put a precise number on that. We have got people who 
only come and help us on election days and people who run their cars 
for us on election day.  I would say that I always try to add it up on 
election but there are a lot of people. 
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Are you finding it more difficult in recent years to get volunteers 
or are you still able to rely on them? 
 
I think it is generally the same people year in year out who volunteer. 
Certainly it is becoming more difficult to attract people to give up time, 
like I said, some will help out for a day but not many can give up a lot 
of time. 
 
Has there been a decline in party membership? 
I believe there has been a fall but this is reflected nationally and for all 
three major parties. 
 
How many branches are there working across Calderdale? 
 
We don’t have branches in every ward; I would say about 12 
branches.  This doesn’t mean wards will be ignored; we will still make 
sure we have some form of contact with every ward. 
 
What happens within the party after the election, are there steps 
to capitalise their success? 
We will of course examine the results, look to see where we have 
done well or not, if we poll well in a particular ward, we will then look to 
maintain that support the following year.  
 
How long have you been a member of the party? 
 
For over 30 years now, I have actively been involved with the 
Conservative party, I have been involved with Calderdale council for 
20 years. 
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